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This study uses the concept of the learning organization as a lens through which
to examine the education division of the World Bank. The Bank is the largest and
most influential single donor to education in the developing world and has been
active in the field for over 30 years. It is currently going through a period of
review and self-evaluation which makes it timely to consider what sort of
organization it is or might become.
The view taken in this study is that organizations which learn will be more
effective in what they undertake. The Bank has struggled for years with a
reputation as a technicist, positivist institution which believes in market
economics as the main vehicle for national development and that formal schooling
is best conceived of as the tool of such development. How far this reputation is
deserved became a key issue for examination in the study.
The study begins with a discussion of the rationale for the task
undertaken, lays out the aims of the exercise and briefly discusses the research
questions to be addressed. Theoretical and conceptual orientations and research
methodology are indicated.
In Chapter Two the concept of the organization is explored in some depth
with particular emphasis on the notion of organizations which learn. The
literature is examined and the characteristics of learning organizations are
adduced.
Chapter Three discusses the World Bank's educational development division.
Its strengths and weaknesses are outlined and its history briefly traced.
Research methodology is the concern of Chapter Four. Qualitative methods
based on grounded theory and hermeneutics are the focus and the research
techniques adopted for the study are discussed and justified.
The following two chapters present the data gathered, first from
documentary sources and then from interview subjects. The final chapter
summarises the findings of the research and draws conclusions. The most
important of these is that the theory of the learning organization is insufficiently
explicated in the literature. A more refined model of learning organizations is
presented as the conclusion of the study.
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THE WORLD BANK AS A LEARNING ORGANIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW THE
BANK FUNCTIONS AS AN EDUCATIONAL LENDER TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO TIlE STUDY
In times of change learners shall
inherit	 the	 earth,	 while	 the
learned	 are	 beautifully	 equipped
for a world that no longer exists.
James Thurber
1.1. Introduction
This study takes as its focus the workings of the World Bank in its role as
lender to international educational development. The Bank has become an
increasingly important actor in international education and, although its actual
provision of funding is not enormous (20% of all lending to education in the
developing world in the 1980s), its influence is all-pervasive (George and
Sabelli,1994). This overwhelming influence has come about for a number of
reasons. Perhaps the most important is the linking of the Bank's developmental
advice with the restructuring of the economies of recipient countries. In short,
the Bank lends where it has achieved agreement to an overall shift in the
economic policy of the recipient country (World Bank, 1995:152). Hence, its lending
to education tends to follow more comprehensive developmental strategies. It has
become accepted that although the Bank's loans to education per se may be
comparatively modest they are always accompanied by more profound and far-
reaching interventions.
Given that the Bank is the most highly influential actor in educational
development for the so-called Third World it is not surprising that its operations
have been the subject of much criticism. Far from being universally perceived
as developmental, the Bank is often characterised as anti-developmental, or at
least the promoter of economic models of human development which are based on
a narrow perception of the best paths for change (Buchert and King, 1995). This
study will show that the World Bank does operate from a narrow ideological
commitment to market economics; a view which is buttressed by inadequate
gathering, analysis and use of knowledge within and beyond the organization. Its
view of improving or accelerating national development can be summed up as the
creation of market economies which will initially have some human fall-out but
which will eventually take off in the classic Rostowian model of thirty years ago.
The Bank's view of economics is not the main focus of the present study but any
examination of its educational policies must be set within the framework of its
broader activities.
The central concern of this study is whether the Bank learns from its past
experience in its involvement with education. The concept of the learning
organization ( Senge, 1990; Dixon, 1994) will be used to assess the World Bank's
capacity for learning and change. Insights will be developed from the learning
organization literature against which to compare the Bank's performance. Bank
"insiders" as well as critics of the Bank's operations will provide data on the
extent to which the organization learns. Major educational policy documents
produced by the World Bank since 1974 will also be examined for evidence of
learning by the organization. It is expected that the study will yield a useful
analysis of the Bank's processes of self evaluation and reflection leading to
conclusions concerning its effectiveness as a learning organization. A central
issue in this analysis will be the Bank's approach to knowledge and information
gathering, processing and dissemination.
1.2. Background and rationale for the study
As noted above, the World Bank has become the dominant influence in lending for
educational development in the developing countries. The International Bank for
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Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), to give the Bank its full title, came into
being in June, 1946. The IBRD is complemented by the International Development
Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). All three bodies
are referred to by Jones (1992) as the World Bank 'group' and in this study the
term World Bank or 'the Bank' refers to this group of organizations. The specific
functions of each agency are dealt with in Chapter Three below.
Given the Bank's dominance, a significant event occurred in 1995 with the
publication of their policy document entitled Priorities and Strategies for
Education. In the past, the Bank has from time to time produced Education Sector
Policy papers. The first was issued in 1971 and the last in 1980. Subsequent to
the latter date the Bank has tended to produce policy documents on specific
sectors within education, rather than a comprehensive world-view. Hence the 1995
paper which had been preceded by a 1994 paper entitled Higher Education: The
Lessons of Experience. Papers on technical and vocational education, the
relationship between nutrition, health and learning, the financing of education
and enhancing women's participation in education all appeared between 1980 and
1995. Latterly, sub-titles inclusive of the term "learning from experience" have
become more common (see World Bank, 1994a;1994b). The publication of so much
policy-related material by the Bank over the past 15 or so years, the rise in its
involvement with education from its first loan to Tunisia in 1962 to the US$1.487
billion loaned in 1990 (World Bank, 1995:146) and its professed interest in
learning from experience make this an appropriate time to assess whether
'changes in behaviour which are more or less permanent' characterise the Bank
as an organization. This aim is made particularly cogent in the light of the
following statement referring to the Bank as an organization
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which at bottom brooks no opposition or contradiction and
which claims a monopoly on Truth.
(George and Sabelli, 1994:5)
This accusation is made even more damning when the view of truth taken is akin
to that criticised by Dixon (1994:1) as consisting in a thorough grasp of what an
expert knows. The premises of this conception of knowing are that there is a
right answer, that this is known and that if we identify those who know and
apply their answers then our problems can be solved. As will be argued in this
thesis, the view of knowing embraced by true learning organizations is somewhat
different and is illustrated by Dixon as:
1. There are many right answei-s...there are many ways to reach
the same goal.
2. People who are concerned about and affected by a problem are
capable of developing useful knowledge to resolve it.
3. Learning occurs in a context of work and praxis, and results from
intentional effort.
Dixon (1994:2)
1.3. Aims of the study
The study has a straightforward aim - to assess the extent to which the World
Bank is a learning organization. This assessment will be carried out by four main
means, interrogation of documents produced by the Bank, examination of
published critiques of the Bank's development as an organization lending for
educational development, interviewing of Bank staff involved in policy
development and project lending and interviewing of critics of the Bank's
activities. The concept of the learning organization will be clarified and distilled
from alternative but complementary theories to be found in the literature.
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1.4. Research questions
The main research questions to be addressed are:
a) How does the Bank function as an organization, particularly
in terms of its acquisition, distribution and processing of
knowledge ?
b) In what ways has the Bank changed these practices over the
past 25 years ?
c) Do these changes match with the characteristics of a
learning organization ?
d) Does the concept of the learning organization have
relevance to better understanding of the Bank?
e) Is the concept of the learning organization adequate as a
theoretical tool or lens ?
These questions are extended and expanded in Chapter Four below and are
applied exclusively to that section of the World Bank group which deals with
educational development in the developing world.
1.5. Theoretical and conceptual orientation
In seeking clarification of the term 'learning organization' the researcher's
experience paralleled that of Sackmann (1991) in her investigation of
'organizational culture'. She notes that the term culture figures large in the
business world and the literature suggests that corporate culture influences an
organization's success. Yet Sackmann's investigation of the term revealed that
'empirically based knowledge about culture in organizational settings is rather
scarce and spotty' (Sackmann, 1991:1). She goes on to illustrate that there are
almost as many definitions and understandings of culture as there are writers
on the topic. Further, she notes that to some extent these differences have
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arisen from the importation of the topic from anthropology. In the same way, the
'learning organization' is open to a great deal of variety in interpretation, partly
due to its importation from the psychology of individual human learning. A major
problem with the present study has been the pinning down of a very elusive
central concept. The concept of the learning organization has been implicit in the
literature on management for many years but became more explicit with the
publication of Senge's (1990) book The Fifth Discipline. Senge suggests that
organizations which are to succeed do more than merely adapt to changes in the
environment. In his terms, they become generative as well as adaptive in that
they maintain a creative tension between current reality and their vision for the
future. Other significant writers in the field such as Whiston (1994), Morgan
(1986) and Dixon (1994) develop alternative but complementary theories of the
learning organization. They have certain characteristics in common - notably that
those organizations which are to survive, grow and become more effective must
operate like sentient organisms; they must learn. This learning is no longer a
matter of encouraging members of an organization to prepare themselves for the
work place in the traditional way. Rather, employees must 'learn their way out
of the work problems they address' (Dixon, 1994:4). Dixon goes on to argue that
learning creates equals, not subordinates. Management's control tasks have given
way to facilitating or creating the environment in which employees can interpret,
synthesize, analyse and use information (Dixon, 1994:4). Perelman (1984) suggests
that by the turn of the century, three-quarters of the jobs in the U.S. economy
will involve creating and processing knowledge, a key process in learning.
The appeal of the idea of a learning organization is multiple. First,
organizations, especially in education, will be encouraged that they do not have
to merely wait for things to happen to them. They can be proactive or
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generative. Secondly, likening an organization to an individual human organism
provides a rich field of metaphor (see Morgan, 1986). As Hoyle (1995) has
suggested, the concept of the learning organization also provides possible
solutions to the 'hour glass' problem of the narrow linkage between management
activities and the functions of the organization.
In addition it will be argued that the concept provides a valuable lens
through which the effectiveness of an organization may be assessed. The
argument of this study is that a powerful organization is at work in the world
exercising great power and influence over educational policies which will affect
the lives of millions. How does this organization function ? What processes and
procedures ensure that the organization is reflective, adaptive, generative ? Are
these the qualities and characteristics most appropriate to an international
development agency ? What values does the organization embrace anyway ? Are
they simplistic and positivistic, embracing the view that educational development
problems are merely technical issues requiring technical solutions - getting to
know what the experts know ? Are they more sophisticated, revealing a deeper
understanding of what the real world is like and how it works ? The concept of
the learning organization has been selected as a useful tool for digging a little
deeper into how the World Bank's educational arm functions.
Hoyle (1995) refers to the learning organization as a metaphor, arguing that
a metaphor captures in a word or two some essential aspect of what is a complex
phenomenon, an organization. Hoyle suggests that "any metaphor is but one way
of apprehending the totality of an organization and different views of the
complexity can be achieved by deploying more than one metaphor" (Hoyle, 1995:1).
Morgan (1986) devotes a substantial book to the exploration of various metaphors
of the organization - as machines, as organisms, as brains, cultures, political
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systems and so on. Aspects of his analysis are represented in this study as the
Bank could be viewed through the lens of any of Morgan's metaphors,particularly
that of the instrument of domination, or even as a psychic prison for its staff.
Suffice it to say that whether the learning organization is a metaphor or merely
a descriptor, various of its interpretations are used in this study as tools for
examining the organization called the World Bank. It should also be noted that
an important dimension of the literature on the learning organization reflects a
concern with the metaphysical aspects of such organizations. There are numerous
suggestions within the literature that 'something extra' happens when the true
learning organization gets under way (see Dixon, 1994 and Argyris,1993). This
approach is linked in the study with the concept of organizational culture.
1.6. Research Methodology
Research methods employed in this study are semi-structured interviews and
documentary analysis. In themselves, these are merely approaches and must be
located in a methodology which itself must be grounded in an epistemology. If
there is a hierarchy implicit in the terms methods, methodology and epistemology
then methods are at the lowest level. They are merely the techniques utifised.
Whether they are suitable techniques depends on the methodology selected - that
is, the justificatory arguments put forward on behalf of the methods chosen.
These arguments depend on the epistemology underpinning the study - the view
of what constitutes "warrantable knowledge" in Bryman's phrase (Bryman, 1988).
John Vaizey ( 1972:14) has argued, "If a thing cannot be measured then it
probably does not exist" - a positivist epistemology if ever there were one. Other
social scientists would argue that multiple realities exist, not one Archimedian
point against which the world might be levered or measured. Given this
epistemological view, grounded theory has been taken as a methodological
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approach. Grounded theory demands that the data generated in a study supply
theoretical understanding. A more positivist view suggests that selected theory
is the starting point to test which relevant data are gathered. Glaser and
Strauss, the fathers of grounded theory, would argue that such starting points
are restrictive especially where understanding is sought rather than numerical
analysis. Critics of grounded theory would characterise the approach as lacking
rigour and being too dependent on the subjective views and opinions of the
researcher. Therefore, to strengthen the grounded theory approach this study
includes hermeneutics in its analysis of the data gathered. Flermeneutics, a
method of interpreting data, emphasises the process of developing a bridge or
rapprochement between present understanding and the world we seek to
appraise. This process is referred to as "fusion of horizons" in the literature on
hermeneutics. Within this process there are appeals to evidence, there is testing
and criticism of hypotheses (Follesdal, 1979).
In summary It can be said that the present study seeks understanding of
phenomena rather than measurement. It accepts that knowledge springs from the
interaction of the object or phenomena being researched and the culturally
shaped researcher. Objectivity and subjectivity are not opposite poles on a
continuum. The best that can be hoped for is a form of objectivity in which the
work has been opened up to criticism. The evidence presented will have
withstood serious scrutiny (Phfflips, 1993). The starting point for the study is
the concept of the learning organization. If grounded theory and hermeneutics
are to be applied to the investigation it may well be that a new view of the
learning organization emerges.
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CHAPTER 2: ThEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ORIENTATION; THE CONCEPT
OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION




It was noted In introducing this study that the World Bank as an organization
involved in educational development was the focus of attention. It is therefore
necessary to examine the concept of an organization before much further analysis
can be engaged in. The literature on organizations is extensive and eclectic. A
summary of its main concepts and principles follows in section 2.2. below.
Even more important for the study's analysis of the World Bank's activities
is the concept of the learning organization. The idea that organizations can and
indeed must learn in order to survive and grow is of relatively recent origin.
That individuals can and do learn is a commonplace. The idea that an organization
per se may have a learning capacity in addition to the sum of the learning
capacity demonstrated by the individuals within it is a challenging proposition
explored further in 2.3. below.
If learning organizations exist, by what criteria can they be identified ?
Are there common traits or characteristics which identify all learning
organizations, or Is the concept more elastic than this? The chapter then
examines how learning organizations might be identified.
Finally, this chapter raises the fundamental research question of where to
look for evidence of the existence of the characteristics of a learning
organization in a set-up like the World Bank. In short, it may be quite possible
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to identify plausible characteristics of a learning organization and apply these
insights to the organization under investigation. However, if the researcher is
looking in the wrong places or at the wrong kind of evidence then 'not proven'
becomes the only acceptable verdict.
2.2. The notion of tue organization
2.2.1. What is an organization?
Argyris and Schon (1978) suggest that a group becomes an organization when its
members develop procedures for:
- making decisions in the name of the collective
- delegating to individuals the authority to act for the
collective
- setting boundaries between the collective and the rest
of the world.
The term organization as a descriptor for groups of individuals clustered
together for some common purpose, whether it be an army, a small business or
a political party, is relatively unproblematic. If the term is broadened to include
the idea that the activities of the group are rational, goal-directed, systematic
and efficiently managed then important distinctions between organizations may be
drawn. Organizations cannot be defined fully in terms of their structure. Context
and function become important.
2.2.2.How do organizations function ?
Morgan suggests that organizations arise
.out of a conscious decision on the part of an individual or group to
achieve certain goals through the bringing together in a disciplined fashion




It is further argued that a characteristic of organizations is that the whole
becomes more than merely the sum of the parts. As Morgan (1990) puts it, the
act of coming together into an organization increases our capacities geometrically,
not merely arithmetically. This assertion provides justification for a view of the
learning organization which is more metaphysical than metaphorical ( see 2.3.4.
below).
Morgan goes on to distinguish organizations from social institutions and
social movements. Organizations are characterised by constant monitoring of
means and ends, rare in other social Institutions such as the family. Social
movements in Giddens' (1984) terms are enterprises devoted to the establishment
of a new order of life. They do not operate with fixed locales and 'positioning
within them does not have the clarity of definition associated with "roles"
(Giddens, 1984:204). Given these definitions there is no doubt that the World Bank
qualifies as an organization in Morgan's terms.
Implicit in the definition of an organization is its function in terms of
bringing individuals and resources together in a controlled way in order to
achieve goals unattainable by the individual alone. Sociologists have long been
interested in how the organizations we now have arose, how they differ from
each other and what alternative types of organization we can invent. Morgan
(1990:6) refers to these as the historical, anthropological and critical sensitivities.
The present study falls clearly into the last category in the sense that the
analysis presented seeks through its critique of the Bank to invent alternatives
within the organization. Reed (1992) sees the development of formal bureaucratic
organizations as a key development in the transition from earlier social relations
to industrial societies. The bureaucratic organization became 'a primary
institutional carrier of modernization' (Reed, 1992:1). As an outcome of the
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development of organizations in society the instrumental rationality characteristic
of them has extended Into every area of life, economic, social, political and
cultural. Bureaucratic organizations have become the main institutional expression
of instrumental rationality.
2.2.3. How are organizations analyzed?
Morgan argues that the central issue in the study of organizations is the tension
between individuals with their own goals and interests and the organization as
a structure (Morgan, 1990:7). Even this can be misleading as there is no such
thing as the organization without its individual actors who induce system-like
qualities in the organization. Morgan goes on:
the key issue remains the way in which organizations seek to control the
potential disorganization within themselves that is inescapable from their
nature as socially constructed phenomena, and to utilize human resources
in a directed and co-ordinated fashion in order to achieve objectives.
(Morgan, 1990:8)
As Handy puts it:
organizations are political systems, not simply collections
of individuals;..., the relationships.., grouped under
power are the principal linking mechanisms which turn
those collections of individuals into purposive systems.
(Handy,1985:21)
People, power and politics are identified by Handy as key terms in understanding
organizations.
Any study of the notion of the organization demands an acknowledgement
of the classical theorists. This should not delay the present study too much as
it is not the writer's purpose to 'prove' the validity of the concept of the
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organization. That organizations exist as social phenomena is a given. However,
classical views, such as those of Marx, who held that all organizations need to
be understood In terms of the underlying class conflicts inherent In capitalism,
or those of Weber, must be touched upon. Max Weber's concept of the rational-
legal bureaucracy as the fundamental change agent which gave rise to capitalism
and industrialism is central to his sociology. The rise of the rational-legal
bureaucracy can be traced to its technical superiority over other forms of
organization and Weber likens it to the superiority of the machine over non-
mechanical approaches to production (Morgan, 1990:10).
Later theorists such as Merton, Gouldner and Perrow built on Weber's work
but focused more sharply on limited, empirically based questions rather than on
broad generalizations. Researchers in a more quantitative tradition, notably the
Aston Group in Britain, argued that Weber's standard criteria for bureaucracies
did not always combine in the same way. Their development of quantitative
measures of organizational structure and their correlation with aspects of
environment and performance to measure the 'fit' of an organization with its
environment, provided additional perspectives on the study of organizations. The
comparative study of organizations benefited particularly from the principles
adduced by the Aston Group and U.S. writers like Lawrence and Lorsch (1967).
The apparently rigorous quantitative approach of the Aston Group and its
adherents persuaded some authorities to claim that it was the only way to study
organizations. In fact, according to Morgan (1990), the joint influence of U.S.
studies of bureaucracy and the work of the Aston Group created a sub-discipline
within which organizations could be studied in their own right rather than as
sub-sets of wider social analyses.
In reaction to the glut of quantitative material produced in organizational
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theory in the 1960s and 1970s, more radical and critical theorists emerged.
Writers like Burrell and Morgan (1979), Cooper and Burrell (1988) and Clegg and
Dunkerley (1979) attacked the current orthodoxy in a number of ways. In his
later work, Clegg has expanded his concern for issues of class, control and
political economy by examining the importance of different social settings for
class formation and organizational transformation (Clegg, 1994). The very title of
Clegg's 1994 book, Frameworks of Power, ifiustrates the focus of much current
writing on organizations and the dominance of the work and ideas of Foucault
(1980) in present analyses of organizations. The theoretical arguments remain
powerful between the more orthodox and the more critical writers, leaving the
sociology of organizations in something of a state of flux (Morgan,1990:13).
Reed (1992) provides a useful summary of current dominant views of how
organizations may be conceptualized. Each of the analytical frameworks reviewed
by Reed focuses on a different problem to provide a basis for their conceptual
development. Systems theory is mainly concerned with the adaptation of internal
organizational structures to a changing external reality (Morgan, 1986). The
matching of internal design to external conditiOns wifi lead to maximum operational
efficiency and strategic effectiveness. The negotiated order perspective begins
farther back. Instead of taking pre-existing structures for granted the social
processes through which organizations are constructed and maintained are the
focus of attention. This view presumes that structures have to be worked at and
continually reconstructed through social interaction. The power and domination
framework focuses on the political and economic realities through which
organizational control is maintained. The starting point is the mechanisms of
control necessary to regulate conflicts of interest. These mechanisms are seen as
reflections of ideological domination and economic power at work in the macro-
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context. The cultural / symbolic framework rejects the reductionism implicit in
the power and domination perspective. Culture is what the organization is, not
what it has. The belief systems and ideologies of such an organization sustain a
collective sense of identity. In this respect it sets itself apart from structural
frameworks which tend to reify the organization. Rather, it offers a view of
organizations which emphasises the descriptive and explanatory significance of
cultural enactment, social constructions reproduced through their members' modes
of thinking and acting. Symbolic creation and cultural enactment become 'the
constitutive processes of organizational existence' (Reed,1992:121). The practice
perspective draws attention to the mechanisms by which social agencies and the
resources that feed into organizations come together to create coherent and
viable collectives. The explanatory significance of wider structures of economic
and political power in regulating organizations is an important focus of this
perspective. Reed summarises his analysis by illustrating the development of
theory on organizational analysis since the 1950s. He shows the shift from
orthodox systems thinking to perspectives derived from the viewpoint of those
who are subject to the control of dominant groups. The struggle for power and
control has become a focus for analysis. The social construction of organizational
reality is seen as the primary point of reference. The environment is no longer
seen as an independent process that imposes itself on decision makers and the
structures they invent. It is now regarded as a resource to be manipulated and
interpreted by dominant groups within organizations.
2.2.4. Why are organizations important?
The development of formal organizations was a key factor In the transition
towards industrialization and modernization (Reed, 1992). The combination of
cognitive instrumentality, moral anonymity and technical effectiveness which
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secure a social order based on rational calculation and control characterize
bureaucratic organization. However, this clinical analysis bears only a partial
likeness to reality. The arguments of writers like Reed suggest that bureaucratic
organization hardly existed before Western industrialism transformed the world.
However, the system of governance of the ancient Chinese, the highly
bureaucratized Egyptian and Roman empires and even the early Christian church
all carried the hallmarks of what would be understood in modern terms as
organizations. Reed's main point is that the notion of organization has become
synonymous with modern social life in all aspects. Whether we consider the
transition from local herbal remedies to the National Health Service or from
education at mother's knee to modern schooling, the organization has largely
taken over as the context within much of what we do is conducted. Yet the
instrumental rationality which typifies bureaucratic organizations is much less
rigid and predictable than Reed would have us believe. In short, organizations
form a patchwork which surround us and incorporate us from the Welfare State
to the golf club or the international charity raising money for the blind.
Bureaucracy, in its true rather than pejorative sense, is the preferred mode of
functioning for these organizations. Instrumental rationality is implicit in the
functioning processes. But organizations may fail. They may rise and fall. They
may not always accomplish their goals. Their usefulness may diminish. They may
be misguided. They may be misdirected. They may change and reconstitute
themselves. They may be less predictable than was hoped for. The World Bank
is often regarded as monolithic but the same caveats must apply to any
discussion of its functioning as an organization. Because they are important,
organizations need to be analyzed, monitored, subjected to scrutiny. Ways must
be found to challenge them and to improve them.
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2.3. The concept of the learning organization.
This study is based on the premise that something called a learning organization
can be shown to exist. That the literature is full of references to the learning
organization is insufficient evidence for its validity, in the sense that the term
has some real or metaphorical meaning (see Table 1.below). First then some space
must be devoted to an analysis of what is meant by the learning organization.
The Immediate starting point must be a discussion of the differences
between an organization which is full of individuals with the capacity to learn
and an organization which is thought to be able to learn independently of or in
addition to the sum of individual learning within it. There is little debate about
the validity of the first type of organization and much good work has been done
in organizational development by encouraging individuals within organizations to
maximise their learning opportunities and potential. Greater difficulty is
experienced when discussing the second type of organization, difficulties which
are analogous to the debate concerning the 'ethos' of a school, the 'culture' of
an organization, or more demandingly, whether computers can actually think for
themselves, independently of their hardware capabifities and the software
introduced into them. Argyris and Schon go so far as to state:
there is no organizational learning without individual learning, and that
individual learning is a necessary but insufficient condition for a-ganizati'inal
learning.
(Argyris and Schon,1978:20)
Dixon (1994:34) takes this assertion a little further. She defines learning, in an
adaptation from Koib (1984) as
.interpreting what we experience in the world; we each create our own
unique interpretation; the meaning we create mediates our actions.
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Using the work of McClellan, Dixon goes on to discuss the relationship among the
private meaning structures of individuals, the accessible meaning structures,
which they may make available to others, and collective meaning structures which
are those learned elements which 'organizational members hold jointly with other
members of the organization' (Dixon, 1994:39). Her construction of a learning
organization Is based on a deep interaction between these structures which she
illustrates as concentric circles, the collective being at the centre, the private
at the periphery. A key concept for Dixon is:
Organizational learning is strengthened by making more of
individuals' private meaning structures accessible so that
they can influence other members, as well as by making the
collective meaning structures accessible so that they can be tested and
altered. In either situation the need is to make the meaning structures
accessible to others so they can be exchanged and examined. To accomplish
that requires systematic processes, a culture that supports collective
learning, and skills and knowledge that facilitate collective learning.
(Dixon, 1994:43)
Dixon seems to suggest that given the right conditions any organization can
become a learning organization, one which is 'distinguished by its capacity to
create knowledge (my emphasis) through the transformation of experience', to
paraphrase Koib (1984). Indeed, she states that by following a specified
organizational learning cycle, organizations can transform themselves
(Dixon,1994:8). So far, so unexceptionable. But Dixon's approach does not explicitly
suggest that organizations as collectives necessarily learn for themselves. She
gets states:
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When a critical mass of individuals have altered their meaning
structures, the new meaning structures become collective.
(Dixon, 1994:41)
This statement is somewhat akin to Stephen Jay Could's assertion that, 'change
occurs in large leaps following a slow accumulation of stresses that a system
resists until it reaches the breaking point', (Gould, 1980). In other words, both
authorities suggest that an in-built will or force is at work to bring about
change. This metaphysical issue is picked up in section 2.5. below.
Learning is broadly defined as a change in behaviour which is more or less
permanent. Change and learning are not necessarily synonymous in the
individual's psychology. This is true for organizations. It is possible for an
organization to change - by being privatized for example, yet to learn very little
from the experience. Therefore It must be argued that change alone does not
produce learning. Dixon would certainly agree with this. She suggests that
learning only occurs in an organization if a structured organizational learning
cycle is in place (Dixon, 1994:70). A useful diagram is presented by Dixon in
which she combines a learning cycle with an experiential cycle. Key stages in the
cycle include the widespread generation of information, the integration of new or
local information into the organization, the collective interpretation of information
and the authority to act on the interpreted meaning (Dixon 1994:70). Explicit in
Dixon's schema are the collection of Information by primary users from multiple
sources, analysis of mistakes and successes, unimpeded flow of information, multi-
skilling of staff, everything being open to question, no penalties for risks and
'profit' sharing in its broadest sense. Her diagram is reproduced as Figure 1 on
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offers more than a formula for better functioning. There are key issues for
organizational culture implicit in such statements as the creation of knowledge
by experiment, what she refers to as the 'what if ?'strategy. Even more important
for an organization like the World Bank is Dixon's requirement for rewards for
accurate reporting rather than expected Information. The availability of multiple
perspectives is seen by Dixon as crucial in the collective interpretation of
information. As will be seen in Chapter 3 below, this represents a major problem
in current Bank functioning. Dixon's approach offers a rich model for analysis
of the Bank and wifi be returned to when other writers who have useful insights
into what is meant by a learning organization are discussed.
Senge (1990) goes so far as to say that organizations only learn as much
as the individuals within them learn. He describes learning organizations as:
organizations where people continually expand their capacity to create the
results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking
are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are
continually learning how to learn together.
(Senge. 1 990:1 5)
This Is more of a formula for getting a company moving and indeed, his title of
"The Fifth Discipline" clearly focuses on management's task in developing a
learning organization. Whiston (1994) on the other hand, takes a far more
technological view of the learning organization. If Senge is more concerned with
democratizing the work place such that the 'collective genius' of the organization
is utilized to the full and that all members are engaged in developing the
governing ideas, Whiston is far more interested in developing what he calls
'spare capacity' in Individuals and the organization. Only when spare capacity
has been created is there room for organizational learning to occur. Senge's work
22
0
is based heavily on a humanistic model with recurring resonances from John
Dewey. Negotiated orders and cultural/symbolic organizations would appear to be
his preferred environments. Whiston is a product of the cybernetic age and his
model reflects this clearly with its emphasis on algorithms, channel capacity and
information processing. Morgan (1986) examines a number of metaphors for
organizations as brains, as organisms, as machines and so on. One of his most
persuasive models is his image of an organization as flux and transformation. This
metaphor has obvious connections with the concept of the learning organization
as developed in this study. Characteristics of both permanence and change are
to be found in such organizations (Morgan, 1986: 233ff).
2.4. Defining values and typical practices
In analyzing the selected literature on the concept of the learning organization,
two important dimensions present themselves as characteristic of these entities,
whether metaphorical or metaphysical. First are what may be termed the 'Defining
Values', those principles by which the organization lives and which ifiuminate all
aspects of its functioning. Secondly, learning organizations are characterized by
'Typical Practices', those activities which are integral to the operation of a
learning organization and which distinguish it from less effective organizations.
These dimensions are ifiustrated in Table 1 on page 24 below. This analysis does
not seek to reduce the concept to a formula in the sense that any organization
displaying these characteristics automatically becomes a learning organization,
reminiscent of trait theories of leadership. Rather, the characteristics described
are presented as a 'cognitive map' or set of signposts against which
organizations might measure progress. An important aspect of this theorizing is
that in some cases the principles are apparently contradictory, both between the
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2.5. Summarizing the characteristics of learning organizations
Defining values themselves may be summarised from Senge, Whiston and Morgan
and Dixon as involving reflectivity, coherence and positive orientation. Senge and
Morgan are particularly strong on reflectivity, arguing that openness and
reflectivity are the norms in learning organizations and that reflection on norms
and subsequent self-criticism are important values in such organizations.
Coherence figures in both writers' analyses and also in the work of Whiston.
Whiston suggests that 'patterned performance' creates the space for spare
capacity, that algorithms which 'guarantee' an answer by means of a formula,
replace heuristics or 'rule of thumb' solutions to problems. In consonance with
this Senge suggests that structural and systemic issues become more important
in the learning organization than events or patterns of behaviour. More important
stifi are the attempts by learning organizations to address their constraints and
limitations, to define and challenge them. To do this the 'collective genius' of the
organization is harnessed by design and at all levels. Defining values are built
into the organization so that coherence of purpose and process is commonplace.
Coherence is further enhanced through the design of structures and strategies
which will clearly embody institutional purposes. Positive orientation is
demonstrated by using negative events and legitimate errors as learning
opportunities. Spare capacity is deliberately created and goals emerge rather
than being imposed. Learning organizations view the operational situation as
complex and problematic. They expect challenges and difficulties. As Dixon in
particular emphasises, the use of knowledge and information becomes a key factor
In effective organizational learning.
These defining values are open to a good deal of debate. There are, for
example, inherent contradictions in allowing goals to emerge whilst building
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defining values into the organization. Those values must be constantly under
review whilst maintaining structures and strategies which embody institutional
purpose. An examination of the typical practices of learning organizations may
serve to clarify these apparent contradictions.
Typical practices of learning organizations may be categorised as involving
democratization,creativity, feedback and the development of specific techniques.
Democratization appears as a strong characteristic in learning organizations as
perceived by Morgan and Senge. This view reflects Dixon's model of the sharing
of private, accessible and collective meaning structures (Dixon, 1994:37). Learning
organizations typically engage all members in developing governing ideas.
Creative ideas are developed everywhere In the organization in advance of
problem solving. Strategic thinking is developed at all levels. Creativity in
learning organizations is encouraged through practices which integrate thinking
and acting at all levels, rather than leaving the 'brains' of the organization to
think whilst the 'hands' do the work. New ways of looking at the world are
encouraged in learning organizations and differing viewpoints or constructive
conflict are embraced for problem solving. A key practice in true learning
organizations is the building In of continuous feedback from the organization's
activities.
Whiston's (1994) more technological approach to the learning organization
is rich in specific techniques. He argues that task diversification raises
performance levels and that selective attention is a valuable technique in
learning. Allied to these ideas is the notion that parallel information processing
is more effective than sequential approaches, good news for all those with
countless unfinished tasks on their desks and in their diaries. Whiston
emphasises the importance of communication in organizations and this aspect of
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organizational learning has long been recognized as vital. The organization which
does not pay attention to issues like information overload or underload, rates of
information absorption and the 'channel capacity' of key staff will underachieve
in learning terms.
This latter section of the argument has moved into the realm of principles
and techniques by which a certain type of organization may be achieved. As
noted earlier, Dixon (1994) has a neat schema for this, suggesting that the
breaking down of barriers between the private, the accessible and the collective
meaning structures in organizations wifi bring about organizational learning. This
process will be facilitated by the widespread generation of information within and
for the organization, the integration of new or local information into the
organizational context and the collective interpretation of information. The final
process for ensuring organizational learning will be the arrangement of authority
at afl levels to take responsible action based on that interpreted meaning (see
Figure 1 on page 20 above).
A genre of management texts has grown up somewhere between the
academic offering and the station book-stall type of management text. Catchy
titles like The Rise of the Expert Company (Feigenbaum et.al. 1988) and Liberation
Management (Peters, 1992) offer rules of thumb and case histories plus sound
references to research and theory. But such rules of thumb, exemplars and
strategies need to be clearly located within broader frameworks. Referring again
to Table 1 above, it can be seen that the twin keys of participation and
information characterise the literature examined.
However, another issue to be addressed lies beyond the metaphorical use
of the term 'learning organization' in the form of what has been called the
metaphysical position on learning organizations. Dixon appears to believe in the
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'something extra' theory of learning organizations. For example, she states:
When we reframe learning as a collective as well as an individual
capability, we amplify its power.
(Dixon, 1994:xlx)
This appears to go beyond mere techniques for mobilising workers to be more
orientated towards learning. Hoyle (1995) takes issue with the 'something extra'
theorists. He states,
Organizational learning can be unhelpful if it leads to the
attribution to the organization of system properties which are
in some ways independent of the members.
(Hoyle, 1995:3)
In the same paper Hoyle goes on to argue that,
Insofar as organizations are systems they are such only to a limited extent.
They are ultimately human inventions.....there are no compelling grounds
for hypothesizing a system which is independent of human agency.
(Hoyle, 1995:5)
In this Hoyle may well be right. Yet the metaphysical camp does not envisage
learning taking place Independent of human agency. Perhaps the nearest
comparison we can make is to what the psychologists refer to as 'Insight' or
more popularly, the 'Aha!' experience. Suddenly, that which was not known or
understood is apprehended. Ratiocination has not produced understanding but
some combination of events has occurred leading to the breakthrough. In a
somewhat similar way, psychologists have sought explanation for what appears to
happen spontaneously within a crowd, or even a mob. Human agency is there.
What happens is not independent of it. Individuals may be identified who were
prime movers, but the question remains of why a crowd suddenly supports,
28
rejects, attacks, protects, turns violent, becomes docile. There is something more
than the sum of individual motivations and desires at work.
2.6. UndersLan ding learning organizations
So far this discussion has looked at the concept of the organization, has
reviewed contrasting theoretical approaches to the learning organization and has
now to address the question of whether organizations learn or whether their
individual members learn. The five models put forward by Reed suggest widely
differing environments within which organizations may operate. Within an
organization different sections or units may reflect different organizational types.
A university for example probably includes all five. Learning organizations may
be similarly disparate although Dixon suggests that democratization of knowledge
within organizations is the key factor in making them learning organizations
(Dixon, 1994:129). That learning organizations do not simply happen seems to be
clear from the earlier analysis. They have to be worked at and there are many
useful models and techniques available. What remains unresolved is the major
issue of the 'something extra'. Successful learning organizations do seem to have
an additional element in them which goes beyond the sum of the parts. A recent
(December 1995) BBC 2 programme on the John Lewis Partnership explored the
peculiar nature of that organization, the largest successful commercial experiment
in 'capitalism with a human face' ever attempted. There is something special about
being a partner in the John Lewis organization although the programme made
clear that not all employees were equally enamoured of this specialness. Dixon
quotes the case of an American company, owned by Ralph Stayer, who used the
analogy of geese in flight to redirect his company. 'The geese, he surmised, have
a common goal. Each takes turn leading, and most importantly, each of the geese
is responsible for its own performance' (Dixon, 1994:61). There is something more
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In the migratory behaviour of geese than the actions of a set of individuals. In
his history of the Rifle Brigade, Arthur Bryant frequently refers to esprit de
corps, that quality which distinguished the Green Jackets from other regiments
(Bryant,1972). The examples of something extra in human organizations are
manifold. The question remains of how it can be apprehended. There seems no
doubt that some organizations have all the right ingredients, procedures,
techniques and yet nothing extraordinary happens. Professional soccer teams
provide a good example. Other organizations, like IBM or Microsoft, become major
players in world affairs. Perhaps Vaizey's dictum, 'If it cannot be measured it
probably does not exist' (Vaizey, 1972) needs to be balanced by the assertion
that some of the most Important things in human life and organizations certainly
exist but so far defy attempts to measure them.
Krech et al (1962) refer to the sentiments above as the 'institutional
fiction'. The group transcends the immediate members or the real properties of
the group. We perceive groups or organizations in a particular way - Japanese
manufacturers are all efficient, British labour unions are always recalcitrant -
and these stereotypes become part of our belief systems. Within groups, beliefs
develop regarding the superior nature of the organization. The work on groups
by the social psychologists is extensive and has useful contributions to make to
the examination of the learning organization. However, it is to the work of the
organizational culture analysts that the argument now turns.
2.7. Culture and the learning organization
Organizational culture is a large topic and one which cannot be explored fully
here. Suffice it to say that in organizations, the term culture should be reserved
for the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs shared by the members of
the organization. These usually operate unconsciously in defining in a taken-for-
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granted manner an organization's view of Itself in relation to the environment
(Johnson and Glll.1993). Schein defines culture as:
a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered or
developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its
problems...	 (Schein, 1985:9)
This statement seems to carry resonance for the issue of organizational learning.
Culture is learned. Schein likens culture more to what Argyris and Schon (1974)
call 'theories in use' and notes that they are more difficult to identify than
values and practices within an organization. Johnson and Gill's discussion of
organizational culture Is well summarised as follows
- cultures are produced interactively and can therefore only
be changed interactively;
- the quality of the interaction will be reflected in the
quality of the relationships and the dialogue within and
among different interest groups and sub-cultures, both
within and outside the organization;
- cultural adaptation and change is, therefore, a network
development process. The network, not the formal authority
structure, is the basic unit of cultural production and
adaptation.
(Johnson and Gill, 1993:110)
The concept of organizational culture seems to hold promise for the development
of learning organizations. By linking the concepts of organizational culture and
the learning organization we begin to square the circle of whether the learning
organization is just another useful metaphor or whether it holds a metaphysical
quality as well. They are not mutually exclusive. Just as theologians have had to
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wrestle with concepts like 'faith' and 'belief', and without reifying them have
been able to explore them fruitfully, social scientists should not be afraid of the
metaphysical qualities inherent in terms like organizational culture or the
learning organization. If organizational culture carries with it more than a whiff
of institutional fiction this is not necessarily a bad thing. Some of our most
important human activities are bound up in myth in the Jungian sense, mythology
which 'formulates the life of archetypes' (Evans, 1976). For the purposes of the
present study the key issue of the role of knowledge in organizational culture
and in the development of learning organizations provides common ground to
bring the two concepts together.
2.8 Fusion of horizons - knowledge and culture in organizations
2.8.1. Culture and knowledge
The concept of 'fusion of horizons' is discussed more fully in Chapter Four
below. However, it is necessary at this stage to indicate that this term refers to
the bringing together or rapprochement between the different worlds we seek to
examine or appraise. Organizational culture is one well documented and
researched world. Organizational learning is perhaps a less well understood
world. Fusion of horizons wifi lead to new understanding of both concepts.
Frost et. al. define organizational culture as follows:
organizational culture seems to mean talking about the importance for
people of symbolism - of rituals, myths, stories and legends - and about
the interpretation of events, ideas and experiences that are influenced and
shaped by the groups within which they live.
(Frost, P.J. et.aI. (eds) 1985:17)




• . .related to history and tradition, have some depth, are difficult to grasp
and account for and must be interpreted; that they are collective and
shared by members of groups and primarily ideational in character, having
to do with values, understandings, beliefs, knowledge and other intangibles;
and that they are holistic and subjective rather than strictly rational and
analytical.
(Hofstede et.al (1990) In Alvesson,1993:2)
Interpretation of events, ideas and experiences; ideational, holistic and subjective
notions of understanding and knowledge; the 'intangibles' of group culture - all
have relevance to both the the metaphorical and metaphysical interpretation of
the learnlag organization.
To use the learning organization as a lens or tool for examining an
organization like the World Bank is a central aim of this study. It now remains
to devise a means of discovering whether the characteristics of the Bank, or at
least that part of its structure responsible for lending to educational development
in the developing world, have resonances for or even a direct relationship with
those of the learning organization.
2.8.2.Indicators of the learning organization: questions to be addressed
Studies of organizational culture have been criticized by Alvesson (1994) as
simplistic, focusing on culture as a means to control and offering a banal
interpretation of culture as a matter simply of rationality. Alvesson argues
persuasively that organizational culture is a complex matter and that attempts to
link culture with performance are doomed to failure:
Values and norms.. .have very little direct impact on organizational
effectiveness.	 (Alvesson, 1994:33)
Using culture as a means to explore the concept of leadership in organizations
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is equally unsatisfactory. The apparently obvious causal link between strong
culture and high performance (or the reverse) has proved difficult to research
(Calorl and Sarnin, 1991). Alvesson argues that it might prove more fruitful to
pursue what Habermas (1972) has called 'practical-hermeneutic interests', the
attempt to achieve understanding about human existence:
the creation of meaning and communication in order to produce
knowledge about man as a cultural being, without any particular
concern for the utility of that knowledge.
(Alvesson, 1994:43)
In this paradigm, questions of interpretation and description take precedence
over questions of function and causal explanations.
Deep exploration into the nature of organizational culture is not a prime
concern of this study. Yet a summary of the major concepts discussed so far
parallel Dixon's (1994) characterization of a learning organization. Identity, group
integration, shaping by the group, interpretation, collective values, beliefs and
knowledge, the place of understanding - all are found in Dixon's organizational
learning cycle (see Figure 1, page 21).
This study now begins to focus more sharply on the World Bank and its
performance as a learning organization. This focus Is not designed to elicit a link
between culture, the learning organization and performance. Rather, in a
Habermasian hermeneutic spirit, it wifi attempt understanding of human activity
In the Bank by addressing the following questions:
- What is understood by Bank staff as the culture of the World Bank ?
- How is knowledge generated, shared, distributed and interpreted
within the Bank ?
These broad questions are refined and expanded In Chapter Four, the
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methodology discussion, below. The exploration of these questions with the
subjects selected for interview - Bank insiders and outsiders - is designed to
lead to better understanding.
The initial research question which prompted this whole study was whether the
World Bank learn from its experience, as so much of its literature claims ? Is
there an experiential learning cycle in Dixon's terms to be found within the
Bank? The set of questions deriving from the main lines of enquiry listed above
will lead to better understanding of the Bank's claim. Chapter Three which
follows gives an outline of the functioning of the Bank and the ways in which
it affects educational development in the Third World. In particular, Its
approaches to knowledge and information, which in turn affect choices in policy
and practice, are analysed.
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CHAPTER 3: HOW THE WORLD BANK FUNCTIONS
A bank is a financial institution
from which you can borrow money
as long as you can provide sufficient
evidence to show you do not need it.
Anonymous
3.1. Introduc±ion
It might have been with the irony of the quotation above in mind that, in
1944, the Bretton Woods Conference was held in the United States. This gathering
of leading western economists set out to build a new world order on the war-torn
remains of the old. In his address to the conference, President Roosevelt spoke
of the need for governments to prevent a recurrence of the economic collapse of
the 1920s and 1930s when mass unemployment, financial instability and social
upheaval laid down the preconditions for war. The experts who met at Bretton
Woods embraced a common vision and ambition to address the great social and
economic challenges of the post-war era (Oxfam, 1994).
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the
original institution of what is now the World Bank group, was founded at Bretton
Woods as a specialised agency of the United Nations. It was set up in conjunction
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the organization which was to
generate much controversy at the conference and the subsequent follow-up
meeting in Savannah. Whilst the IMP' was set up to provide short-term balance
of payments relief, the IBRD was seen as the vehicle for much longer term
investment and development initiatives. The organizations were closely linked in
that membership of the IBRD and access to its funds was made conditional on
membership of the IMF. As Payer (1982) expresses it, this strategy was designed
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to force countries to accept IMF standards and procedures in order to obtain
benefits from the Bank. This issue will be returned to frequently; a recurring
theme through this study's analysis of the Bank is the apparent subservience of
educational development and other social sector activities to economic and
financial objectives. In the words of Robert W. Oliver:
Their major objective was to provide a world within which competitive
market forces would operate freely, unhampered by government
interference, for they supposed that market forces would produce
optimum results for the entire world.... As Jacob Viner put it,
they were "trying to reverse the whole trend of policy and practice
of the world at large in the field of international economic
relations since 1914 and especially in the ill-fated years since 1929 ".
(quoted in Payer, 1982:22)
The architect of the IBRD and IMF was Harry Dexter White of the U.S.
Treasury. His proposals formed the agenda at Bretton Woods (Mason and Arthur,
1973). He worked under the direction of Henry Morgenthau with some input from
Lord Keynes. The latter actually chaired the group which designed the Bank
(Jones, 1992:3). At the time of the founding of the World Bank, the United States
as the dominant economic force in the free world, held 37% of its voting power.
The location of the Bank's headquarters in Washington reflected the institution's
status as very much the creature of the U.S. administration, a state of affairs
which has not radically altered over the years.
The early years of the Bank at work were characterised by programme
loans (the first four were to France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg)
which were essentially to bridge balance of payments problems. The first project
loans were made to Chile in 1948 and to Brazil and Mexico in 1949. Project
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lending soon became the Bank's preferred mode of international assistance. By
the end of 1949 the Bank's reconstruction phase was more or less completed and
it had moved into its development phase (Payer, 1982). At about this time, the
Bank made clear moves to distance itself from the United Nations. This was a
clear signal that political judgements or influences on the Bank's operations
would be minimised and that the 'sound economic principles' of the Bank's
operations would not be compromised (Jones, 1992:4). It could also be argued that
the United States, as the dominant partner in the Bank mistrusted the United
Nations as an organization. After all, within the UN. each member nation had
equal voting rights. Within the Bank, voting rights were in proportion to a
member state's holdings.
By mid-1981 membership of the Bank had grown from 45 to 139. The
process of decolonization, to which the Bank had contributed, increased the
number of member states accordingly. It has been said that a great deal of the
Bank's work - the financing of irrigation projects, roads, railways, port facilities
and other infrastructural developments - was the work of empire anyway. This
criticism will be returned to.
The impact of different presidents of' the Bank on its workings cannot go
unremarked. As Jones (1992) was to discover in his analysis of the Bank's role
in educational development, the influence of specific individuals had a marked
impact on the style and approach of the institution in general. Eugene Black, who
presided over the Bank from 1949 to 1963, encouraged the kind of infrastructural
lending which for many still characterizes the Bank. Black's conservatism
emphasised the necessity for getting GNP growing in recipient countries.
However, during his time the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was created
to ease access to borrowing from the Bank by private corporations.
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In addition, the International Development Association (IDA) was set up to satisfy
the developing countries' demand for a more liberal type of development fund
than that offered by the IBRD. In addition, the Bank saw that the IDA might
prove a useful lever if so-called Third World countries could be persuaded to
adopt more free market approaches to their own economies. It must be noted here
that these developments within the Bank group were occurring at a time of
heated competition between the capitalism of the west and the communism of the
Soviet Union and its various satellites. The Bank, with its solid Wall Street power
base and staffing policy, was an important player in the Cold War.
George Woods succeeded Black as president and managed the group until
1968. He •was shocked by the rigidity of the institution he came into and
determined to set in train developments which were to change the nature and the
face of the organization both within and beyond his own period of office. It was
during Woods' time that the first educational loans were made. However, it was
during Robert McNamara's time that the Bank began to assume its dominant
position as the foremost international development agency. McNamara came to the
Bank with the avowed aim of experimenting with more innovative approaches to
the Bank's activities. A fascinating conflict of interests and styles developed.
McNamara, fresh from the U.S. Department of Defense, brought a kind of whiz-kid
style with him. Forward planning in five-year cycles and personnel budgetting
were two of the initiatives he introduced. At the same time he espoused a policy
of aid to the poorest. But as Van de Laar states:
If..staff output is measured by the speed with which a "product" is
delivered, staff are strongly tempted to avoid anything that detracts from
well trodden paths; any deviant or more ambitious course of action
introduces additional uncertainty and possible delays in completion dates,
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which look bad on staff records.... The prevailing work environment entails
that any novel approaches come about not because of the organizational
style adopted but in spite of it.
(Van de Laar,1980:232)
The result of this paradoxical management climate was rapid expansion of annual
lending, leading to accusations that the Bank pushed money out regardless of a
borrower's actual needs. At the same time McNamara's expressed objective was aid
to the poorest economies. The Bank is still subject to these kinds of criticisms
as will be seen below. In fact, McNamara had set in train a process through
which the Bank borrowed more money than ever before, increased the availability
of loan funds and thus generated a demand within the institution for more
projects. The very structure of the Bank dictated this development. As a variety
of writers have stressed, the World Bank has to be viewed as a bank and it
should come as no surprise that it does on a world scale what all banks at local,
national and international levels attempt to do. As this study will make clear, this
issue lies at the heart of the problematic nature of the Bank's educational
activities. Although the structural demands to which it responds are those of a
bank, the field of operations in which it engages goes far beyond what is
normally expected of a bank. In short, it operates in social and developmental
areas for which it may be ill-prepared and ill-designed. What Payer indicates is
that the changes in the Bank's lending style during the Woods/McNamara era did
not represent fundamental alterations but were adaptations to a rapidly changing
environment coupled with a systemic imperative to expand loans in order to 'keep
net capital transfers to borrowers positive' (Payer, 1982:27).
It is worth emphasising at this point that the IBRD and the IDA will form
the focus of this study's analysis. Both institutions have the same staff and
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follow the same policy guidelines and have similar, if not identical procedures for
appraising and supervising project work. The IDA as a separate entity is a legal
fiction within the Bank's operations. The original entity, the IBRD, makes loans
in a fairly conventional way. It is "owned" by its shareholders, the member
countries, who have voting rights proportional to their shareholdings. One tenth
of the Bank's share capital is used in the Bank's operations. The remaining 90%
can only be used as a guarantee to the Bank's creditors (Payer, 1982). The bulk
of the IBRD's loanable funds are borrowed on capital markets and from
governments and central banks. The IBRD can borrow at very favourable rates
as it has the huge guarantees referred to above. The World Bank is the largest
non-resident borrower in virtually all countries where its issues are held
(Rotberg,1981).
Borrowing is divided between official sources, from governments and
central banks, and from private capital markets. The latter account for two-thirds
of the Bank's borrowings. The IBRD in turn offers loans at significantly more
favourable rates than most borrowers could obtain in the markets. This can be
done because the member states, although shareholders, receive no interest or
dividends on their contributions. Secondly, the Bank has its massive callable
capital to act as a guarantee on its borrowings. Thirdly, the Bank borrows only
in the strongest currencies so runs no risk of loss through fluctuating exchange
rates. In effect this means that borrowers are actually paying a hidden interest
charge as the strong currencies favoured by the Bank may appreciate in value
over a loan period. It should also be noted that Bank loans are attractive to
borrowers because they are made at fixed interest rates over relatively long
repayment periods.
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3.2. The International Development Association (IDA)
The changing circumstances of post-war recovery led directly to the founding
of the IDA in 1960. Western European economies had recovered and were
prospering in many cases. Less developed countries like India and Pakistan were
struggling under huge external debts. The World Bank was in no position to lend
to countries with dubious creditworthiness, like the emergent African nations. The
IDA was set up to maintain the Bank's role in international development and In
effect created a source of soft loans for the developing world. Despite its
constitutional status as separate and distinct from the World Bank, the IDA is
simply a separate account managed by the Bank's officials and staff, which funds
the same type of projects as the Bank to the same criteria.
IDA funds come almost exclusively from grants made by its capital-
exporting member countries, with a small proportion coming from the IBRD's
profits. IDA "credits" are nominally loans which must be repaid but which carry
no interest charges and which have very long (up to fifty years) repayment
periods (Payer, 1982:33). As the softer IDA credits are much more attractive than
"harder" loans from the IBRD, there is a good deal of politicking and competition
involved in obtaining the better deal. An irony of the IBRD/IDA criteria is that
countries qualifying for IDA loans have to demonstrate a low rate of per capita
GNP. At the same time they have to demonstrate "creditworthiness", a
characteristic which may push them into a harder IBRD loan than the soft IDA
arrangement preferred. The promise of IDA loans is a useful lever to exert on
countries defaulting on IBRD loan repayments.
Loans and credits managed by the World Bank are for the most part
project-tied. This means that funds are paid directly to the organizations or
agencies successful in winning contracts for the services desired. These
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organizations and agencies are normally found in member countries. Hence the
situation arises where certain countries gain more from their involvement in Bank
projects than the cost of their contributions to the IBRD/IDA. This state of
affairs had a deleterious effect on recipient countries who either could not
compete or were trying to restrict imports in order to build up their own
industrial base. The rules had to change and the Bank responded by moderating
its insistence on international competitive bidding. However, there is no doubt
that much Bank finance, put out as development assistance, finds its way back
to the richer countries, particularly the United States.
3.3. The World Bank and International Educational Development
3.3.1. Introduction
"The World Bank lies at the centre of the major changes in global education of
our time", says Jones (1992:xiv). Yet questions on its operations and ideology are
raised both within the Bank and beyond it. Is project lending merely the most
rational channel for distribution of funds? Is it a vehicle for piloting and
spreading innovation? Is it an instrument of control, ensuring that school
systems reproduce capitalist economies? There is much scepticism within the Bank
regarding its operations and it must again be emphasised that the Bank is not
monolithic; yet it has an organizational culture. This culture has received little
academic scrutiny. The Bank is secretive and, as Jones (1992) argues, the
academic community itself is often closely allied to the Bank.
That the Bank must be viewed and evaluated as a Bank is almost a truism.
Yet there is an inherent contradiction in this which deserves exploration. The
Bank began its lending to education in the early 1960s after a long period of
resistance to this type of activity. When lending to education did ensue, it was
inevitably influenced by the procedures, practices and culture of the Bank
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already established. The Bank's style was 'written in a language which implied
that it was a formulation of received doctrine.., a statement of how things were
being done' (Jones, 1992:8). Even more important in the development of the
Bank's attitudes and practices concerning education was the motivating force
behind the change in direction. Prior to the 1960s there had been resistance to
lending for education. But as Mason and Asher point out:
It was the availability of financing for such (developmen tat)
undertakings that stimulated philosophizing about the vital role
of economic infrastructure in the developmental process, rather
than the reverse.
(Mason and Asher, 1973:152)
Once the economic infrastructure had been disaggregated to reveal the severe
shortages of trained manpower in the developing countries the momentum for
investment in education began to grow. At about the same time new ideas in
human capital and human resource development were becoming more widely
accepted in the academic community. The Bank began to look for expert guidance
beyond its own community and eventually, senior Bank staff recommended Bank
investment in education and training (Jones, 1992:38). What materialized was a
'limited policy' approach. The Bank was convinced that infrastructure,
particularly buildings, should form the main focus for its interventions,
regardless of what Jones calls borrower sentiment, new thinking in the economics
of education or mainstream educational thought (Jones, 1992:40). The Bank
engaged in an ad hoc approach which led inevitably to conflicts. For recipient
countries, unprecedented levels of funding were made available for very limited
educational purposes - narble-c1ad walls for institutions whose graduates could
not find employment. The Bank in its early days was learning by doing. One of
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its pioneer educators, Duncan Ballantine, Is on record as stating, "There were no
road maps, so we had to learn on the job" (Ballantine,1986).
3.3.2. Early Project Lending
Philip Jones (1992), whose work has already been quoted extensively, provides
an excellent and detailed overview of the Bank's 'learning by doing' on projects
in the earliest days. Broad conclusions which he draws include:
- the short-lived co-operation with Unesco in project planning and
management, due to ideological as well as organizational conflicts
between the two bodies
- the development of a highly assertive Bank style in negotiating
projects with recipient governments (see Jones,1992:75-77)
- the development of highly optimistic and unrealistic project
designs in the early days
- inflated expectations resulting from the sheer scale of projects
- high costs, delays and budget over-runs seemed to characterize Bank
initiatives
- forced and unrealistic attempts to link project outcomes with
labour market demands
- internal technical battles in the Bank over appropriate
theoretical tools for policy formulation
- the growth of expertise in technical areas rather than the broader
macro-economic sphere previously the Bank's major concern
- conceptual difficulties in linking the Bank's educational
portfolio with country economic reports
- inflexibility in planning and an inability to use projects
for innovation or experimentation
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- tight financial control supplanting overall project monitoring
and evaluation.
Jones' catalogue of shortcomings is summarised by Mason and Asher as follows:
It cannot be said that the Bank has been an outstanding leader in applying
new techniques of project appraisal or analysis of development processes....
A more common criticism, and one more difficult to dispose of, is that the
Bank's practice of supervising construction, as well as the operation of
projects in their early years, tends to deprive borrowers of learning
opportunities... .Is it better to emphasize the learning process at the
expense of possible mistakes or to make sure that the operation is well
done, even though done by outsiders ? There is no single answer to this
question, but it is probably true that the Bank, perhaps with excessive
zeal for the correct technical solution, has not in its project lending
contributed as much to the education of borrowers as it should have
done...Perhaps the most serious criticism of IBRD project lending is its
failure to assess adequately the developmental consequences of its loans.
Ends-use supervision falls far short of dealing with this question.
(Mason and Asher, 1973:258)
3.3.3. McNamara and beyond
These early criticisms were to be overtaken by substantial changes in the Bank
occasioned by the arrival of Robert McNamara as President in 1968. His 12 years
in office have been the subject of much analysis and are generally seen to mark
a watershed in the Bank's operations. McNamara emphasised a new focus for Bank
lending - the alleviation of poverty, to be achieved through 'redistribution with
growth'. The publication of the Education Sector Working Paper of 1974 made
explicit this new emphasis in an influential style. McNamara's presidency saw
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unprecedented levels of lending; by 1981, 85% of all Bank lending had taken place
under McNamara's leadership (Jones, 1992:90). At this time the Bank also
experienced major changes in its organizational structure, its lending policy and
its conceptual approaches to the economics of education. Perhaps of greatest
significance at this period was the Bank's formulation of a view of development
which not only informed the Bank's lending activities but exerted great influence
over the policies of recipient countries. This issue of the hegemony of the Bank's
views and indeed their validity, is picked up below in the review of critiques of
the Bank but at this point in the discussion raises interesting questions about
the Bank as a learning organization. In an increasingly complex economic world
which was to be further complicated by the oil price crisis of the early 1970s,
the Bank formulated a view of development and the role education should play
in the process which persists to this day. Briefly stated, despite the poverty
alleviation emphasis of MacNamara's rhetoric, the Bank continued in one guise or
another to embrace a policy which viewed education as a means to increasing
worker productivity. The opening line of Lockheed and Verspoor (1991), a classic
Bank text, reads:
A nation 's children are its greatest resource.
(Lockheed and Verspoor, 1991 :xiii)
This influential text develops into a technicist, instrumental hymn to the economic
value of schooling. Despite a dedication which states that the book is 'about
children, learning and primary schools', it is in fact solely about the uses to
which primary schooling can be put to ensure 'national development'. This aspect
of Bank thinking about schooling dates back to the 1974 Education Sector
Working Paper referred to earlier. But equally as important as the Bank's narrow
view of what schooling is about - and space precludes a more detailed discussion
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of the organization's conflation of schooling with education - are the twin issues
of how the Bank gets its knowledge and information and how it shares that
information. Jones (1992:94) draws attention to the fact that the influential group
of strategists and thinkers during MacNamara's time at the Bank came from the
same academic background and shared common views on how economic
development worked. As a result Bank policies on a more diversified and
liberalised approach to educational lending were formulated, albeit by an 'in-
house' team. Of great importance was the Bank's decision to view lending in the
light of a country's systemic educational needs. However, it must be emphasised
that the education system was still viewed as a vehicle for producing manpower
and thereby raising productivity.
If the MacNamara years can be seen as the beginning of a more systematic
lending policy based on public criteria, they can also be seen as a period when
recipient countries began to question the blanket application of such criteria to
all cases. Within the Bank there was a profound debate going on between the
manpower forecasters and those who favoured the newly developed technique of
cost-benefit analysis (Jones, 1992:104). This debate cannot be gone into in detail
here but suffice it to say that it illustrates the Bank's total focus on the
economic role of schooling. It should also be noted in advance of the critiques
of the Bank discussed below that cost-benefit analysis (CBA) remains a major
article of faith in the Bank, despite the scholarly and cogent criticisms of the
technique by such writers as Hough (1994).
McNamara's presidency is rightly emphasised but he was by no means the
the only powerful figure to head the Bank and influence its ideology extensively.
His successors, notably Clausen and Conable, embraced the controversial
'structural adjustment' policy which has characterized the Bank's lending over
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the past ten years. The education division of the Bank had undergone structural
adjustment itself with the accession of Conable to the Bank presidency. A
reorganization occurred in 1987 which led to the break up of the Education and
Training Department (Jones, 1992:161) and saw education downgraded, with
researchers and staffers scattered throughout the Bank. Population and Human
Resources division took on responsibility for much educational policy work. Yet
at this time the Bank president initiated the 'education for all' stance which was
to inform Bank policy initiatives for some time to come. Jones lays great emphasis
on the significant personal contributions of two Bank education specialists, Habte
and Had dad, in this 'shift in priority (which) shaped more than any other factor,
the educational policy orientation of the Bank in the 1980s and early 1990s'
(Jones, 1992:161).
3.3.4. The Bank's educational policies
Documentary evidence of Bank policies is dealt with in Chapter 5 (see Table 2 on
page 50). However, it is appropriate at this stage of the discussion to give some
idea of what policies the Bank has espoused and some of the criticisms of Bank
policy statements. In the long-awaited Priorities and Strategies for Education
(World Bank, 1995) a familiar statement is presented in the introductory section:
Education produces knowledge, skills, values and attitudes; it is
essential for civic order and citizenship and for sustained economic growth
and the reduction of poverty. Education is also about culture; it is the
main instrument for disseminating the accomplishments of human
civilization.	 (World Bank, 1995:xi)
The document goes on to indicate that the Bank believes that education is
important, both as a right and as a means for improving the conditions of life.
To do this effectively, the quality of teaching and learning must be improved,
49

provision should be expanded, access to education should be more equitable and
there is an urgent need to find new resources for education. Better use should
be made of existing resources and a strong priority is expressed for basic
primary and junior secondary education. The core subjects must be emphasised,
private provision should be encouraged, clearer specification of objectives, better
supervision and accountability and greater competition among schools should be
nurtured. Free basic education should be balanced by cost-recovery in other
sectors, particularly higher education. This 1995 statement builds on a long
tradition of similar policy statements and can be illustrated from further
publications.
In 1991, Marlaine Lockheed and Adriaan Verspoor, supported by a
considerable team of World Bank staff writers, produced the Bank's Improving
Primary Education in Developing Countries (Lockheed and Verspoor, 1991). The
foreword to the book sets the tone for an almost wholly instrumental view of
education and its role in developing countries. The authors' preface does begin
with the words, 'This book is about children, learning and primary schools'
(Lockheed & Verspoor, 1991:xv). Unfortunately, the book is solely about the uses
to which primary education can be put to bring about 'national development'. Lip
service is paid to primary education serving other purposes, such as helping
children 'function effectively in society'. But again the language is revealing.
Children do not live happily, enjoy their childhood, have fun - they 'function
effectively'. The neglect of arguments for the intrinsic, cultural and social value
of schooling characterises much Bank discourse despite the 'Education is also
about culture' statement quoted above.
Similar criticisms could be made of Higher Education: The Lessons of
Experience (World Bank,1994). This publication, again produced by a Bank team
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of experts, starts with a conventional statement that universities are essential in
all countries for the education of future leaders and the provision of high level
manpower. Governments invest heavily; the Bank has assisted in the development
of higher education throughout the world. In the past twenty years, enrolments
in lower/middle income countries have increased by an average of 6.2% per
annum. However, quality is perceived to be deteriorating.
Public subsidies are too high and more equitable income distribution
suffers as graduates earn more and more. The need for reform is 'widely
acknowledged' - a generalisation akin to the 'research shows...' arguments
beloved of the Bank. Proposed solutions to the 'crisis' include more privatisation,
diversified sources of funding, redefinition of the state's role in higher education
and more emphasis on quality and equity - all echoes of Coombs' analysis of a
decade ago (Coombs, 1985). The document is fraught with contradictions. Cost-
recovery is proposed whilst student loan schemes are characterised as largely
unworkable. Higher education's contribution to economic growth and poverty
alleviation is alluded to while the soaking up of valuable resources and the
growing scale of graduate unemployment are also noted. Equity is promoted as
a goal for higher education through positive discrimination whilst privatisation
is also recommended, presumably to provide places for those who can afford to
pay. Income generating activities for universities like research and consultancy
services are recommended. At the same time, note is taken of the poor quality of
staff in many universities in developing countries.
Underpinning the whole analysis is the unexamined assumption that higher
education's contribution to economic growth and development is unproblematic.
Worse, for a statement of World Bank policy towards higher education, no radical
or robust alternatives to the standard model are offered, except for a brief
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discussion of diversifying tertiary level institutions. Little or no research on
innovatory practices is offered. Exemplars of good practice are drawn almost
exclusively from countries where the Bank is most active.
The long awaited Review Paper Priorities and Strategies for Education
(World Bank, 1995) is full of examples of the Bank's unwillingness to learn from
the experience of its own past or that of others. The fundamental premise of the
document is that basic formal education remains the key to economic advancement
for poor countries. Lip service is paid in various places to the socializing or
cultural aspects of education usually in terms of how these elements affect the
earning power and productive capacity of the educated. Throughout the
document, the language is that of the technicist. Effective education is dependent
on five "inputs", which include "tools for teaching and learning" (World Bank,
1995:6). Attention to the outcomes of schooling is restricted to economic analysis
and standard measures of achievement. The key priority for education is that:
...it must meet economies' growing demands for adaptable workers who can
readily acquire new skills and it must support the continued expansion of
knowledge.
(World Bank, 1995:1)
This is put forward as a prescription for countries where there are no jobs and
where the days of mass semi-skilled employment have gone for ever, if they even
existed. Most disturbingly of all the Bank persists in transferring economic
evidence from the United States to the developing countries of Africa. Evidence
of rises in wage premiums in the USA associated with mastery of elementary
mathematics is advanced as a justification for investment in basic education in
countries which have little or no industrial employment capacity (World Bank,
1995:97). Like most industrialised countries the United States has huge
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opportunities for part-time, casual, informal employment from job-sharing to dish-
washing and clerical work. Countries like Bangladesh and Tanzania do not have
these opportunities and designing universal primary education on the premise
that they do is at best misleading. The dismissal of vocational education in the
1995 Paper is illustrative of the unrealistic ideology by which the Bank works.
The paper claims that 'work tasks involve less and less manual attention' (World
Bank, 1995:ix). This may be true in the industrialized, automated and
computerized economies of the West but is hardly a viable premise for policy in
countries where the vast majority of the labour force is involved in agriculture
and the informal sector.
The Bank's insistence on its sectoral approach (World Bank, 1995:13) is also
a cause for concern. As its prescriptions show the emphasis is on making the
education sector more efficient and effective. But unless change in education is
accompanied by other changes in the economy which lead to job creation, basing
educational policy on fitting primary school leavers for employment is doomed to
failure. The Bank's Structural Readjustment programmes have rarely led to
greater employment opportunities; rather the reverse.
It has been said earlier that the Bank is a bank and that it takes an
economist's view of the role and purpose of education. This is a legitimate enough
stance although it has the obvious weaknesses of any one-dimensional view of
social phenomena. Unfortunately, questions must also be raised about the
legitimacy of the Bank's economics, particularly its enthusiastic embracing of
cost-benefit analysis as a reliable tool (World Bank, 1995:21). The section of the
Bank's Review Paper devoted to a discussion of education and development (World
Bank, 1995:17-31) is at best controversial. An arguably faulty view of the
relationship between schooling and economic development leaves one with deep
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concerns regarding the Bank's self-proclaimed advisory role
Bank financing will generally be designed to leverage (sic) spending and
policy change by national authorities.
(World Bank, 1995:14)
The regular output of World Bank policy documents is firmly based on an
unproblematic and positivist view of the world, i.e. what is broken can be fixed,
but appears to be equally firmly based on a broad network of research findings.
Fagerlind and Saha have this to say about the positivistic style of much
discourse on education and development:
What we felt was lacking in the field... was a broader and more
coherent view of how the economic, social and political aspects of
societies as a whole affected and were affected by education.
(Fagerlind and Saha, 1983:vi).
The authors go on to state:
Our conviction that efforts to use education to promote change in
particular directions could be both highly successful or doomed to
failure motivated us to think more carefully about the complexity of
the relationship and how it works.
(Fagerlind and Saha, 1983:vi).
This understanding of the complexities of policy formulation appears to be lacking
in the Bank's approach to finding answers and solving problems. As noted
earlier, the relatively unproblematic critical path analysis which the Bank adopts
tends to oversimplify what Fagerlind and Saha use as the rationale for their
argument - the complexity of the relationship between education and national
development. The formula the Bank appears to adopt is that clearly defined
problem areas can be identified, equally clear research findings can tell us how
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to resolve the problems and by dint of rational strategies the mismatch between
education and national development can be bridged.
3.4. Critiques of the Bank
Critiques of the Bank abound and 'Bank-bashing' has long been a popular sport
among academics. Peter Williams' metaphor of the Bank viewing the world from
Mount Olympus dates from the 1970s and provided a powerful critique at the time
(Williams, 1974). Williams' criticism of the Bank as an institution cut off from the
real world is echoed in other more recent critiques. Ironically enough, one of
the Bank's own authors, Jamil Salmi, comments on preparation for the 1994 World
Bank paper, Higher Education, The Lessons of Experience as follows:
the study would not be a traditional World Bank document prepared in
isolation in Washington...
(Salmi in King, K. (ed), 1994)
However, of more relevance to the present study are critical analyses which deal
with the Bank's ideology and rhetoric, its practices, its management and whether
it learns from the past. These analyses focus on five broad areas of the Bank's
functioning in the developing world:
- the Bank's economic ideology: its Marketism
- the Bank's uses of research, knowledge and information: its Technicism
- the Bank's hegemony in aid policy: its Imperialism
- the Bank's lack of self-criticism and reflection: its Egoism
- the Bank's distance from the real world: its Olympianism.
3.4.1. The Bank's ideology and rhetoric
There is no doubt that the Bank has an instrumental, market-economics view of
the role of education in the world. It is also a powerful political force despite the
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assertion in its charter that is a purely economic institution. As George and
Sabelli put it:
As a supranational agency in an increasingly globalized world...
the Bank now has more to say about state policies than many states.
(George and Sabelli, 1994:1)
In promoting market economics, the Bank has a poor record of success. Its
insistence on structural readjustment programmes as the basis for renewal of
loans or granting of new moneys has not led to the economic growth the Bank
predicted. Oxfam (1994) refers to this approach as 'extreme' and states:
Potentially competitive labour intensive industries and rural employment
have been undermined by declining public investment in social and
economic infrastructures, credit shortages and import constraints. Moreover,
the imposition of an 'export-led growth' strategy for resolving the debt
crisis has carried the seeds of its own destruction, especially in the
world's poorest countries.. .In OxJ'am 's view, these adjustment policies were
in large measure responsible for the 'lost decade' of the 1980s, when most
developing countries experienced steep declines in human welfare.
(Oxfam, 1994:4)
Not only do the critics regard the Bank's central mission as unfocussed and
wrongly conceived but would draw attention to the harmful effects of such
policies in terms of the social, political and environmental degradation ensuing
from them. Friends of the Earth go so far as to state:
For ten years (working with citizens' groups from around the world) we
have been accumulating more and more evidence of environments destroyed
and economies undermined by World Bank loans.
(in George and Sabelli, 1994:233)
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These criticisms arise from the perception that the Bank is working within a
discredited development paradigm. It is also clear to many observers that the
Bank has not succeeded in calling economic trends accurately. Within the Bank,
those like Herman Daly who have attempted to draw attention to the shortcomings
of Bank economic policy, have been unable to move the organization away from
its basic articles of faith. As George and Sabelli put it:
The market may be reasonably efficient at setting prices but it can tell
us almost nothing about costs, particularly the longer-term ones.
(George and Sabelli, 1994:203)
Jones (1992) devotes considerable space to discussion of the Bank's focus on the
pace of disbursement as a priority, rather than the effects of its lending policies.
This leads the researcher to the conclusion that the organization lacks
intellectual leadership. It must also be stated that the constraints and demands
of its management structure perpetuate these damaging conditions. George and
Sabelli (1994:212 ff) indicate that senior staff have huge workloads, frequently
scrambling to get loan agreements processed by short deadlines. There is rapid
turnover at this level, the Board members are protected from bad news and
standard operating procedures function everywhere within the Bank, thereby
reducing flexibility and capacity to respond creatively to new situations. The
publication of the internal Wapenhans Report in 1992 staggered Bank officials by
its discovery that 37.5% of projects could be classified as 'troubled', Bank-speak
for failing. The relationship between staff time spent on project preparation and
eventual project success was in inverse proportion. Borrowers showed little
commitment to projects dreamed up by Bank staffers. In Wapenhans' own words,
'the evidence of non-compliance (by recipient countries) is overwhelming'.
Borrowers respected their agreements in only 22% of the loans examined by
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Wapenhans (George and Sabelli, 1994:224) - a far cry from the 90% success rate
claimed by the Bank's own Operations Evaluation Department.
The Bank's economic ideology and rhetoric are open to criticism not only
on technical grounds. The Bank has become the most influential force in
determining educational policies and priorities in the developing world and as
Lauglo (1996) puts it 'Bankers and pedagogues think differently'. Contending
cultures are at work. The Bank believes in 'hard' information, although the
rigidity of cost-benefit analysis has already been questioned. Social scientists are
comfortable with 'softer', more qualitative information. The Bank embraces a
rationalist model of economic man. Educationalists are often more interested in the
influences which shape choice rather than in the simple matter of what choices
are made. Human capital theory shapes Bank policies. More organic models of
human development concern educationalists. Improving the productivity of labour
has received little attention in educational theory. Higher order goals, often
expressed in admittedly woolly terms like 'developing each child to his or her
fullest potential', characterize the thinking of educationalists. In contrast, key
concerns of the economists who determine Bank attitudes include costs, inputs,
outputs and economic benefits. The processes of teaching and learning which
transform inputs to outputs lie outside their expertise. Thus the Bank frequently
latches on to school effectiveness studies, or emphasises libraries or home-work
as single-factor solutions to complex educational problems. Economists like to use
mathematical models - the education production function (EPF) is a typical
example (Simmons, 1980). Educators know that the classroom reality is a turbulent
environment of organized anarchy where little is predictable or amenable to
mathematical formulae. Lauglo (1996) states:
These pedagogic concerns might seem like 'armchair' ideals which have
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little to offer in the grim reality of schools in low income countries. But
the model which underlies an economistic view of education might suffer
from a more Olympian kind of remoteness because it has not evolved
through study and practice of the education process itself'.....Thus the
stage is set for much tension between 'soft' pedagogues and the
increasingly 'hard-nosed' World Bankers of education. The(1995) Paper is
likely to exacerbate such tension, because it is an assertion of a tougher
'Bankers' ethos' than previous policy papers on education.
(Lauglo, 1996:5)
3.4.2. The Bank's approach to knowledge and information
If the Bank's ideology and rhetoric can be faulted and found inconsistent, even
more revealing is its approach to knowledge and information. Characteristics of
the true learning organization discussed in Chapter 2 above (see especially Table
2 on page 20) included the following:
- information is generated and manipulated through transformation of
experience
- responsible action is based on interpreted meaning
- knowledge is contributed by all members in a planned and intentional
way
- systematic processes create meaning
- widespread generation of information is essential
- integration of information into the organization is deliberate
- collective interpretation of information is encouraged
- negative events are seen as sources of knowledge
- differing viewpoints are embraced for problem-solving
- findings are related to guiding norms
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- continuous feedback and experimentation are built into the
organization's activities
- organizational learning is affected by informational overload/underload
- algorithms replace heuristics
- information absorption must be as effective as possible
As noted in Chapter 2, the role of knowledge and information is seen as of
paramount importance in the learning organization. Chapter 5 of this study offers
an empirical investigation of the extent to which the Bank qualifies as a learning
organization in terms, inter alia, of its approach to knowledge and information.
But the starting point of the whole enquiry was an implicit 'foreshadowed
problem' that the Bank was not obviously a learning organization. Well known and
scholarly critiques of the Bank, whilst not necessarily using the learning
organization terminology as a tool of analysis, draw attention to weaknesses in
the Bank's approach to epistemology. Van de Laar, already quoted in 3.1. above
suggests that any innovation within the Bank comes about not so much because
of the organizational style of the institution but in spite of it. The organizational
culture is one which rewards use of 'well trodden paths'. George and Sabeffi,
referring to the hegemonic status of the Bank in the development industry state:
culturally speaking it has a near-monopoly over development
discourse, theory and practice and successfully propagates an
increasingly fundamentalist ideology.
(George and Sabelli, 1994:220)
Thus it can be argued that what knowledge the Bank does have is not
necessarily valid or current.
The research dimension is an important factor in the Bank's approach to
knowledge and information. The quoting of research findings lends an air of
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legitimacy to otherwise shaky or unclear arguments. Weiss (1979) in an article
entitled The Many Meanings of Research Utilization presents seven models of how
research can influence policy making, ranging from the linear model of
fundamental applied research through to the enlightenment and 'intellectual
enterprise' models. The Bank appears to use research from a number of the
categories identified by Weiss. Lockheed and Verspoor (1991) provide examples
of utilizing research for advocacy, for problem-solving and as a linear model. The
writers present many policy statements as unproblematic yet often quote only one
research study in support of their position (see Lockheed and Verspoor,1991:67
for example). Bennell, in a detailed technical analysis of the Bank's use of rates-
of-return analysis, draws attention to a further abuse of research. Eight 'miracle
economies' of South Asia are used to illustrate the linkage between a policy of
basic education first and rates-of-return by level of education. In only two of
the eight countries quoted is such a direct correspondence actually observable
(Bennell, 1994:12).
Samoff (1993) also has some strong words to say about the Bank's use, or
abuse, of research. Not only does he criticise the Bank's generalisations
concerning what the research actually says but he takes issue with the notion
that research actually does influence policy making in the way the Bank assumes
it does or should. Writing of Education for All , Samoff states:
The Jomtien resolutions are but a single example of the privileged
position of research or, more accurately, of claims about research
and its findings in the discourse on educational policy.
(Samoff, 1993:18)
Samoff also identifies a convergence in aid agency approaches which prevents
nation states from shopping around for support for policies not reflected in Bank
62
priorities. Britain's ODA makes no bones about linking its aid policies to those of
the Bank and the agency has shown considerable willingness to support larger
Bank initiatives by taking on components of Bank projects rather than
identifying and pursuing its own interventions. In Samoff's words, 'The World
Bank has come to be the lead agency in setting the education and development
agenda'(Samoff, 1993:187). Samoff's analysis of the rise of the Bank as the lead
player shows clearly the inherent contradiction in using a Bank as the main
development agency. As a Bank it requires quick and obvious returns. Its staff
are dependent on short-term successful outcomes to their activities if preferment
and advancement are to follow. The dominant perspective is economic - what
works must be expressed in explicit and quantitative terms. As Samoff expresses
it:
The greater the role in the (project) approval process played by
individuals who consider themselves ehard scientists (a self-
description that is common among, but not limited to, economists) the
greater the pressure for explicit and unambiguous research findings
expressed in quantitative terms.
(Samoff, 1993:190)
Research is expensive and complex to undertake. Small wonder that the
agency itself does it - commissioning, undertaking and managing the research
enterprise. But this incestuous procedure merely serves to reinforce the
weakness of Bank policy formulation. In-house experts, working within an
organizational climate, which though not monolithic, has a style of its own, are
almost bound to find the answers they are supposed to be looking for. The
notion that there may in fact be no answers cannot be entertained. This is
clearly illustrated by a leading Bank expert, George Psacharopoulos who presents
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an analysis of the 'problem' of policy in African education as a story of failure
because policies have not been implemented fully or properly and have not been
clearly stated nor financed adequately. Therefore:
Perhaps the safest course of action for the policy maker would be
to abstain from educational policy fireworks and concentrate on the
documentation of cause and effect relationships - the only activity
in my opinion, that can lead to successful school improvement.
(Psacharopoulos,1990:21)
Once again we see the Bank's search for definitive answers, through
research or exemplars, presented in a technicist mode. Answers are 'out there',
and it is merely a technical task to find them as efficiently as possible. Yet most
researchers would agree on claims regarding the impact of schooling on economic
productivity, health, population and good governance. But educationalists who are
convinced that formal education generally brings about benefits may be very
uneasy about the firm and categorical generalisations found in the Bank's
documentary output. There are other voices which argue that formal education
can have undesirable effects - it alienates young people from their own culture,
it can legitimate social injustice through its selection procedures, it can be used
politically to indoctrinate, it can create unrealistic aspirations and so on. None
of these voices are heard in the most recent Bank Paper. The 1995 Paper does
not recognise that it is at least problematic whether schools unlock the door to
a better way of life for their pupils. The moral and social impact of education
is not reflected in the paper, neither is research which deals with these issues.
The Bank tends to use the knowledge and information which suits its case and
to neglect or ignore the considerable body of research which would contest its
basic assumptions. Referring to the Bank's recent Higher Education paper (World
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Bank, 1994) Colclough refers to its basic premise as 'descriptively accurate but
analytically deeply misleading' (Coiclough in King, K. (ed), 1994:22). The case is
made that many developing countries are over-extended financially in their
provision of education. Yet Coiclough argues that the problem is not over -
spending on schooling but over-spending on other sectors to the disbenefit of
education. The Bank's blanket judgement that less should be spent does not
support the reality in many countries where funding should be diverted from
other sectors to support education fully.
3.4.3. The Bank as imperialist
If the Bank's marketism and technicism are major foci for the organization's
critics, so too is its apparent imperialism. The Bank's lending for educational
projects has increased eightfold in the last 20 years. It now provides more than
25% of all bilateral and multilateral donor assistance to education in developing
countries (Bennell, 1995:1). Samoff's fears of the hegemonic outcomes of this
position of dominance have been touched upon earlier - recipient states have
fewer alternatives to choose from as the Bank's thinking dominates the aid
agenda. McGrath (1994) sees the Bank's Higher Education paper of 1995 as
'further homogenisation of donor policy' (in King, K (ed), 1994:53). Buchert (1995)
in discussing what has happened post-Jomtien, draws attention to the marked
similarity in donor agencies' programmes for 'Education for All', a direct
consequence of the Bank's orchestration of the Jomtien meeting. Critics are justly
concerned that aid policies are being adopted second-hand from what the Bank
has to offer with little reflection. McGinn puts the imperialism case even more
strongly. The Bank, he says, is:
Weakening the ability of a state to be the major influence on everything
which takes place within its borders...
	 (McGinn, 1994:291)
65
The Bank provides loans only for its own specified programmes, establishes its
conditionalities which must be met before funding is released, produces
'guidelines' concerning the hire of consultants and the selection of overseas
training institutions and co-ordinates policy making among various countries. To
label this as imperialism is no exaggeration.
3.4.4. The Bank and self-reflection
Bennell (1995) in the course of his technical criticism of the Bank's uses of
rates-of-return analysis has this to say about its other practices:
The simple truth .... is that the Bank rarely evaluates its own education
investments in the way it is prescribing for others.
(Bennell, 1995:19)
Despite hopeful noises emanating from such documents as Higher Education: The
Lessons from Experience (World Bank, 1994) which seem to indicate a more
consultative style in Bank publications, self-reflection does not appear to typify
the way the Bank works. Part of the reason for this is structural. The Bank
tends to deal in short-term (five-year) projects. Bank staff are mobile, moving
on to the next assignment, the next job without too much evaluation of what has
gone before. Peter Williams suggests in reviewing the Bank's policies that
'ideological inclination has taken precedence over objectivity' (in King, 1995:21).
Olsson, writing in the same publication states:
It is easy to get the impression that examples and studies have been
chosen to confirm a model, rather than as a basis for balanced conclusions.
(in King, 1994:55)
Yet more hopefully, Reimers, writing of the Higher Education paper says:
The success of the paper of drawing lessons from experience while
constantly reiterating the need for con text-specific policy design could
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beneficially in form debate within the Bank beyond the specific field of
higher education.
(in King. 1994:60)
Im p licit in this is the perception that the rest of the Bank's education specialists
rarely indulge in this form of reflection. Another aspect of the Bank's egoism is
touched on by Reimers:
A more serious shortcoming of the paper relates to the knowledge base
chosen to draw lessons of experience. Of the 152 bibliographic references
only 32 (21%) are not World Bank publications or publications of Bank staff
(in King, 1994:62)
3.4.5. The Bank's distance from the real world
Reference has already been made to Peter Williams' 1974 metaphor of the Bank as
an Olympian institution. Enough has probably already been said about its narrow
economistic outlook, its embracing of a North American world-view, its highly
selective uses of information and expertise and its conviction that it knows the
right ways to do things. The picture drawn so far has been one of a hugely
influential and even dominant force in world educational development which
promotes policy decisions and choices with great authority and power. Yet as an
organization it is sadly flawed as the criticisms above have shown. Certainly the
contrast between the Bank and the archetypal learning organization as envisaged
by the authorities discussed in Chapter 2 above could not be sharper. As this
study moves into its empirical phase and the investigation of the Bank as a
learning organization unfolds it is expected that fusion of horizons will occur and
that this apparently sharp distinction will be examined more closely.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion draws all
things else to support and agree with it. And though there be a greater
number and weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet these
it either neglects and despises, or by some distinction sets aside and
rejects, in order that by this great and pernicious predetermination the
authority of its former conclusion may remain inviolate
Francis Bacon
4.1. Introduction
Despite the stern warning of Bacon quoted above, research is often presented in
an unproblematic way as if the whole process is rational, logical and follows a
predictable and warrantable path, much like the stereotype of experimentation in
the natural science laboratory. Recent writing on real life experiences of research
sheds a different light on the process which can be messy, unpredictable and
leading to different outcomes from those planned (Cornett, 1995; Hyde, 1994;
Vulliamy et al, 1990). If the process of research is often more problematic than
predicted then it must also be admitted that writing up is more than a winding-
up activity at the end of the real business. Writing becomes a form of
reconstruction as new aspects of the topic are discovered in the process, or in
Bacon's terms irrational persistence of beliefs is maintained. With these caveats
in mind, the research approach selected can now be described.
A qualitative approach has been adopted for this study, mainly because the
concept of a learning organization is somewhat loose and diversely defined. It is
worth mentioning that hard distinctions between qualitative and quantitative
research can be misleading (Kirk and Miller, 1986:5). It could be argued that
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qualitative and quantitative research use distinctive methods of data collection
and have distinctive research strategies. But the differences are not always clear
cut (see Figure 2 below). Sometimes a positivist epistemology can be detected in
participant observation, a key technique for the qualitative researcher. Equally,
a quantitative study may require considerable interpretation of data or events.
There is no simple one-to-one relationship between a research method and an
epistemological position (Dale, Arbers and Procter, 1988). Vuiliamy (1990:10) argues
that definitions of qualitative research are themselves controversial and in
practice, different theoretical and methodological positions may be adopted within
the genre.
From a technical viewpoint, the choice of a starting point on the continuum
between qualitative and quantitative methods is dictated by a judgement on the
suitability of the chosen paradigm for the research questions selected (Bryman,
1988; Vulliamy et al, 1990). Different types of question demand different research
approaches. Within this study the researcher's preconception was whether the
concept of the learning organization could be applied to a huge international aid
agency like the World Bank. The learning organization is now part of the
landscape of organizational theory and characteristics of such organizations have
been adduced. However, no set of general criteria has been developed against
which an organization's status as a learning organization or potential for
becoming one might be measured. To explore and chart new territory is an aim
of this study. It is widely recognised that the qualitative approach is well suited
to this type of enquiry (Bryman, 1988; Vuiliamy et al, 1990).
Investigating the Bank's capacity for learning is also designed to produce
guidelines or pointers for its development towards the objective of becoming a
learning organization. This presupposes that learning organizations are
69
worthwhile. Chapter Two examined that supposition and concluded that the
concept, although capable of diverse interpretations, has significant value for
organizations wishing to achieve greater effectiveness.
It should also be admitted that a qualitative approach to the study was
intentionally adopted as a matter of personal preference. This in itself is not
sufficient to justify a research approach but it is a fact of life that research
issues are made rather than found. Problems have to be constructed. They do not
spring ready-formed from the academic undergrowth (Dale, 1986:50; Woods and
Ham mersley, 1977).
For the purposes of the present study, neither experimental techniques nor
numerical analysis lend themselves to the type of enquiry envisaged. Finding out
what people think and what they do on a large scale probably indicates a
particular epistemology and subsequent methods of a numerical or quantitative
nature. Similarly, filletting large numbers of documents to analyse the frequency
of use of positive or negative statements on a given topic lends itself to
numerical approaches. For the present study, conducted on a small scale to
examine a loosely constructed concept in its theoretical and practical dimensions
a hermeneutic approach has been selected as the dominant methodology. This
approach provides access to what Bryman (1988) has called 'warrantable
knowledge' within a qualitative epistemology.
4.2. Methodological UnderpThning
4.2.1. Introduction
Writers on hermeneutics argue that all understanding is based on pre-
conceptions. No matter how hard the researcher tries, theory is unavoidable in
any study. However, pre-conceptions are open to challenge through what
Bernstein (1983) refers to as the "hermeneutic circle".
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4.2.2. Grounded theory in partnership with hermeneutics
Strauss and Corbin (1994:283) suggest that this combination of approaches may
present great promise for the future. Grounded theory held certain attractions
for the researcher. It is a methodology which requires the researcher to generate
theory from the data gathered; a grounded theory is inductively derived from
the study of the phenomena selected (Corbin and Strauss, 1990:23). However, the
concept of the learning organization had been selected as the phenomenon to be
examined. The concept was distilled from the literature so a deductive rather
than an inductive methodology presented itself. It could be argued from the
evidence in Chapter Two above that the concept of the learning organization is
so diffuse that it may deserve a grounded theory approach to provide the
concept with a respectable theory. However, the researcher found himself in
danger of creating a trait theory of the learning organization against which the
World Bank might be measured. This would not necessarily have been a bad model
and to some extent it does inform this study. But, it is argued, the process of
research must be satisfying to the researcher. The Bank literature and its critics
represented secondary sources. Analysis of these produced warrantable findings.
How could the responses of the interview subjects be made more fruitful ? How
could their voices be heard ? It was obvious that interviewees could not be
approached cold - "What do you think of the World Bank?" - and out of the mass
of data theory be generated. More focus was required, hence the phrasing of the
questions in the interview schedule. The spirit of hermeneutics emphasises a
process of becoming, rather than the development of a means to an end. The
essence of hermeneutics is to develop a rapprochement between the present world
and the different world we seek to appraise, what is known in the literature as
a "fusion of horizons". Therefore to enhance understanding through a fusion of
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horizons becomes the basic interest of the research, without necessarily much
explicit theorisation. Hence the selection of a hermeneutic approach, particularly
to the interview responses but also to the literature.
Cornett (1995) has argued the need for constant vigilance and self-
reflectiveness in qualitative research, as indeed in all research. There is no
doubt that the implicit values of the researcher and even his or her unconscious
beliefs may become evident in an interpretative study of this type. The
researcher may still work on the assumption that truth is to be found "out
there" in some way - what Bernstein refers to as the "Cartesian Anxiety"
(Bernstein,1983). This problem is addressed through the hermeneutic approach
which has been adopted. Understanding does not come from separating ourselves
from our own context. Meaning comes through events of understanding; it is not
there to be discovered. All knowing involves some pre-judgements or even
prejudices. The hermeneutic approach produces a continuous conversation, or
dialectic, which leads to fusion of horizons. This phrase refers to the dynamic
interplay between the researcher and the researched. Movement to and fro
characterises the whole research process. Meaning is sought but never fully
apprehended (Fowler, 1987:110). The concept of "inexhaustible interpretability"
familiar to psychoanalysis is also characteristic of hermeneutic studies (Urmson
and Ree, 1991:268). The corollary to this is that the researcher's understanding
is subject to continual revision and all research "findings" are provisional.
Holub (1991:57) argues that interpretation is always grounded in something
we have in advance, something we see in advance and something we grasp in
advance. We are filled with pre-understanding. All seeing is theory-laden; what
we see already presupposes a kind of theory (Hanson,1981:258). Instead of
attempting to remove all such preconceptions, they must be tested critically in
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the course of enquiry. Ricoeur suggests that a true hermeneutic theory must
include critical elements (Holub,1991:76). This position suggests an answer to the
common criticism of grounded theory, that in fact it uses previous theory as a
guide to the research process and merely serves to make previous theory more
dense (Denzin, 1994:508). Adopting an hermeneutic approach it can be stated that
this kind of fore-knowledge is legitimate and even unavoidable. The task of
hermeneutics is to subject it to testing, what Addison (1993:119) refers to as
"questioning the account".
4.2.3. The fusion of horizons between hermeneutics and grounded theory
The fusion of horizons between these two approaches is found in the constant
interplay between the researcher and the researched. A grounded theory
approach argues that theory should be developed in a back-and-forth interplay
with data (Strauss and Corbin, 1994:282). In the same vein, a to-and-fro
movement between the interpreter and the interpreted is a central characteristic
of hermeneutics. Within grounded theory, researchers accept responsibility for
their role as interpreters. They do not believe it is sufficient merely to report
the views of the researched (Strauss and Corbin, 1994:274). The researcher plays
an active and interpretive role which fits well with the hermeneutic position that
knowledge is achieved by a dialectical interplay with the unfamiliar, based on our
foreknowledge and fore-conception (Bernstein, 1983). We are not playing the role
of disinterested spectators.
4.2.4. Overcoming the qualitative/quantitative dichotomy
Popkewitz and Tabachnick (1981:vii) suggest that there are multiple ways of
knowing and that no one method can answer all our questions. Both quantitative
and qualitative research methods are warrantable. The characteristics suggested
by Bryman (1988) are useful in distinguishing between the two paradigms and a
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discussion of them serves further to illustrate the way in which the present



















Socially constructed by actor
Rich, deep
(Adapted from Bryman,1988:94)
One end of this continuum would regard qualitative research as preparatory,
investigating in an exploratory way prior to more rigorous testing by
quantitative methods. The other pole regards qualitative research as an end in
itself, exposing the meanings and interpretations of the researched. It could be
that the present study leads to more quantitative research, developing
questionnaires which larger numbers of Bank staff and Bank critics could
respond to. But the study is conceived of as a contribution to the jigsaw of
knowledge. In that sense it is preparatory. However, the inexhaustible
interpretability principle within hermeneutics underlines the provisional nature
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of all research, be it qualitative or quantitative. In the words of Rorty, every
study has been "hammered out" in the course of its history and every study has
a role in modifying or shaping the future (Bernstein, 1983:167). A hermeneutic
spirit is useful in transcending any apparent dichotomy between quantitative and
qualitative methods.
The relationship between researcher and subject may vary from the non-
existent to the close and personal. The interview method followed in this study
falls somewhere between the two extremes. All the respondents were known
personally to the researcher but at varying degrees of closeness. Of course, no
relationship could be developed with the documentary sources researched.
However, the hermeneutic spirit takes research relationships beyond the
superficial level. Research becomes a conversation between the researcher and
the researched who include not only the interviewees but the "voices" within the
documents. This is an interesting corollary to what Kluckhohn has to say:
...informants should be viewed not as actors whose behaviour must be
measured, but as documents that reflect the culture of which they are the
bearers.
(In Sherman R. & Webb R. [eds], 1990:76)
Thus, all the sources for the study are people, and all the interviewees are
documents. To-and-fro movement between the researcher and the researched
constitutes the basic element of interpretation. Physical closeness may not always
lead to deeper understanding. Fusion of horizons occurs through the dialectical
process. Hermeneutics again overcomes the barriers between qualitative and
quantitative approaches.
In many studies, the researcher is an outsider, coming in with a pre-
ordained set of questions or framework with which to approach the subjects. It
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may in fact be important to try to remain detached. Attempting to see through
the eyes of the subjects and to get into their life-world represents the opposite
pole. At this end of the continuum, the researcher adopts the role of insider
(Bryman, 1988:96). A typical example of this would be the phenomenological
approach. In the words of Husserl, "back to the things themselves", or
commitment to the greatest possible freedom from pre-suppositions (Urmson and
Ree, 1991). The extreme could again be represented as the researcher controlling
the reported speech of the subjects as opposed to allowing them to speak for
themselves (Goodson and Walker, 1988).
It is of course possible to enter in some degree into other people's ways
of thinking, believing and acting. But with the best will in the world, we cannot
see things exactly as they do. Beattie (1981) argues that even within our own
culture, it is impossible both to be ourselves and to view the world from the
position of the researched. However, the researcher in a qualitative paradigm
attempts to view reality as supposedly constructed by the researched, achieving
empathetic understanding by challenging preconceptions. Within the spirit of
hermeneutics, the researcher tries to switch between detachment and involvement.
As Gadamer says, "there is a polarity of familiarity and strangeness on which
hermeneutic work is based" (Fowler, 1987:110). During the course of the study,
the researcher moved between the insider/outsider poles and encouraged his
subjects to do the same, thus bridging a dichotomy again. Insider subjects for
interview ere asked how "outsiders" viewed the Bank; the researcher's own
experience of orking as a Bank consultant was also used to inform the analysis.
Bryman 1988:97) suggests that deductive research starts from a given
theory or set of concepts whilst inductive research sets out to discover rather
than verify theory. In practice, research is rarely so neatly compartmentalised.
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structure and the following up of new lines of enquiry. Documentary analysis was
again loosely structured. The major concepts to be explored - self-reflection,
communication of information, governing ideas, informing values, the role of tacit
knowledge, established patterns of behaviour - had often to be interpreted or
surmised from Bank statements or critiques of Bank policy. Once again, a flexible
research strategy was adopted.
Quantitative research usually attempts to establish law-like findings - the
nomothetic dimension. This can also be true of certain types of qualitative
research. Webster et.al. (1993) in their investigation of parental choice of
secondary school, appear to show that presentations by headteachers and
"recruitment" materials produced by the schools have little influence over
parental choice. Opinions of current "customers" are a dominant force in
selection. As a general rule it could thus be argued that schools should not
bother with elaborate recruitment procedures or PR presentations by the Head.
Vulliamy (1990:161) refers to the trade-off in research between ecological validity
and population validity and the present study attempts to reach a balance
between the nomothetic and ideographic. The nomothetic is addressed through
questioning whether large international organizations can conform to the model
of a learning organization. The ideographic is addressed through examining a
particular organization at a particular time. Through the latter process,
generalisations are developed which resonate with the former question.
The Cartesian Anxiety mentioned earlier refers to the desire to find a fixed
reality against which phenomena can be measured. Reality is seen as external to
the actor. An alternative view is that reality is socially constructed; multiple
realities exist as different actors adopt different world-views. Taylor (1993:185)
argues that the true nature of reality can never be fully grasped. This is an
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attractive proposition in a world characterised by rapid change. This study
therefore assumes a dynamic view of reality rather than a fixed congruence
between the model adopted and the phenomena examined.
Bryman (1988:172) suggests that many aspects of the debate about
qualitative and quantitative research are unsatisfactory. Each approach has its
own strengths and weaknesses. If one is characterised as using "hard and
rigorous data", the other adopts a "rich and deep" metaphor. The present study
does not attempt to gather data by conventional quantitative research methods.
Its emphasis is more on the rich and deep. Yet the limitations of space dictate
that richness and depth cannot be too great. This apparent shortcoming is
overcome by using a hermeneutic approach.
4.3. Research techniques
4.3.1. Semi-structured interviews
Interviews can be used to obtain details of situations which the researcher
cannot witness (Burgess, 1984). Also, the interview is well suited to investigating
people's perceptions of phenomena or events. There is a wide variety of views
on the activities of the World Bank and the interview is a proper vehicle for
sampling these.
The interview exists in many forms and has many uses. Cohen and Manion
(1989:307 ff) distinguish between four types of interview - the structured
interview, the unstructured interview, the non-directive interview and the
focused interview. Kitwood (in Cohen and Manion, 1989:311 ff) also distinguishes
between interviews designed for pure information transfer, those which inevitably
contain bias and those which represent encounters sharing many of the features
of everyday life. In this study interviews have been used partly as a
conversation to explore issues and partly in a more structured way to ensure
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adequate coverage of the topics selected for investigation. The term "semi-
structured interview" has been adopted because the interview schedule (see
Thnexure), although structured in advance, allowed for the interviewees to go
)eyond the schedule, to discuss issues arising and to engage in a conversation
iith the researcher. Holstein and Gubrium (1995) suggest that in conventional
interviews, subjects are regarded as "vessels of answers", or mere repositories
of facts. For these writers, the trick of this type of interview is to formulate
questions and provide an atmosphere conducive to open and undistorted
communication between the respondent and the interviewer. The respondent is
therefore epistemologically passive, not engaged in the production of knowledge.
If the interview is construed as active, the subject creates knowledge. He or she
is an active maker of meaning. Traditional views of validity and reliability are
replaced when the interview is seen as a dynamic, meaning-making occasion. The
circumstances of production are seen as more important than correspondence of
answers. As Holstein and Gubrium express it:
All participants in an interview are inevitably implicated in
making meaning.
(Holstein and Gubrium, 1995:18)
All the interviews were individual, oral interchanges and were conducted
by telephone, a procedure suggested by Philip Jones. It was the task of
reviewing his book World Bank Financing of Education (Jones, 1992) that first
suggested the topic for this dissertation. The subjects had received a set of
questions in advance and had agreed to discuss them. All interviews were one-
time events.
Interviews by telephone present certain technical and methodological
challenges. In fact, the research literature on conducting interviews by telephone
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is thin, being mainly focussed on the large-scale commercial type of survey
beloved of Gallup and other pollsters. The in-depth interview by telephone is
rarely treated in the literature. Practical considerations dictated the use of the
telephone. Visits to Washington to interview Bank staff face-to-face were ruled
out by considerations of cost and time. A questionnaire for self-completion by
subjects was also rejected as there was a low likelihood of response and the
qualitative nature of the questions posed could not be addressed adequately.
The advantages of using telephone interviews were perceived to be many.
Apart from the cost saving the researcher felt that the more detached nature of
the questioning process would lead to a less messy set of responses. There would
be little or no interference by contextual influences. The interview would be
perceived as taking place on neutral territory. In addition, telephone interviews
tend to stick to the points raised. The cost of the call is often prominent in the
respondent's mind so little time is wasted. The telephone interview may also be
seen as more impersonal, less threatening than a face-to-face event. As the
researcher was to find, once the initial telephone contact had been made, the
ostensibly impersonal nature of the exchange helped the subjects open up and
expand their remarks more than might have happened in more conventional
circumstances (see Kitwood (in Cohen and Manion, 1980:319) for arguments in
favour of a more 'human' situation for the interview). Babble (1989) suggests that
telephone interviews have a number of advantages, the first being that the
interviewer can dress as he or she likes! Social niceties seem to figure strongly
in his thinking as the second major advantage Babbie notes is that over the
telephone respondents may be more honest and more willing to give socially
disapproved views. From the researcher's point of view, using the telephone may
also allow the probing of more sensitive areas. On the other hand, Babbie notes
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that respondents may be more suspicious if they cannot see you (Babble, 1989
:251). Bernard (1994) states that questionnaires conducted by telephone, in
person or through the mail yield equally valid results. Telephone interviews are
often less intimidating and allow probing as with face-to-face interviews
(Bernard, 1994:262). He also suggests that a maximum of 20 minutes should govern
telephone interviews as subjects get restless and less responsive over longer
periods (Bernard, 1994:263).
Other disadvantages of the telephone method must also be mentioned. The
most obvious is the lack of non-verbal cues as to what the subjects were
actually thinking. No body language was observable. The time given over to the
interviews was limited; replies were not expansive. It was perhaps easier to ask
leading questions over the telephone - a problem with any type of interview in
fact. Fontana and Frey (1994) in an article entitled, Interviewing, the Art of
Science suggest that all interviewers, whether by phone or face-to-face, must
exercise common sense and moral responsibility
to our subjects first, to the study next and to ourselves last.
(Fontana and Frey, 1994:373)
4.3.2. The interview schedule
To formulate an interview schedule, issues arising from the Bank's policy
statements over the last 25 years were integrated with criteria selected from the
literature on the learning organization (see Annexure 3 for a copy of the
schedule). The interview questions were broad in nature. For example, one item
was, tHOW are successes and failures dealt with in the Bank ? What mechanisms
are there for learning from the past?". Issues raised spontaneously by the
respondents were welcomed for a richer pattern of information. This approach is
justifiable in a study concerned more with meaning than numbers. Within this
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research paradigm the purpose of the interview is not so much data collection
as to establish meaning and plausible explanations.
Sampling presents problems in this type of study. In classical research
designs, sampling approaches depend on the population to be studied (Cohen and
Manion, 1989:101). To question quotas or strata of respondents who had
experience of the Bank, had been or were employed by them or were in some
recognisable position of competence to comment on the workings of the
organization presented problems both of scale and of preferred research
paradigm. Eventually what Cohen and Manion (1989:103) refer to as Purposive
Sampling was adopted in that the researcher 'handpicked' the respondents to be
included on the basis of his judgement of their competence and typicality. To
quote from Cohen and Manion again:
In this way (the researcher) builds up a sample that is satisfactory
to his specific needs.
(Cohen and Manion,1989:103)
This approach fits well with Glaser and Strauss' notion of 'theoretical sampling'
which they define as follows:
the process of data collection for generating theory whereby
the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyzes his data and
decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in
order to develop his theory as it emerges.
(Glaser and Strauss,1967:45)
As Figure 2. below illustrates, interviewees were both insiders and outsiders,
Bank staff and Bank critics. One informant moved from the inside to the outside
during the course of the research. Data from interviews were tape recorded. This
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was essential as all the interviews were conducted by telephone. Despite the
existence of recorded responses, some reconstruction of what was said inevitably
occurred. Even people in elevated academic and professional positions are not
invariably coherent and well organized in the spoken medium.
4.3.3. Documentary sources
As noted earlier the World Bank has been prolific in its output of policy and
review documents. The bibliography attached to the study gives a full list of all
those consulted. The literature critiquing the Bank deserves a special mention,
particularly the seminal book by Jones (1992) and the stimulating George and
Sabelli (1994). Chapter 5 below indicates in detail the Bank literature and the
critical literature reviewed. Suffice it to state at this point that the researcher
attempted to examine an appropriate spread of documentation.
Figure 3: Research Design: Insiders and Outsiders
Insiders	 Outsiders
People	 Bank staff	 Bank critics
Documents	 Bank papers,	 Published critiques
policy statements etc.
4.3.4. Data analysis
Within the discipline of hermeneutics a constant interplay between the data and
conceptualisatlon is an important feature of the data analysis process. This is
somewhat parallel to the constant comparison methods of grounded theory.
Constant comparison generates plausible categories, properties and hypotheses
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about the problem under investigation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Addison (1993)
provides a first-hand account of how hermeneutics work in practice for the
researcher. He describes hermeneutic data analysis as a "necessarily circular
procedure". Whilst immersed in observing events, writing notes and recording
interviews he "moved back and forth between collecting, analysing, reflecting and
writing in such a way that cannot be laid out or predicted in advance" (Addison,
1993:116). All these activities were carried out in the light of the practical
research question under consideration - in this study's case, "Does the World
Bank operate like a learning organization?" Addison developed a coding system
to make sense of his data, a global approach in which key or recurrent phrases
or terms were recorded from a variety of responses and an "in vivo" coding from
what was actually said by his respondents. Out of this collection of words and
phrases a visual display of cards and notes was put together. Soon, common
threads became detectable, organizing themes evolved. Notes and transcripts were
re-examined to find further references to the key themes and the "hermeneutic
circle", from understanding to interpretation to deeper understanding to more
comprehensive interpretation was achieved.
Too much activity within the hermeneutic circle has its dangers for the
researcher too. As Miles and Huberman (1994:11) suggest an extended text can
overload our information handling capacities and may result in the "finding" of
oversimplified patterns. Strauss and Corbin (1990) have suggested means for
raising levels of theoretical sensitivity by using techniques such as flip-flop,
where a concept is turned upside down to encourage more extreme comparisons.
Theoretical sensitivity is important in grounded theory as it develops an
awareness of the subtleties of meaning within data and it relates to the capacity
to develop theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:41). For the past fifteen years the
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4.3.5. Triangulation and Qualitative Research
Originally borrowed from land-surveying, the concept of triangulation is closely
related to the quantitative tradition (Bryman, 1988:131). The central idea of
triangulation is to cross-check different findings against each other (Bryman and
Burgess, 1984). This process is expected to produce validity (Jary and Jary,
1991), or a check on whether the test or procedure in use really measures what
it was supposed to measure. There are numerous methods of triangulation but
four dimensions are normally utilised - data, investigator, theory and method
(Bryman, 1988; Burgess, 1984; McKernan, 1991). Method is the most commonly
tested dimension and it usually refers to the use of more than one method of
data collection within a single study.
Inconsistencies among different sets of data are not uncommon. The problem
in such circumstances is to know which to adopt as the most valid. Hitchcock and
Hughes (1989) have argued that one data source cannot be used unproblematically
to validate another. When the metaphor of triangulation is transferred to a
qualitative study, the problems become more profound. The underlying
epistemology of a quantitative study is that there is an external reality '1out
there" somewhere which can be measured. By triangulating, the researcher
focuses down and identifies that reality by reference to other fixed points.
However, most qualitative researchers work on the assumption that multiple
realities exist within us as well as "out there". The well documented accounts of
inconsistencies among eye-witnesses to an accident or crime bear this out. Victims
or perpetrators can be tall, short, dark, light, fat, thin, male or female when eye-
witness accounts are tabulated. Socially constructed reality is evident; objectivity
and validity become less significant. As Denzin (1994:507) puts it, all texts are
biased, reflecting the influence of class, gender, ethnicity and culture.
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Triangulation in qualitative research is usually taken to correspond with validity
in quantitative research. But, as Wu (1995) has indicated, there may be a
"metaphor mismatch" if triangulation is used unproblematically in qualitative
research. Her argument is that it is quite possible for qualitative research to
operate on a positivist model, more frequently associated with quantitative
studies. In cases like this it is quite legitimate to use triangulation. However, if
multiple reality is the epistemological underpinning, external and fixed reality, the
basis of triangulation, cannot be entertained. She offers the following matrix to
illustrate her case:
Figure 4	 Research and Triangulation
With Triangulation	 Withit Triangulathn
Q&a1ftative research
based on an external
reality metaphor
Qualitative research












Wu's analysis suggests that when a qualitative study uses triangulation to
confirm reality then a metaphor mismatch occurs, a Type 1 error. However, when
a qualitative study uses the techniques devised by triangulation as a means to
identify and track down multiple meanings or realities then this is a legitimate
use of triangulation within the qualitative epistemology (see Figure 4.2.above). In
order to distinguish between the two techniques, she has coined the term "neo-
triangulation".
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4.3.6. The concept of Neo-triangulation
In qualitative research the scope of the term triangulation has to be extended
and enriched. Many qualitative researchers use triangulation, but not in its
cross-checking or validation sense (Bryman and Burgess, 1994:223). Wolcott
(1994:369) argues that to identify critical elements in data and to seek plausible
explanations is more acceptable than a search for ultimate truth. Perfect validity
is probably unattainable anyway. For these reasons, Wu's concept of neo-
triangulation has been adopted in this study whose focus is on meaning and
explanation rather than reliability and validity in a more positivist sense.
4.3.7. The strategy of multiple methods
In this study, an attempt has been made to use the widely recognised strategy
of multiple methods. Documentary analysis as well as interviews have been
employed. The use of multiple investigators has been used in the sense that
interviews have been conducted with Bank officials and with Bank critics. In the
same way, Bank documents have been examined as well as documents critical of
the Bank. In this way, "outsiders" as well as "insiders" have been questioned.
4.4. Summary
A qualitative approach has been adopted in this study because of the nature of
the enquiry, an exploratory investigation of certain characteristics of the World
Bank. The research techniques employed include semi-structured interviews and
documentary analysis. A hermeneutic strategy is the main approach to data
analysis. Hermeneutics allows for some bridging of the traditional gap between
quantitative and qualitative research. The overall aim of this combination of
approaches is to achieve fusion of horizons, a successful transition from current
reality to the world we seek to appraise.
Addison (1993:124) concludes the account of his hermeneutic approach as follows:
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I do not believe that (my) account corresponds with or reconstructs
'reality'. Rather, I generated an interpretive account that looks at a crucial
period (in the process of becoming a physician); provides an interpretation
of how distress developed and was maintained; describes the conditions,
context and problematic atmosphere of the process; discusses the costs
and significance of the process for the residents, their families and health
care; and suggests directions for improving physician training. The account
can be modified as time, social conditions and individuals change.
Similar aims inform the present study.
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CHAPTER 5 : THE WORLD BANK AS A LEARNING ORGANIZATION: WHAT THE PAPERS
SAY
The World Bank lies at the centre of the m&jor changes in global education
of our time. Its financial power and influence have helped shaped the




The foregoing chapters have shown that the concept of the learning organization
has much to offer for the more effective management and operation of an
organization. It has also been seen that certain characteristics define learning
organizations - they are participatory, democratic and creative; they are system-
based and informational; they are action-based. In addition, learning organizations
are open and reflective, they perceive their situation as complex and problematic
and they attempt to make sense of the world. Perhaps most significantly they
harness the collective genius of the organization by design. Strategies and
structures do not arise by accident but are purposefully established (see Table
1 in Chapter 2 above).
This study now goes on to examine the workings of the World Bank in
order to assess its standing as a learning organization. Implicit in this enquiry
is the assumption that learning organizations are better at what they do than
organizations which do not or cannot learn. Still more deeply implicit in the
study is the preconception that the Bank probably may not conform to the
characteristics of a learning organization. But in the true spirit of grounded
theory in partnership with hermeneutics the evidence must be adduced and
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subjected to analysis before understanding is reached.
The chosen evidence on which to base an assessment of the Bank as a
learning organization is fourfold. First the documentary evidence is examined and
then the evidence drawn from a number of interviews. Documents from within and
from outside the Bank are analysed. Subjects from within and without the Bank
are interviewed leading to the fourfold design tabulated below:
Figure 5 : Research Evidence: The Fourfold Design
Source	 Insider	 Outsider
Documents	 Bank publications e.g. 	 Published critiques
1974/80/95 Policy papers
People	 Bank staff, e.g. education	 Bank commentators,e.g.
specialists	 academics, former Bank
staff
Dealing with the research evidence presents the researcher with an organizational
and conceptual problem. The interview schedule prepared for the 'people
dimension' of the study has obvious limitations in being applied to documents.
What the documents say is one thing. What they imply is another and how they
are interpreted is yet one more view. Integrating the evidence from the people
and the documents had obvious attractions for the coherence of the study yet,
in the spirit of nec-triangulation, and for practical reasons, it was decided to
look at documents and people separately and then to attempt an integrative
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exercise to complete the hermeneutic circle. It must also be noted that separating
documentary and human evidence provides a barrier to over-integration or the
finding of over-simplified patterns. Theoretical sensitivity is also enhanced by
this separation of data sources.
5.2. The documentary sources
The World Bank has been a prolific producer of documentation, not just
concerning education but covering all aspects of its work in both the developed
and developing worlds. Of specific interest to the present study has been its
output on educational matters. Significant among this extensive output have been
the policy or sector papers published in 1974, 1980 and 1995 (World Bank
1974,1980,1995). In addition, a wide variety of additional regional or topic-based
papers have been produced. Prominent among these have been the 1988 paper,
Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies for Adjustment,Revitalization and
Expansion (World Bank, 1988). These four major publications form the prime focus
for the 'insider' documentary analysis although, as noted in Chapter 3 above,
other significant Bank publications have not been neglected.
'Outsider' documentary sources are more numerous than the insider
product. For every paper produced by the Bank a multiplicity of critical
responses can be expected, some positive, many negative. For the researcher
there is a temptation to take the easier road of simply pulling together the best
of a rich vein of 'Bank-bashing' literature. Yet it must be repeated that the Bank
is not monolithic and much of what it pronounces is well received. It must also
be said that it is easier to find critics of its pronounced educational policies than
to find whole-hearted supporters. Part of the reason for this is the Bank's own
approach to its published output. It rarely if ever employs or promotes the views
of more radical educational thinkers. It would be unthinkable for an Everett
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Reimer, a Paulo Freire or an Ivan Illich to be found among the Bank's authors,
commentators or even as participants in Bank seminars. An examination of the
participants at the Jomtien Conference 'Education for All' held in Indonesia in
1990 reveals a predictable list of educationalists, some of whom, it must be
admitted, are on record as critics of Bank policy. Yet the overwhelming weight
of published evidence from the Bank itself is 'insider' originated. However,
further discussion of this issue is deferred until the documentary sources are
examined more thoroughly below.
5.3 The insider literature; selected Bank documents
Any selection offers an opportunity for demonstrating bias yet those Bank
documents which are most prominent and which would be regarded as presenting
the most obvious statements of Bank thinking, policy and action have been
selected. They are also representative of a spread of Bank output over time, from
1974 to 1995. The selected documents also deal with the broader issues of policy,
a focus which it is held wifi more clearly indicate whether a learning organization
is at work or not. Since 1980, in addition to its annual World Development
Reports, the Bank has produced 16 major statements on policy (see Bibliography
for Priorities and Strategies for Education, World Bank, 1995). In addition,
publications authored by Bank staff or nominees have been numerous
[e.g.Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985);Levin and Lockheed (1990);Lockheed and
Verspoor (1991); Zidermann and Albrecht (1995)]. The Bank has also been prolific
in its production of internal discussion papers and keeping up with the Bank's
output in education alone is a serious challenge. In order to make the present
study manageable, the following Bank publications have therefore been selected
for specific analysis:
- Education Sector Working Paper (1974)
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- Education Sector Policy Paper (1980)
- Education in Sub-Saharan Africa (1988)
- Priorities and Strategies for Education (1995)
The earlier discussion of Chapter 3 , particularly sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4., dealt
with additional Bank literature. Lockheed and Verspoor (1991) and Higher
Education;The Lessons of Experience (1994) were examined for their reflection of
the characteristics of a learning organization. In other words, an attempt has
been made to look at a representative spread of Bank material.
5.4. What the papers say - the output of a learning organization ?
As an introductory statement concerning the World Bank papers, it must be noted
that certain overarching themes or theoretical positions govern the way the Bank
presents its papers and policies. Foremost among these has always been the
economists' view of the value and purpose of education as opposed to the
pedagogues' view or the social administrators' view. The tight coupling of the
Bank's educational policies with its economic policies is a given. This wedding of
educational policy to economic policy presents one of the most intractable
barriers to the Bank's operation as a true learning organization. Put simply, the
Bank has always viewed education as a dimension of economic activity; it is there
to serve economic rather than social or individual developmental missions. This
view is allegedly changing as the researcher's interviews with Bank staff reveal
below. However, the starting point of a discussion of the Bank's documentation
is the dominance of a specific economic paradigm in education and the consequent
use by the Bank of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and the education production
function (EPF) as tools for the analysis of education (see Hough, 1992; Bennell,
1995; Simmons, 1980). Briefly, the Bank argues that the only effective way to
measure the quality of education, by which is meant formal schooling, is by
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measuring its contribution to economic growth and development. Hence its aims
for education will always be couched in these terms.
Within this economic development paradigm, the World Bank in its early
years concentrated on projects in technical and vocational education at various
levels and on general secondary education to meet the needs for trained
manpower in the developing countries (World Bank, 1980:78). So-called 'hardware'
projects involving construction and equipment were the preferred mode of
operation in the 1960s. By 1971, a 'systematic study of the total education sector
of a country as a prerequisite to financing' (World Bank, 1980:78) had largely
replaced the bricks and mortar approach of the previous decade. Construction
was still regarded as important but a concern for quality and for manpower
training was emphasised. New areas for lending were suggested to include non-
formal education and training, educational broadcasting, local production of
learning materials and support for management and administration. Commenting
on the 1974 Education Sector Working Paper, Williams (1975) was concerned that
despite these shifts, gaps were still visible between the Bank's policies and the
development realities of many low income countries.
This judgement raises the question of whether, at this early stage, the
Bank was becoming set in its ways or whether it was learning from its
experience. Before going more deeply into the selected literature it is worth
asking what signs or indications of a learning organization might be expected
from the Bank's published output. Revisiting the analysis of Chapter Two above,
especially Table 1, Characteristics of Learning Organizations, the following salient
signs or indicators may be looked for in the Bank's published output:
- Evidence of shared deep basic assumptions
- Signs of an open, participatory, action-based, informational and creative
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organizational culture
- Indications of clear defining values; ideas thought to be important
include participation, purpose and vision, appropriate information loads,
situations perceived as complex, being open to self-criticism, attempting
to make sense of the world
- Evidence of' successes and failures being dealt with openly as a basis for
learning; meaning being shared in an enabling environment and legitimate
errors being accepted
- Indications that knowledge and information are shared openly, that there
are high levels of interaction, good ideas emanate from anyone and
feed back mechanisms function well
- Evidence that information is generated through experience, it is absorbed
effectively and differing viewpoints are accepted
- Evidence that knowledge is contributed by all and integrated into the
organization in a planned way through systematic processes.
In sum, the literature produced by a learning organization to announce its
strategies, rationale, policies and actions should reflect the qualities above.
It must be admitted that mere documentary analysis may not reveal all that
is being sought, hence the importance of the interviews with Bank insiders and
outsiders which complement the study of the documents - neo-triangulation in
practice. Table 2 below represents an abstract of the main themes and statements
of each document. This table is the beginning of what Addison (1993) describes
as the "hermeneutic circle". As the documents were reviewed, analysed and
summarised, so key themes and issues presented themselves to the researcher.
A visual display of notes was assembled as Addison described and then the
display was examined for signs of change and development. From the documentary
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sources categories were arrived at - areas of little or no change, areas of limited
change, areas of significant change and areas difficult to categorize. This
fourfold grouping informed the later analyses of critical documentary sources and
the oral information given by subjects interviewed. Hermeneutics then gives rise
to a complex of interpretation - what was said by whom and what level of change
did the statement indicate ? Within this complexity lies another hermeneutic
technique - questioning the account. As will be seen below, contradictions occur.
The Bank is not monolithic nor entirely internally consistent. Questioning the
account and constantly revisiting the categories confer validity in Glaser and
Strauss' terms as part of theory development and not as some final product
control, building into the research process checks of the "credibility, plausibility
and trustworthiness" of the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:223). So what did
this first hermeneutic exercise in neo-triangulation reveal?
Areas of little or no change
a) Where do Bank policies come from?
Broadly speaking the Bank's policy statements are internally produced. The level
of external input has risen over the period since 1974; however, the 'external'
inputs remain largely Bank commissioned or from 'friends' of the Bank. This
raises serious questions about how the Bank deals with information and
knowledge. According to Dixon (1994) the widespread generation of information
characterises learning organizations. The Bank appears on this evidence to fall
short. Much more on this issue was revealed through the interviews and, as a
key category of analysis, it will be returned to below.
b) What does the Bank see as important in the educational field ?
The focus over the years has always been on the role of formal education with
little or no importance placed on non-formal approaches. The discussion in the
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1974 paper (World Bank, 1974:11) has segued into a work-related training debate
in the 1980 paper (World Bank, 1980:42). Although this consistency fits in well
with a learning organization's quality of shared deep basic assumptions, it might
also indicate a kind of inflexibility. Could these shared assumptions have ossified?
If in Senge's (1990) terms learning organizations are generative rather than
adaptive, one would look for evidence of the Bank generating new responses to
changing realities. Morgan (1986) notes that learning organizations attempt to
make sense of a complex world. Planned change of focus would seem inevitable
in any organization. Yet the Bank falls short here too.
c) What themes characterise Bank statements on education ?
Efficiency has been a recurring theme throughout all the papers examined;
internal efficiency is defined as getting schools to raise cognitive achievement
levels of pupils; external efficiency is defined as preparing pupils adequately for
economic activity in the modern sector. Linked as these ideas are with the overall
economistic outlook of the Bank it is perhaps not surprising to find them
repeatedly appearing in the literature. Yet the economic indicators of countries
in the poorer parts of the world clearly show that economic development has not
taken off in sufficient strength to provide the modern sector employment
essential for these aims to be realistic. The World Bank Annual Report for 1995
states, concerning sub - Saharan Africa:
Although there has been relatively less progress overall on the deeper
structural elements of the development agenda, successful examples can be
pointed to. Twenty-one countries (of 34) achieved positive per capita
income growth during 1988-93. About half (i.e. ten) attained or exceeded
growth rates of between 4 per cent and 5 per cent annually.
( World Bank Annual Report, 1995:56)
99
This is hardly an account of overwhelming success in modernizing sub-Saharan
Africa. The modern sector remains a distant target for most school leavers. More
realistically, in the same report the Bank admits that , "it is impossible to speak
of sub-Saharan Africa as an undifferentiated whole" (World Bank Annual report,
1995:56). Yet the prescriptions for progress are exactly that - undifferentiated.
d) What means does the Bank use for measuring educational progress?
Economic tools for measuring the effectiveness of education have always been
favoured by the Bank. Manpower planning was utilised in the 1970s but the
apparently more sophisticated cost-benefit analysis procedures brought in during
the 1980s remain a major technology by which the Bank measures success in
education. Despite passing references to the cultural and civilizing effects of
schooling in the 1995 paper, little or no use is made of social and cultural
indicators for the effectiveness of schooling. Referring again to the 1995 World
Bank Annual Report the Bank states:
Lending for basic social needs during fiscal 1995 alone amounted to $3,907
million; $2,097 million for education sector projects; $1,162 for projects and
components in the population, health and nutrition sector; and $648 million
for projects in the social sector.... The Bank's long-term vision in the area
of human capital formation is to help developing countries reach the point
where inadequate in vestments in people no longer hold back growth or
keep people in poverty.
World Bank Annual Report, 1995:18)
Inadequate investments in people typify the Bank's view of the problem with
education in the developing world. The aims and content of that schooling
experience are rarely discussed.
e) What is the role of schooling in the developing world ?
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Relevance was a key term for the Bank's educators of the 1970s. Although, like
freedom, relevance is a relational concept (the question must be asked,
"Relevance to what?"), it is only defined by the Bank implicitly - relevance to
economic development. By the 1995 paper, relevance has become more explicit -
schooling is to develop 'adaptable workers for changing economies' - but the
theme of all the Bank's papers is unchanged. Schooling is to prepare youth for
productive work in the modern sector. Lip service is paid by the Bank to
"improving the quality of life" as a development aim in the broadest sense. But
this is defined by the Bank largely in terms of higher incomes (World Bank
Annual Report, 1995:18).
But the unchanging nature of much of the Bank's rhetoric and practice
is not universal. There are signs of adaptation and even generation.
Areas of limited change
a) What aspects of education has the Bank emphasised ?
An early emphasis on hardware - buildings, equipment, materials - has to some
extent been replaced by more of an emphasis on software - the teacher, the
managers, what happens in the classroom. The 1995 paper Priorities and
Strategies for Education is particularly strong on this with its emphasis on
improving the quality of education by raising the students' capacity and
motivation to learn, improving the curriculum, developing teachers who know
their subjects and can teach them, providing adequate time for learning and
providing the requisite tools for teaching and learning. Yet even within this more
hopeful scenario there are numerous signs that the Bank has failed to learn from
past experience. "Sound-bite policies" are in abundant evidence. Determinants of
effective learning are tabulated on page 83 of the document referred to (World
Bank, 1995). Libraries are shown in a histogram as having the greatest effect on
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pupil learning. At least, that is the impression given by the bar-chart. Closer
inspection reveals that 90% of studies dealing with the effectiveness of libraries
on pupil performance show a positive effect; almost the same can be said of
"instructional time" as a determinant of pupil achievement. Class size is at the
opposite end of the scale with only 38% of studies showing that it had a positive
effect on pupil performance. Fuller and Clarke (1994) are given as the sources
of this information. Yet such sound-bite solutions to complex issues raise a
variety of questions - What sort of libraries - class libraries, school libraries,
circulating book boxes ? How frequently do pupils use them 7 Under staff
supervision or by free access 7 Do they simply read or carry out structured
assignments 7 Is a qualified librarian necessary or even essential 7 Are books
borrowed or simply referred to ?
It is not enough to say that serious enquirers should go back to the original
research which was collated by Fuller and Clarke. Busy Permanent Secretaries
seeking answers to pressing problems will be seduced by colourful histograms.
In brief, the switch from hardware solutions to software solutions seems to be
as beset with difficulties as ever. Limited change is no real change here. Broader
questions of how the Bank deals with information - a characteristic indicator of
the true learning organization - must be raised at this point. As becomes clear
through the interviews discussed below, there is a strong sense among Bank
critics of the organization selecting strategies or answers, presenting them as
unproblematically as possible and then declaring, "Research tells us...". (see, for
instance, World Bank, 1995:22,28 and 73).
b) Have the significant themes of Bank policy changed ?
Equity was a significant theme of the 1974 paper. Over the years this has been
accompanied by emphases on access and quality with gender equity assuming a
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more dominant role in the 1995 paper (World Bank, 1995:43ff). This change is to
be welcomed yet it has usually been discussed in the Bank documentation in a
context and culture-free way. Typical is the Bank's treatment of female enrolment.
The 1995 paper places great emphasis on the statistical dimension of the gender
gap in enrolments; girls in South Asia could expect 6.0 years of schooling
whereas boys could expect 8.9 years (1990 figures). But the 1995 paper also
reports and supports concrete measures to improve girls' levels of enrolment by
the provision of stipends, increasing the number of women teachers and
conducting community awareness programmes (World Bank, 1995:115). The Bank
does seem to learn from experience that pleading the case for greater equity in
access and greater quality in provision demands concrete proposals which will
bring about change. Yet there is a lingering suspicion that deeper understanding
of why girls do not attend or why parental choice is a nonsensical concept in
rural Tanzania remains outside the Bank's policy prescriptions.
c) Have sources for policy formulation changed ?
The 1974 paper makes no bones about its prescription of externally developed
policies. The 1980 paper lays claim to some local market research in its
recommendations. The 1988 paper is unashamedly clear about prescribing policies
from the 'successful' economies of the West. By 1995, the Bank's policy paper is
referring to 'stakeholders', lays claim to lessons from research and experience
and tries to couch its prescriptions in global language. What is successful in the
"Tiger" economies and in the more developed nations of the West - privatisation,
market competition, less government - informs the discourse. The apparent
contradiction of global solutions based on stakeholder research is easily squared
in Bank-speak. The question must be raised, "Which 'stakeholders' is the Bank
referring to?" There are no references in the research-heavy 1995 paper to
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experience from Cuba, Senegal, the People's Republic of China or any of the other
countries where alternative economic models are in use. Those studies which come
from former socialist economies like Romania, Poland or Mongolia focus on the
problems of 'transition', the process of becoming like the West (World Bank,
1995:171). A relatively naive, positivist reliance on economic articles of faith is
evident throughout the period referred to. Any change is very limited indeed.
Areas of significant change
a) What type of schooling is recommended ?
Whereas vocational education was an emphasis of the 1974 paper, by the 1980s
the focus had moved to general secondary education and latterly to basic
education as a priority. This of course presents its own problems, particularly
for those countries which borrowed and invested on the strength of earlier Bank
prescriptions. This criticism is particularly acute in the case of higher education.
Huge amounts of investment were devoted to the universities of emergent Africa,
often supported by Bank loans. A 511% increase in tertiary enrolments was
recorded by the Bank between 1950 and 1970 (World Bank, 1974:13). In the late
1990s governments are left with expensive plant and staff, ambitious students and
a vacuum in funding and support. The Coiclough World Bank Staff Working Paper
(World Bank,1980) entitled Primary Schooling and Economic Deveiopment;A Review
of the Evidence, must be seen as a very significant event in Bank policy
formulation. Although the paper points more to the failings of the secondary
sector than to hard evidence of the advantages of investment in the primary
sector, Bank embracing of the cheaper, more populist provision became
institutionalized. Careful analysis of the evidence for basic/primary education's
greater private and public rates of return in developing countries reveals very
substantial doubts about its validity. Yet, as witnessed in the Jomtien Conference,
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Education for All, investment in basic/primary education is now an article of
faith. How the Bank deals with information, especially that which clashes with its
own ideology, presents a very serious criticism of its function as a learning
organization.
b) Who pays for education ?
Public financing of education in the 1970s as a policy imperative has gradually
been replaced by a shift towards more private funding in the 1980 paper, a mix
of public and private in the 1988 paper and finally, in 1995 to a stronger
emphasis on cost-sharing and 'household involvement' and less reliance on public
finance for schooling. As early as the 1974 paper the Bank was asking questions
about who pays for schooling and suggesting that governments spending more
than 20% of public expenditure on education were likely to damage other
deserving sectors (World Bank, 1974:21). The paper goes on to ventriloquise the
proposals of "some analysts" that school fees should be introduced or increased
to lower demand and to share costs more equitably. These proposals are linked
with the highly impractical suggestion that earning differentials should be
reduced between groups with different educational attainments (World Bank,
1974:23). It is interesting to contrast this Stalinist notion in the 1974 paper with
the Thatcherite views of the place of the market in determining who pays for
education found in the 1995 paper. Is this knowledge generated by experience
and integrated into the organization ? Or does it represent an urgent search for
solutions to the intractable problem in the Third World of how to fund increasing
demands for schooling ? Borrowing solutions from the affluent West where
parents, albeit unwillingly in many cases, will use their spare capacity to finance
their children's education; in the countries of the poorest of the poor this
scenario is unlikely to run.
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Areas more difficult to categorize
a) The issue of quality
Concerns with quality in education have been expressed by the Bank from time
to time. They are found more strongly emphasised in the 1988 and 1995 papers.
As early as 1974 the Bank was concerned about the question of relevance, stating
rather sweepingly that:
Education systems have been irrelevant to the needs of developing
countries during the last two decades because education policies were often
keeping company with overall development strategies which were themselves
irrelevant to the societies and conditions of developing countries.
(World Bank, 1974:3)
This linking of educational policy with development policy was referred to earlier.
Questions have also been raised about the appropriateness of current Bank
development policies and the continuing linkage of educational, strategies to
perceived economic goals. Defining quality has become a more sophisticated art
since 1974. The 1980 paper remained largely focused on relevance as the key
quality factor (World Bank, 1980:21). The 1988 paper focused very much on
cognitive achievement of pupils as the crucial quality factor (World Bank,
1988:31). The 1995 paper takes a more elaborated view, dealing with a variety of
"inputs" as key factors in quality. As for changes in Bank behaviour detectable
from these shifts, suffice it to say that broad generalizations have been replaced
by technical solutions to what are complex problems. It has been stated earlier
that a characteristic of the learning organization is that it sees the world as a
complex place. This is not always true of the World Bank.
b) Issues of management.
Proposals for improving the management of education are found in all the papers
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under discussion. In this sense there is no change. The 1974 paper emphasises
macro-planning and management (World Bank, 1974:6). The 1980 paper devotes
much more space to management, administration, planning and research (World
Bank, 1980:53 - 58). Even greater detail in prescriptions is to be found in the
1988 paper (World Bank, 1988:81 - 92). The 1995 paper makes an interesting
departure. Rather than the usual section on management and administration of
education, the paper looks at issues like decentralization, the creation of more
autonomous institutions, developing more creative funding procedures and
generally getting the 'stakeholders' more involved in education (World Bank, 1995:
126 ff). Is it possible to detect some learning from experience, or do these
measures simply represent the application of free market strategies tried in the
West and now applied more generally ?
c) Pupil achievement and estandards
A concern for academic standards is more evident in the 1980, 1988 and 1995
papers. The 1980 paper focuses on efficiency in learning, improvements to the
curriculum, teacher education and instructional materials (World Bank 1980,30 ff).
Books and supplies are the emphasis of the 1988 paper (World Bank, 1988:45) and
the 1995 paper heads one of its sections of recommendations as "Attention to
Outcomes" (World Bank, 1995:94). The Bank's expressions of concern about
academic standards must be seen within the research framework adopted. Over
the period during which the four selected papers were produced the Bank has
shown a heavy reliance upon positivist research of the school
effectiveness/determinants of cognitive achievement type (see, for example,
Simmons, 1980). This kind of research specializes in separating out variables
which can be identified as more or less important in determining pupil
achievement. From such studies it can be deduced that the successful pupil is
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a boy attending a boarding school which has well educated (but not necessarily
trained) teachers. Adequate time-on-task is provided in an environment where
success is valued, leadership is exercised and there is a common understanding
among teachers of the mission of the school. In addition, this successful boy will
come from a home where the parents are educated, where an international
language is spoken and where books, newspapers and other media are available.
The research findings on which these prescriptions are based are frequently
conflicting (see Table 16 in Simmons, 1980:86-87). The controversial TEA studies
are often used by the Bank to buttress its prescriptions (see World Bank,
1995:167) despite real concerns about the comparability of such international tests
( see, for example, Vaizey in Purves and Levine (1975:161) and Theisen in Aitbach
and Kelly,1986). A concern for academic standards in the Bank's output is not
unexpected but questions must be raised about whether this is another example
of 'Back to Basics' or whether there are genuine educational reasons for this
emphasis.
5.5. Summing up the swnmary
What can this summary tell us about the Bank's status as a learning
organization? If the criteria identified earlier are now applied to the Bank's
publications, is it possible to relate areas of greater or lesser change to those
criteria ?
The shared assumptions of the Bank's education division seem to be clear enough.
Formal education as the key to modernization and economic development has
always been an article of faith with the Bank. It is represented strongly in the
four documents referred to. Only in the 1995 statement is there reference to the
cultural and civilizing dimensions of schooling. By this criterion the Bank is a
learning organization. It has a consistency in its shared assumptions but may
108
show evidence of a change in behaviour as the more social and cultural aspects
of formal schooling are recognised.
An open and participatory culture ? Certainly the evidence from the documents
appears to show that a shift has occurred in the Bank's use of outsiders in
formulating its policies. The 1974 paper had a total of ten academic references.
By 1980 this had risen to 65. The 1995 paper has 275 references, 100 of them
coming from internal sources or staff members. Of the remaining 175, many are
publications by Bank staff or associates which are found in academic journals.
There is no doubt that there is an appearance of more openness and
participation. In addition, it should be noted that the Bank normally invites a
selected group of academics and critics to comment on drafts of its major papers
(see World Bank, 1995:xiii). This reference group is usually named in the
acknowledgements along with a 'Bankwide advisory panel'. In a personal
communication from a participant in such an exercise, it was revealed that
contributions from the reference group for the 1995 paper were not incorporated
into the final version. Thus there is a perception among Bank critics that the
procedure for openness and participation is in place but it is more a matter of
appearance than reality. This issue will be returned to as the critics of the
Bank's documents are discussed below.
Clear defining values are another mark of the learning organization which
sees its world as complex whilst trying to make sense of it. The Bank documents
referred to fail to match up to this criterion. Situations are not seen as complex.
General solutions, for example, adjustment, revitalization and selective expansion,
are offered for what are often country-specific problems. One of the interviewees
within the Bank refers to this phenomenon as 'sound-bite answers to complex
problems' (see below). Seeking new sources of finance is offered as a solution to
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economic difficulties in providing schooling - this for countries where even the
Bank admits the poor are already paying too much towards the education of their
own and other's children. It can be argued that the Bank has clear defining
values. These are revealed in the documents and in the interviews discussed
below. But these values do not match the vision of a learning organization which
attempts to make sense of the real world, rather than a world constructed in
Washington.
The learning organization deals with its successes and failures in specific
ways. It is impossible to find in the Bank's documents any indication that the
policies and projects of the past have failed. Experience is referred to in tandem
with research as the basis for the policy selections found in the 1995 paper. That
experience seems always to have been positive. Yet Bank projects fail. An example
is found in an annex to this study. Nowhere is failure recognised or dealt with,
even euphemistically.
Knowledge and information are shared openly in learning organizations. The
evidence for and against this is more clearly perceived through the interviews
below but analysis of the sources of information used by the Bank indicates that
restricted sources of information are used by the Bank. The vast majority of
information is generated in the West, and in the United States in particular.
The 1995 paper lists 275 references. Only 10 of them come from developing world
sources with another 2 drawn from overseas offices of USAID. If the sources of
information are seen to be restricted it is not unfair to conclude that open
sharing of knowledge and information within the organization may function but
that sharing is of information from severely constrained sources.
Knowledge and information are generated through experience in the learning
organization. This seems to indicate a reflective approach to the review of
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experience; efforts are made to make sense of what has happened and to gain
from the reflection process. The 1995 paper Priorities and Strategies for
Education, (World Bank, 1995) begins its substantive discussion on page 17 with
the heading, The Record of Experience and the Tasks Ahead. Unfortunately little
or no real experience is referred to or drawn upon. Rather the document
concentrates on assertions like,
The spread of education has reduced poverty by helping developing
countries' economies grow at historically rapid rates.
(World Bank, 1995:17)
In addition, education contributes to the strengthening of the institutions
of civil society, to national capacity building and to good governance..
(World Bank, 1995:19)
No evidence is adduced to support these assertions, no 'record of experience' is
quoted from. More positively, the Bank's document goes on to point out that
although education contributes to economic growth, of itself it will not generate
growth. This only occurs where other conditions are right - such conditions as
the right mix of investment in human and physical capital in a competitive
market, which itself is the product of macroeconomic stability, well functioning
labour markets and an openness to international trade and modern technology.
These are conditions which few western economies enjoy, let alone those of the
poorest countries in the world. It seems a counsel of despair to suggest that
investment in schooling only pays off under these rare and unreliable conditions.
Yet the critic detects a shift from the simplistic statements of earlier days, for
example, Harbison and Myers' dictum that 'education is the key that unlocks the
door to modernization' (Harbison and Myers,1964). Reflection on the Bank's
experience would surely have lead to more realistic goals for formal schooling
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than to see modern education systems in developing countries as viable only
when part of complex, inter-related economic patterns of development. Analysis
of the documents seems to indicate clearly that very little real reflection on
experience goes on within the Bank. The same economic models are embraced,
albeit with a switch between 1974 and 1995 from Manpower Planning as the major
tool for educational development towards Cost Benefit Analysis, an equally suspect
technology (Flough, 1992; Bennell, 1995).
5.6. What the critics of tue papers say.
Once again, a selection process must be undergone and a representative spread
in time as well as viewpoint is used. Rather than attempting a comprehensive
presentation of each critic's views, selected issues are subjected to examination
through the lens of the learning organization in much the same way that the
Bank's own papers were assessed.
The starting point is an examination of the Bank's deep basic assumptions
and beliefs. Note has already been taken of the Bank's strongly economistic view
of the world. After all, this is a Bank under examination, not a philanthropic
society. Gibbon et.al.(1993) point out that during the 1970s the Bank promoted
"dirigiste" economic development strategies in the Third World. Ailed with this
was a promotion by the Bank of strong government. The outcome was,
The role attributed to the state.. .expanded successively.., from one of
provision of infrastructure, health and education, and rural extension to
one of active guidance of all sections of social and economic life. Indeed,
the increased role of the state, the increased role of the World Bank and




and it is worth repeating his concern that the deep underlying assumptions of
the Bank's education staff are getting further and further removed from the
culture of those who have evolved their ideas through "study and practice of the
education process itself" (Lauglo, 1996:5). That education has a role to perform
in getting the social and economic reforms Jaycox recommends under way is
unarguable. But as the 1995 paper seems to hint and as Morris' analysis clearly
indicates, eggs and chickens have to be in the right order.
The perceived culture of the Bank is another crucial area of critique.
Williams (in Buchert and King, 1995:164) repeats the oft-quoted fear that
"ideological inclination has taken precedence over objectivity". Williams goes
further in suggesting that the Bank is "rewriting history in its version of
events" (in Buchert and King, 1995:164). Conversations with the Bank "insiders"
(see 5.2.5. below) are more revealing in this matter of the Bank's perceived
culture, but Girdwood (in Buchert and King, 1995) notes that "there are certain
institutional constraints and practices which define and shape the way in which
World Bank employees as individuals conduct their duties" (page 65). These
constraints even go so far as to cause editing of documents from external
sources to omit what Girdwood refers to as the "strong health warnings" of the
authors (page 66). Even more serious is her statement, backed up through the
interviews below, that:
the overwhelming impression (of the Bank) is of constant institutional
change: change in divisional structures; in divisional policies; in personnel;
and in line-management responsibilities. Such constant change would make
the formulation of coherent policy hard to achieve. And finally, the
constant process of restructuring and re-assigning staff suggest that the
Bank as an institution is unlikely to learn from the lessons identified
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during the preparation of the study (on higher education).
(Girdwood, in Buchert and King, 1995:67)
All commentators on the Bank refer to the huge impact of the so-called
Wapenhans Report, produced in late 1992. An internally commissioned review of
the internal efficiency of Bank projects,(i.e. the extent to which they fulfilled
their own targets), Wapenhans delivered a disturbing verdict. Failure rates were
as high as 40% in some project sectors. Wapenhans suggested a culture change
for the Bank - from one of loan approval as the target to one where results on
the ground were seen as the measure of efficiency. The deep basic assumptions
of the Bank's staff, whether critiqued from within or without, were seen to be
wanting.
The defining values of the Bank have been a constant concern of this
study and these are again picked up by a variety of critics. George and Sabelli
draw attention to the Wapenhans culture change referred to above (George and
Sabelli, 1995:226). They also lift the lid a little on values within the Bank at the
micro level. Quoting Robert McNamara, a former president of the Bank, internal
communication was identified as his most difficult problem at the Bank. A
researcher is quoted as stating that "work pressures and a sense of competition
inhibit communication.. Communication is perceived as a monologue from higher
management levels.... Directives are given by senior management without adequate
explanation or rationale" (George and Sabelli, 1995:119). Jones (1992) provides
useful insights into the defining values of the Bank when he discusses the role
of certain powerful individuals in policy formulation. Wadi Haddad's questioning
of the Bank's record on curriculum "was an act of conviction and professionalism
not always apparent in the Bank " (Jones, 1992:252). Haddad's findings were not
published by the Bank for 8 years, largely because they identified major failings
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in Bank priorities and policies. It is also significant that Haddad assumed
leadership of the Education and Employment Division of the Bank at that date.
Much more is said below through the interviews about the defining values of the
Bank but any reading of its published output leads the observer to side with
Cheryl Payer, writing as long ago as 1982:
Capitalist development of the Third World has been ideologically justified
by the notion that it would bring a higher development of the productive
forces, and immediately or eventually lead to a better life for all, including
the poorest. The reality of capitalist development has been very different..
(Payer, 1982:357)
Issues of success and failure have also exercised the critics. The
Wapenhans Report has already been referred to and Cheryl Payer's work is a
comprehensive and well-argued attack on the capitalist-economics base of the
Bank's activities. Edward Jaycox, a Bank Vice-President, goes so far as to quote
a Bank specialist who states:
We, I think it is fair to say, among all of our achievements, have failed in
Africa, along with everybody else. We have not fully understood the
problems. We have not identified the priorities, we have not always
designed our projects to fit the agro-clima tic conditions of Africa and the
social, cultural and political frameworks of African countries. This is
evidenced by the percentage of poorly performing projects...
(Jaycox in Commins, 1988:25)
For a Vice-President of the Bank to go so far in print indicates some awareness
of the possibility of failure. Yet the Bank literature in general does not reflect
this awareness. George and Sabeffi (1994) suggest that one of the Bank's major
problems is that "the institution and its personnel are never even made to define
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failure and the steps that might be taken to avoid it, much less take
responsibility for it" (page 92). Mobility of staff and a lack of accountability are
taken up by many Bank critics. Payer (1982) notes that the project appraisal
reports which the Bank produces to evaluate the success or failure of activities
are not published. They are also "heavily edited to suppress embarrassing
revelations" (Payer, 1982:9). Researchers are able, with some difficulty, to get
hold of such documents as these from UN libraries, private sources or even from
the Bank on request. However, the main point from the critical literature is that
although appraisals and evaluations are to be found, open discussion as the basis
for learning from experience does not typify the Bank.
Knowledge and information are particularly important as the Bank prides
itself on the quality and quantity of its printed output. Jaycox (in Commins, 1988)
notes with some pride the amount of information the Bank makes available to
donors, to recipient countries and the public at large. Yet so many commentators,
from Williams, cited above, to George and Sabelli, note the selectiveness of Bank
information and its apparent subservience to ideological considerations. Lauglo
(1996) has commented on the uses to which the Bank puts research and both
McGinn (1994) and Samoff (1993) express serious doubts regarding the Bank's use
of information. George and Sabelli (1994:197) and Alison Girdwood (1995:49) lay
great emphasis on the selectivity of Bank information and the restricted nature
of its sources. Only 21% of the background material for the 1994 Higher Education
paper came from non-Bank sources. Similar statistics can be applied to the other
rn&jor Bank publications under review. Girdwood also draws attention to the
quality of material used by the Bank. She states:
Like all such studies, the work by Albrecht and Ziderman was at risk of
drawing together material which was well out of date before its
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publication. .It can be seen that case studies highlighted as examples of
good practice might well already have been discredited by the time....of
publication
(Girdwood in Buchert and King, 1995:53)
Girdwood's first-hand account of how a major Bank publication was put together
(Higher Education, The Lessons of Experience,1994) resulted from a period spent
as a researcher at the Bank. Her analysis makes it very clear that the uses and
abuses of information, the extent to which external and internal sources are
balanced and the ways in which information is integrated into the organization
are a serious cause for concern for critics of the Bank. Knowledge is interpreted
from the top, secondary sources are commonly used and there is little freedom
for Bank staff to act upon the information they generate or receive. George and
Sabelli characterise the Bank as a structured and suffocating hothouse where:
Researchers are not free to follow intellectual inspiration. They are under
constraints of designated priorities... Further, there is quite a strong
hierarchy and the atmosphere is much more deferential than one would find
in universities. There is an understandable concern with what superiors
will think of conclusions.
(George and Sabeffi, 1994:198)
Finding criticisms of the Bank and its functioning as a learning
organization is not difficult. Only the tip of an enormous iceberg of critical
literature has been examined. Suffice it to say that from the literature, both of
the Bank and of the critics, there is little to indicate that the Bank operates as
a learning organization in the terms laid down in Chapter Two above.
Turning to "the people as documents", what indications are there from the
researcher's informants that the Bank may yet be a learning organization?
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CHAP'FER SIX: THE WORLD BANK AS A LEARNING ORGANIZATION :WHAT THE PEOPLE
SAY
Statistics obscure the qualitative dimensions of pattern and....
informants should be viewed not as actors whose behaviour must be
measured, but as documents that reflect the culture of which they
are the bearers
(Kluckhohn, in Sherman and Webb, 1980:80)
6.1. Introduction
An important dimension of this study has been the personal interviews with
current Bank staff and with critics of the organization, all of which were
conducted by telephone. In advance of the telephone conversation, each
interviewee was faxed a copy of the interview schedule (to be found as an
Annexure to the study). In addition, total confidentiality was assured and in the
case of Bank staff, each subject for interview was encouraged to seek approval
from his or her line manager for taking part in the research. In the event,
interviews were considerably delayed while each of the Bank interviewees
attempted to get this approval. In the event, none of the subjects managed to
get approval but each decided to go ahead with the interview anyway.
All Bank-employed subjects interviewed were extremely anxious not to be
quoted directly. Each was extremely hesitant to speak at all, even when the very
general nature of the questions was evident. To use a word like paranoia to
describe their reactions to being interviewed would be only a slight exaggeration.
This may be attributed to the present defensive climate in the Bank. The bad
press it receives in the United States, the world-wide dissatisfaction with its
Structural Adjustment Policies and the perception of the Bank as an insensitive
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juggernaut crushing all beneath its wheels make it difficult for Bank staff to
speak freely about the organization. More to the point, the Bank is 'downsizing'
its staff with 600 to 700 jobs disappearing in the past year. Loyalty is
apparently a much prized quality among those Bank staffers who retain their
jobs.
As far as outsiders were concerned, no such hesitations were evident in
their agreeing to share their perceptions of the Bank.
In the earlier discussion of methodology in Chapter Four mention was made
of possible advantages and disadvantages of telephone interviews in depth. What
surprised the researcher was the extent to which respondents opened up over
the telephone once the initial hesitation or resistance were overcome. Sample
transcripts are attached as annexures.
6.2. Talking to the insiders
The insider sources are identified as ml, 1n2 and 1n3. Each has considerable
experience within the education division of the World Bank. All are Education
Specialists. Two are male and one female; all have worked at the operational level
in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Two are United States citizens, one is British.
The researcher has worked with all three at one time or another.
In response to the first question - the deep basic assumptions held by
Bank education staff, variation in the responses was not marked. ml suggested
that the deep basic assumption shared by Bank colleagues was that education
definitely leads to or relates to economic development and hence to improved
quality of life. This respondent commented that the idea of education as a basic
human right was not as wide-spread in the Bank as the concept of education for
economic development. 1n2 sounded like a standard spokesperson for the Bank;
education was about equity and access. It was only one input to the process of
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change and development. Empowerment and greater job opportunities were
important aspects of education. Within the Bank, capitalism was seen as all good
and the public sector was not the only way forward. 1n3 was much more pungent
and controversial. The Bank is here to save the world. It has the answers. This
is the backbone of the organizational culture of the Bank. AU commentators
suggested that the deep basic assumptions were not homogeneous throughout the
Bank but that the economic role of education was certainly dominant. There is a
common thread running through these answers. Using a hermeneutic approach it
is possible to view the answers as consonant with the technicist/economistic bias
of the Bank as revealed through the literature reviewed. There seems little doubt
that the insiders interviewed saw the deep basic assumptions as fundamentally
economic. This raises a dilemma in terms of the learning organization. Dixon (1994)
sees continuous transformation as a key factor in developing the learning
organization. Yet a long-standing unifying factor in the Bank's culture has been
what George and Sabelli (1994) refer to as its unchanging faith or dogma. The
question of how important it is to maintain a fundamental vision as opposed to
being continuously transformed will be addressed in the next and final chapter
of the study.
When asked to comment on the culture of the Bank, the insiders gave quite
consistent answers. ml suggested that the Bank was fairly hierarchical, although
it was attempting to open up. Its historical centralization meant that there was
a long way to go before the rhetoric fully reflected the behaviour and practice.
Over time, the Bank had become more horizontal in its management structure. 1n2
noted that the organization was extremely hierarchical at the senior levels. Senior
managers were "victims as well". At other levels, particularly the operational
level, the Bank was very participatory. You could do what you wanted to do with
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like-minded colleagues. There appeared to be some confusion at the senior levels
regarding the concept of teamwork. A memorandum from the top had recently
gone round the organization appealing for more emphasis on teamwork. Yet at
many levels staff were functioning very well as teams. Within the Bank there
were many different types of team - some designated as such by the nature of
their duties, others more loosely aggregated. The fear of "downsizing" played an
important part in the organizational culture and associations, networks and
linkages were often developed for micro-political purposes. 1n3 once again had
an idiosyncratic view of the culture of the Bank. Its essential competitiveness
was stressed by this respondent who also noted that the Bank was both
participatory and hierarchical at different levels and in different circumstances.
This respondent also commented on the "teamwork" memorandum as redundant as
this approach was a feature of much of the work at the operational level.
Referring again to Table 2 (Characteristics of Learning Organizations) the
insiders' description of the organizational culture of the World Bank seems a long
way from that of a true learning organization. The issue of 'constructive conflict'
(Morgan, 1986) seems particularly apposite. The evidence from the insiders seems
to suggest that this is avoided in the Bank at all costs. The alternative is
summed up in the cr1 de coeur of ml - "They are after me..."
The defining values of the Bank were perceived by the insiders as complex.
They were undergoing change and showed variation at different levels of the
organization. ml emphasised a greater focus on the qualitative aspects of
education and less on the physical and quantitative provision. Renewed attention
to the pedagogic aspects of learning, a concern with sustainability and capacity
building as well as how to pay for education were all key issues for professionals
within the Bank. 1n2 took a more philosophical line on this question. What can I
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responding to the question with, "What do you mean 'failure'?". This respondent
emphasised the diffuseness of responsibility within the Bank. Mobility of staff
was also discussed. Under these circumstances failure was difficult to recognize
or identify. From both these insider sources it was clear that success was a
given and that failure was not clearly recognized. 1n2 on the other hand, took
a different view. Although rotation and mobility of staff was an issue the
independent internal evaluation capacity of the Bank was an important regulatory
mechanism. Accountability and institutional learning were part of a new initiative
within the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). This development can be
viewed in a number of ways, the most obvious being that the need to evaluate
success and failure, the need to encourage all staff to learn from experience and
the necessity to disseminate good practice have become more important within the
Bank. 1n2 is a member of staff of OED, therefore promotion of its point of view
is not unexpected. In fact, all through the interview process this informant was
much more inclined to the "party line" than any of the others, was more
conscious of possible offence to authority and took much longer to open up into
frankness. The discussion with insiders of issues of success and failure indicated
a significant area of mismatch with the indicators of a learning organization.
Measures of success seem largely unproblematic and unreflectively arrived at.
Were large enough loans disbursed on time, by standard operating procedures
and without embezzlement ? Measures of failure seem not to be dealt with at all
openly and as sources of wisdom for the future (Morgan, 1986). However, there
are signs of change within the Bank as indicated by the staff member of OED.
The new President of the Bank has brought in an initiative to promote learning
in the organization. Dealing effectively with both success and failure will have
to figure in this initiative if the Bank is to learn.
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A major part of the interview process was taken up by the issue of
information and knowledge within the Bank. As the interview schedule shows, five
of the nine questions put to respondents were concerned with this area. The
answers were rich and interesting. ml said that within the Bank there was much
informal networking through which information and knowledge were generated
and distributed. This was not systematic but depended entirely on personal
relationships. The mobility within the Bank referred to earlier hindered the
maintenance of such networks. Information technology (IT) had proved very
helpful in most respects. However, too much information was being thrown at
people and the quality of what was so accessible was open to question. 1n2
thought that IT has helped in the sharing of information but the quantity
available was overwhelming. Interaction among Bank staff was very good. There
was a culture of helpfulness, although some prima donnas existed. Relationships
and networks were emphasised by this informant. 1n3 reflected this in noting
that groups and clusters were important in information sharing. This respondent
felt that the Bank had a very open information policy where "everything was
available". The transparency issue was referred to by 1n2 who commented on
recent guidelines produced by the Bank on the openness and availability of
information within the institution.
Good ideas came up from everyone and anyone, according to all three
informants. The type of person to get ideas accepted was important, according
to ml. Those with broader networks outside the Bank (those "with a life" in the
informant's words), those with a thirst for change who had experience in the
field were the most likely to have their ideas taken up. 1n3 noted that mavericks
were rare in the organization; they were tolerated rather than encouraged and
their ideas were less likely to be taken up. 1n2 pointed out that it was very
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important to market ideas, to push them in the right quarters. Non-pushy types
got left behind in the culture of the Bank. Good ideas can also become fashions,
adopted regardless of their relevance or direct utility. 1n3 stated that people
with good ideas had to fight their corner, not only for acceptance but also to
maintain ownership of their ideas. All respondents commented on the impossible
work-load dictated by the weight of information circulating in the organization.
Feedback was extremely limited. "Brown-bag" (packed-lunch) meetings were
common but not always effective. The weight of information available led to
overload and hence sloppier thinking. ml referred to the resulting "sound-bite"
answers to complex problems. 1n3 closed our discussion by groaning, "Meetings,
meetings, meetings..."
Sources of information were clearly identified by all three respondents as
largely internal. In 1 summarised the situation within the Bank as having too
little reflection. Staff tended to produce, review and share their own knowledge.
This led to self-delusion: "We have all the answers, we have all the money, we
have paid for all the best information". This informant commented that if the
Bank had less money available it might have sought information outside its own
walls more frequently. 1n2 suggested that there was far too much information
coming from the field. IT was a great help but it was possible to spend 12 hours
every day just reading up on information generated within and outside the Bank.
1n3 was, as usual, more caustic. Information was almost entirely internally
developed through the professional networks staff generated.
As far as integration of knowledge into the organization was concerned all
three informants stated that far too much information was available for full
integration into the organization. Networks were useful to condense and digest
what was generated but this process tended to downgrade the quality of
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knowledge circulating. The overwhelming nature of the information load led to
"seat-of-the-pants" decision making as people relied on their own experience and
the interpretations of others in dealing with information. However, the
relationships, the networks and the contacts with individuals regarded as
authoritative rescued most people from the overload they struggled with. This
dimension of the discussion led directly into consideration of whether knowledge
comes "from the top", is generated individually or collectively. It was clear from
all the informants that the clustering of sources and the functioning of networks,
usually based on personal relationships, governed the use and interpretation of
knowledge in the Bank. Of course, broad policy directions were determined by
senior management but the working knowledge needed to design, appraise and
develop projects came from colleagues within the organization.
Regarding freedom to act upon information, to interpret it and apply it, the
answers received were revealing. All three informants commented on the strong
pressures to conform within the Bank. 1n2 mentioned the micro and macro-
political issues involved in taking too independent a line. ml confessed that he
interpreted the rules freely and was prepared to pay what he thought was an
inevitable price - "They are after me", he said. 1n3 discussed this issue in a
similar way, finding it difficult to speculate on how long he could stay in an
organization which demanded so much conformity.
From the insider information oulined immediately above come the greatest
implications for the Bank as a learning organization. From Table 2 it can be seen
that in its generation, circulation and reflection upon information the Bank fails
most significantly to operate as a learning organization. Certainly Senge's (1990)
idea of governing ideas of purpose, vision and values do seem to be designed
into the organization. But the practical problems of information overload, apparent
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lack of reflection, the inability to accept legitimate error, the oversimplification
of complex problems and the lack of capacity to deal with negative events as
sources of wisdom are serious criticisms of the organization in practice.
6.2. Talking to the outsiders
The outsiders interviewed for the study were all well known commentators on the
Bank, had all carried out Bank-commissioned consultancies or studies and had
substantial experience of the workings of the Bank. One was female, the
remainder male. All retained professional contacts and even friendships with
senior Bank staff yet had the advantage of professional and financial
independence from the Bank. Many potential subjects for interview remain
dependent to some extent on future Bank commissions and in the process of
selecting suitable interviewees this issue had to be addressed. Unlike the
insiders, none of the outside subjects had any inhibitions about speaking freely
concerning their perceptions of the Bank in operation. The same interview
schedule was used with this group as with the insiders yet, because the focus
of the questions was so much on the internal workings of the Bank, these
respondents were not always able to discuss certain issues as fully as did the
insiders. Some restructuring of questions inevitably occurred. For purposes of
anonymity subjects are referred to as Outi, Out2 and Out3. A sample outsider
transcript is found as an annexure to the study. In addition, a fourth informant
was a former Bank staffer, recently retired and referred to in the discussion
below as I/O for "insider/outsider".
Starting the discussion with the outsiders' view of the deep basic
assumptions of the Bank interesting resonances and contrast with the insiders'
views were found. Outi suggested that the deep underlying assumptions of Bank
education staff combined high ideals with a rather pedestrian, economistic
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ideology. Out2 supported this with mention of a rather contradictory set of
beliefs. Whilst the Bank wants to help the poor in developing countries it also
has to make a profit. There is a clash between the meeting of loan targets and
responding to the real needs of a nation state. Financial issues tend to dominate
to the extent that Bank staff tend to ventriloquize the views of recipients to
match the Bank's own agenda. Out3 made a very strong statement concerning the
role of George PsacharopouEos, the Bank's leading economist of education. This
informant referred to the "long shadow" cast by Psacharopoulos in that espousal
of his highly instrumental view of education is almost a sine qua non for Bank
staff. This informant used the term "schizophrenic" to describe the consequences
of this influence. Bank staff had high ideals concerning changing the world for
the better but at the same time were locked into a positivist/economistic model
of how the world works. I/O who had recently retired from the Bank gave a more
comprehensive summary, as expected. The Bank could not be seen as homogeneous
in this informant's view. A great deal of rethinking was also going on within the
Bank with more attention being paid to the social aspects of education. In this
informant's words, "yet another" reorganization was currently under way at the
Bank; a continuing repercussion from the Wapenhans Report. The metaphor used
by this respondent was that the Bank was 'doing the splits - trying to do more
with less but maintaining project through-put as the basis for measuring
success, or "Brownie points". The Bank staff maintain a strongly neo-positivist
approach to their work.
As far as the organizational culture of the Bank was concerned I/O stated
that the Bank was anarchic yet hierarchical. People within the organization were
very status-conscious and there was a definite hierarchy of disciplines with
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economics at the apex.The Bank was also highly competitive. There was not a
happy working ambience in the place at large. The Bank was also poor at self-
reflection, at penetrating its own deep structures. At different levels it was rigid
yet flexible. Outi noted that according to his experience and information the Bank
was moving to a culture where global answers were being replaced by a more
realistic variety of approaches. Staff within the Bank were more collaborative and
the culture of the organization called for more integrative strategies for
development. Out2 was less positive about the Bank's culture. It remained locked
into standard patterns with ownership of the right answers. The Bank tended to
encourage and promote those who conformed and to marginalize those who
contested received wisdom. The accountability structure was important with an
in-built hierarchy with everyone having to satisfy the line manager above right
up to the Board of the Bank. At the same time there was good collaboration
among groups of specialists within the Bank. Career competition was always
present with a culture of working excessively long hours and demands from the
top for people to produce. Out3 found the Bank strongly hierarchical. Continual
policy changes and frequent reorganizations contributed to and even maintained
hierarchical structures. Within the turbulence of the Bank, clear lines of control
tended to be used as lifelines.
The defining values of the Bank were perceived in very different ways. I/O
saw its financial and professional integrity as a frequently overlooked value. The
Bank also exercised great discipline in the sense of rational, sequential and
logical approaches to project design. The Bank was transparent and objective in
its appointment of consultants and, since the arrival of the new president, Mr.
Wolf enson had developed a culture of continuous, permanent learning for
individuals within the organization. These opinions contrasted strongly with the
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views of the other outsiders. Out2 suggested that a key value within the Bank
was a genuine desire to help developing countries among well qualified
"development specialists". Unfortunately these people tended to get drawn into
a Bank sub-culture of meeting loan targets at all costs. Outi appeared to support
this view stating that a conviction model characterised the Bank. A kind of
intellectual arrogance presented the "right" answers. A hard-nosed group of
professionals appeared to be concerned with development but returns to
investment were actually more important. This led to spurious lending, an
experience attested to by Out2 on a recent consultancy to an African country.
Parachutism was also identified as a problem with the values of the Bank; zip in,
zip out and write the Report in the Sheraton Hotel was seen as too typical of
Bank approaches. Out3 confirmed much of this diagnosis in stating that 'power'
was the defining value of the Bank staff. However, this informant noted that
there were no stronger critics of the Bank than its own staff who were quick to
recognize the organization's arrogance. At the same time, Bank staff could not
own up to arrogance themselves; they merely observed it in others.
Issues of success and failure drew a fairly consistent response from all the
outsiders. Outi suggested that the huge volume of material and information
generated by the Bank from its projects was just too overwhelming to be
processed properly so lessons could not easily be learned from past experience.
The use of well-trodden paths (e.g. cost-benefit analysis) was encouraged and
the lack of accountability among highly mobile Bank staff made reflection on
success or failure very difficult. Out3 went so far as to suggest that the Bank
had a culture of covering up. Restructuring of failing projects was common. The
Operations Evaluation Department (OED) was very strong on the mechanics of
project implementation. It measured or assessed technical matters like rates of
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disbursement of funds or whether correct procurement of materials had been
observed. But it had nothing to say about whether children in classrooms were
benefiting from the project under evaluation. Out2 stated that where hard figures
on such matters as enrolments, numbers of schools built and female attendance
were available then success or failure could be discussed within the Bank.
However, there was not much deep reflection, more an interest in taking
apparently workable strategies from one experience and applying them elsewhere.
Greater parental involvement in school financing was a typical case which had
now become part of the Bank's orthodoxy. I/O took a broader view of this
question. The annual review of Bank projects according to financial and
managerial criteria was an important means of assessing success and failure.
However, within the Bank's culture there was an unwillingness to downgrade
other people's projects so much of the review process might lose impact. This
was supported by Out3 who went so far as to suggest that too many Bank
staffers were U.S. citizens. Nationals of other countries were dominated by them
and as their contracts could be terminated if they rocked the boat too much,
such staff tended to keep their own counsel on success and failure. I/O stated
that since Wolfenson's arrival at the Bank a new emphasis on organizational
learning had arisen. As a result, some departments were spending up to 10% of
their budget on training. Generally, the Bank provided huge opportunities for
learning, based on the annual appraisal meeting with an individual's line manager.
These procedures could however have little to do with assessment of the success
or failure of projects at large.
The question of how knowledge and information are dealt with in the Bank
led to a wide variety of perceptions from the respondents. I/O repeated the
views of the insiders in stating that there was far too much information available
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within the Bank which it was not always good at sharing. Out3 suggested that
the Bank was "knowledge rich but lacked a structure to deal with it". Out2
agreed with this in stating that within the Bank there was collaboration and
sharing but outsiders often found it difficult to get hold of important information
which in itself was not sensitive. Out3's experience was that a kind of random
secrecy operated in that some documents were freely available, others could be
photo-copied but not on the premises and some highly sensitive material was left
lying around for anyone to see. I/O agreed with this in saying that information
in the Bank was open and available but that its actual management of its
business was incompetent - payments to consultants were often delayed, for
example - so good information was sometimes not made available. Good ideas were
thought to come up from all levels, often developed through think-tanks,
networks, reading of academic journals and through the work of many bright
young people who specialized in teasing out information from dense reports. The
culture of the Bank was very creative with bright ideas zipping about the place
"like the 4th of July" according to I/O. Outi suggested that the financial
implications of good ideas would create constraints on creativity. Both Out2 and
Out3 commented on the strong party line or orthodoxy encouraged by the Bank's
culture within which information and knowledge were generated and shared. Good
ideas were supposed to come from the top. Outi noted that where consultants or
Bank staff stepped outside these limitations to produce critical yet sound
arguments, these frequently remained unpublished or were watered down. Out2
made similar comments. Outi suggested that 90% of Bank information was
internally produced or generated. I/O agreed that this was so with a strong
representation of U.S. orthodoxy. Third World sources were usually discounted
despite the local inputs usually required for each country's "Education Sector
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Review". This document is produced every five years for each country the Bank
lends to. In the words of Out2 it becomes the "Bible" relied on not just by the
Bank but by other agencies too in the design of their project lending to that
country. Out3 went so far as to state that only "tame" consultants were used by
the Bank to create the majority of its information base. The use and subsequent
interpretation of knowledge raised interesting comments. Despite a wide variety
of mechanisms for feedback and consultation, different lenses or prisms were
used at different levels according to Out3. These lenses were almost exclusively
economic. Despite the strong pressure to orthodoxy from the top there was a
good deal of institutional anarchy. Freedom to take action on information was
very much an individual issue according to Out2 and I/O. The latter expressed
his satisfaction with his own experience in this area but confessed to hearing
"horror stories" from colleagues tightly controlled by their line managers. I/O
concluded his remarks by reminding the researcher that the Bank remains a
basically undemocratic institution. Even its president is unelected; he is
nominated to his post by the United States President.
6.3. Sumniarising the suinniary
6.3.1.Introduction
Addison (1992) describes his own research as "grounded in the everyday
practices of individuals in ongoing human affairs". He also uses the term
grounded to indicate that the research "seeks to illuminate social, cultural,
historical, economic, linguistic and other background aspects that frame and make
comprehensible human practices and events"(Addison, 1992:111). The same
grounded hermeneutics approach is used in summarising the accounts of insiders
and outsiders in this chapter. The research sub-question to be addressed is,
"What are the matches and mismatches between the perceptions of the insiders
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and the outsiders and what light do their responses shed on the notion of the
Bank as a learning organization"? Following the format of Chapter 5 above,
responses are categorized according to the broad areas identified in the
interview schedule.
6.3.2. Searching for patterns
As far as the deep shared assumptions of the Bank staff are concerned, there
were similarities and significant differences between the responses of insiders
and outsiders. There was strong agreement on positivistic and economistic nature
of these assumptions. The power of education to contribute to or even determine
economic growth and national development was a given for both insiders and
outsiders in assessing the culture of the Bank. However, it was pointed out by
a number of respondents that the Bank is not homogeneous. The notion of the
Bank's schizophrenia was a powerful metaphor used by three informants, arguing
that a desire to change and improve the lot of the world's poor conflicted with
the organization's demand for loan throughput. This schizophrenia contrasts
strongly with the key concepts of Table 2, especially those dealing with
participation, democratisation and information-driven decision making.
The organizational culture of the Bank was perceived as heterogeneous. It
was certainly hierarchical, particularly at the top levels yet anarchy reigned in
the many loose aggregations of Bank staffers who formed their own networks and
sets of contacts. Career competition was strong and there was a culture of hard
work characterized by very long hours at the desk. A hierarchy of disciplines
could also be observed with the economists ruling the roost, at least for the time
being. The Bank was perceived by those most knowledgeable as "not a happy
place to work". The organizational ambience was not positive. Frequent
reorganization and downsizing exercises contributed to this climate. Dixon (1994)
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sees an enabling environment and a purposeful social system as key factors in
developing learning organizations. Senge (1990) sees all members engaged in
developing governing ideas and the integration of thinking and acting at all
levels as essential for learning organizations. Mismatches with the reported
perceptions are readily identifiable.
The defining values identified by respondents presented a fairly consistent
pattern. The convictionism (or even arrogance) of the Bank came across strongly
from the accounts given. This convictionism was accompanied by some idealism.
"We have the answers;we will save the world". However, a genuine desire to do
good in the world was to be found among the Bank staff but the "hit and run"
style of the organization, its lack of accountability and its competitiveness
militated against success. An interesting finding was that there was a strong
learning/training tradition in the Bank and the OED was actually reponsible for
encouraging "learning within the organization". Discipline within the technical and
bureaucratic domain was also revealed as an important value within the
organization. Perhaps an apologist for the Bank could argue that the contrast
between convictionism and evangelicalism indicates a 'creative tension between
vision and current reality' in Senge's (1990) terms.
Dealing with success and failure in the organization was perceived by the
outsiders in very similar fashion to the perceptions of the insiders. The inability
to recognize failure because of the high rates of mobility among Bank staff, the
constant reorganizations and a tradition of "restructuring" ongoing projects
prevented real assessment of success and failure. Certainly little or no
opportunity arose for using failure as a means to learning in the ways suggested
by the learning organization literature. The focus of the OED on evaluating the
purely bureaucratic aspects of projects did not contribute to realistic handling
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of failure. Success was always judged on the basis of "hard" facts and figures
like the numbers of schools built, pupils enrolled and so on. Yet these figures
were frequently unreliable. A climate of covering up and moving on typified the
Bank according to the outside observers. Morgan (1986) is strong on the
usefulness of failure and conflict. Legitimate error and uncertainty are potentially
positive for the learning organization. Yet the Bank appears to deny they exist.
On the other hand, Whiston (1994) notes that task diversification raises
performance levels. Here is a justification for staff mobility, interpreted by all
informants, insiders, outsiders and those in transition, as a negative feature of
the Bank. Mere mobility does not appear to confer a diversity of skills it seems.
The complex issues surrounding knowledge and information produced a
fairly consistent set of responses from the outsiders. That staff of the Bank are
overwhelmed with too much information is well established. Most of this
information is internally generated or produced by "tame' 1 experts. At the same
time good ideas can be developed anywhere within the Bank although strong
party lines are detectable within which such good ideas should be based. There
is a very creative environment among younger Bank staff although the
unreflective nature of much that is generated leads to suspicions about the
quality of the knowledge and information generated. Orthodox thinking from the
United States dominates. Information derived from or generated in the Third
World is discounted. Outsiders also emphasised the apparent importance of
networks and contacts within the Bank which accelerate the free flow of
information among staff. At the same time it was noted that communication within
the Bank was problematic; there were confused policies on confidentiality and a
great deal of variation in levels of control of information. In some sections
everything was freely available, in others much tighter control was exerted.
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Whiston (1994) emphasises the necessity of effective information absorption. All
the evidence from informants suggests that this is an area of great weakness for
the Bank. Dixon's (1994) concept of collective interpretation of information also
appears to be a casualty of the way the Bank operates.
6.4. Puffing the strands together
The search for patterns and categories is an essential part of this type of
research. The researcher must bear in mind the dangers referred to earlier of
imposing patterns in the process of hammering out the study. Inexhaustibe
interpretability is the other side of this coin. The researcher could go on for
ever, seeking new relationships, patterns, codes and categories. But the
provisional nature of hermeneutic "findings" removes the necessity for finding
answers rather than seeking understanding. The researcher set out to examine
the concept of the learning organization as it might apply to the World Bank. In
the final chapter which follows, the findings from documentary and human
sources are drawn together to produce fusion of horizons. This fusion should be
more than a comparison of data with a pre-determined set of criteria or traits.
The most interesting part of the final drawing together (in the view of the
researcher) may well be the formulation of new interpretations of what may be
called a learning organization.
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However they may argue against it, qualitative researchers are still wrestling
with the heavy inheritance of positivist correspondence theories of validity taken
over from psychometric research studies. How to conform to conventional
measures of validity whilst maintaining their rich and thick descriptions remains
a dilemma for such researchers.
Kvale (1989) discusses the necessity for qualitative researchers to move
away from correspondence theories of validity towards an investigative model. He
quotes Bernstein (1983) who follows Gadamer and Habermas in arguing for a
communal test of validity through the argumentation of the participants in a
discourse. To validate is to investigate, continually checking, questioning and
theoretically interpreting the findings (Kvale, 1989:77). Validation means
continuously to check "credibility, plausibility and trustworthiness" of the actual
strategies used for collecting, coding, analyzing and presenting data (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967:233). Questioning what is being investigated and why is to validate.
Finally, validation will lead to a theoretical questioning of the nature of the
phenomenon being investigated (Kvale, 1989:82). Kvale states:
It is difficult to get out of this validation paradox. An ideal solution
would be to conduct investigations so convincingly that appeals to
external certification, or official validity stamps of approval, appear
superfluous. Ideally, the procedures would be transparent and the results
evident, the conclusions of a study intrinsically convincing as true,
beautiful and good.
(Kvale, 1989:90)
It is with these aims in mind - the transparent demonstration of valid and
warrantable knowledge - that the concluding sections of this study are drawn
together. Their truth, beauty and goodness are open to checking and questioning
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by the reader.
7.2. Towards conclusions from the study
The questions to be examined now are what the evidence has shown and whether
the Bank can usefully be studied through the lens of the learning organization.
Pursuing the hermeneutic approach which has been a mainstay of this study, the
evidence will be drawn together through a kind of revisitation of the data. The
coding format of Chapters Five and Six will not be followed rigidly but broad
general conclusions will be assembled.
Is the Bank a learning organization ? Yes and no is an accurate but
unoriginal answer and the concluding sections of this study examine whether the
concept of the learning organization advanced earlier has been an adequate one.
In fact, to pre-empt the discussion at this point, it will be argued that a richer
and more refined theory of the learning organization is required. A grounded
theory study will thus attempt to produce theory.
Returning to the question of whether the World Bank is a learning
organization it has been seen clearly enough that certain deep basic assumptions
are commonly held throughout the Bank and that there is a core of common
defining values. These can be summed up as economistic, modernizing and
positivist. However, it has also been seen that these values and assumptions have
been held relatively unreflectively over a long period of time. There is little
evidence to suggest that the Bank has been generative or that it has encouraged
new ways of looking at the world. As far as a theory of the learning organization
is concerned we begin to detect inadequacies. Strong basic assumptions and
defining values are not enough. How does the organization generate new
approaches when it is wedded to a predetermined framework ? Comparing the
Bank to other organizations - and George and Sabelli (1994) make out a
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compelling case for likening it to the Medieval church - it has to be admitted
that those organizations which did not adjust or adapt their deep basic
assumptions have died out. The church is a good example of an organization
which has adapted through upheavals like the Reformation,the Age of Reason, the
rise of the Free Churches, Darwinism and scientism, occasional spiritual revivals
and such phenomena as the twentieth century's charismatic renewal movement.
There is a real difficulty here for the Bank with its strongly positivist,
economistic and even naive beliefs and values. Put simply it must be asked, has
the Bank changed the world, even in its own terms? We have not seen poor
countries transformed; we have seen a small group of countries, located in
particular geographic and economic contexts, modernized through huge overseas
investments, often buttressed by Bank loans to education. The deep assumptions
of the Bank about what changes the world are held sincerely but perhaps
unreflectively. A redefinition of the role of beliefs and values is required if the
learning organization is to become a useful concept.
How learning organizations deal with success and failure represents another
important dimension. It has been shown clearly enough that this is an area of
weakness for the Bank. "Cover up and move on" would not be an inappropriate
slogan for Bank staff. Learning organizations are reflective, engage in continuous
feedback, have systematic procedures for the creation of meaning and share their
meaning structures. From the evidence gathered in this study, these qualities are
not effectively achieved or even pursued in the Bank. The beliefs/values
dimension of an organization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
becoming a learning organization. Appropriate procedures for dealing with




theory of the learning organization. The work of Dixon (1994), already quoted
extensively, offers this kind of approach. Whiston (1994) offers a highly
technicist, almost cybernetic list of indicators. Many of the key characteristics
of learning organizations identified by Dixon are found in this study's analysis.
Murgatroyd and Morgan (1993), in their presentation of "total quality
management" as a strategy for school improvement, offer a remarkably similar set
of traits or characteristics for high-performing management teams. They have a
shared sense of purpose and vision, they have open communication, trust and
mutuality, useful creative conflict (incidentally, a characteristic missing from most
of the learning organization literature), appropriate working methods and
appropriate leadership. There is regular review and reflection, individual
development is enabled and encouraged and there are sound links with other
teams (Murgatroyd and Morgan, 1993:143). Yet there is still something missing
from these prescriptions. The question must be asked, would the presence of
these characteristics be sufficient in themselves to create a learning
organization? Or is the sum of the parts greater or less than the whole?
Revisiting the data in the true spirit of hermeneutics we can identify most
of these traits or indicators as alive and well and living in the Bank. Listing the
positive traits of the Bank in terms of the learning organization gives us such
qualities as widely shared values and beliefs, extensive use of information, high
degrees of networking and sharing of information, high levels of training within
the organization, and integrity in management procedures. More negative aspects
of the organization would include its apparent imperviousness to external
criticism, its strongly conformist organizational culture, its restricted resource
base for information gathering, its narrow economistic focus, its readiness to
borrow inappropriate models, its naive positivism and its inability to handle
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failure.
It would be possible to reorganize or reinterpret the data to consider what
are the core issues in the learning organization and what are the more marginal
or peripheral themes. This is undoubtedly helpful in the case of the Bank.
Whether it pays its consultants on time is in a sense marginal. What its view is
of development is very much a core theme. This last point is in fact the key to
whether the Bank, or any organization for that matter, can be classed as a
learning organization. The issue of whether an organization of itself has the
capacity to learn or whether it is the individual members who do the learning
also becomes marginal when the central raison d'etre of the organization is in
doubt. As far as a business or industry is concerned, this raison d'etre is rarely
at issue. In Dixon's examples manufacturing companies and transport organizations
have no difficulties in deciding why they are in business. The richness of
metaphor which Morgan (1986) brings to the discussion of the learning
organization gives some indication of the greater challenge to more "human"
organizations when determining their reason for being. It must be admitted that
the education division of the World Bank appears to have a clear picture of why
it is at work in the world. The core mission is self-evident. There is no room for
ambiguity. Education is seen as a major contributor to economic development. Its
role in social and cultural development is occasionally acknowledged but is
definitely marginal to the main concern, summarised neatly in the Priorities and
Strategies paper as:
Education.. ..is critical for economic growth and reduction of poverty
(Wcrld Bank, 15:17)
One cannot take much exception to a statement of this type but if the term
'critical' is replaced with the word 'solely' then we get closer to the actual
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agenda of the Bank. Despite its espousal of the cultural and social dimensions of
education in its introduction to the 1995 paper, the Bank devotes only 116 words
in this publication to the issue of AIDS and education. It devotes no space at all
to following through its slogans on the civic purposes of education or on
education as the main instrument for the dissemination of the accomplishments of
human civilization. From the data examined in this study there is no doubt at all
of the rigidly economistic basis for what the Bank tries to do in education for
the developing world. Yet UNESCO's World Education Report of 1993 closes with
these words:
At a time such as the present, when profound changes are occurring in the
whole structure of global economic, social and cultural relations, and the
role of education in these changes is coming to be recognised as
fundamental, all countries can only benefit from knowing more about the
cultural premises of each other's education (emphasis added).
(UNESCO, 13:89)
Even critics within the Bank have recently been raising hard questions about
this economisrn. Stephen Heynemann, in an article entitled, Economics of
educa tion:disappoin tmen ts and potential, states:
We know very little about the economic effects of educational decisions
and, as a result, the sector remains vulnerable
(Heynemann, 1995:572)
For a leading Bank spokesman to make such a statement is extremely significant.
He also goes on in the same article to demand more specification to support such
Bank slogans as 'class size makes no difference', 'money makes no difference',
'teachers are conservative and self-interested'. Heynemann suggests that the
educational community has a responsibility 'to demand better economic evidence
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on a wider variety of educational questions' (Heynemann, 1995:573). Heynemann
quotes much more positive and helpful uses of the economics of education which
use more creative methodologies.
Two important points have now arisen. Not only can it be shown that the
Bank is unduly wedded to an economistic outlook; George and Sabelli (1994) have
made this clear as did Cheryl Payer twelve years earlier (Payer,1982). Any
number of critics from the left or the right would agree on this. The significant
second point is that powerful voices from within the Bank - and Heynemann, a
former president of the Comparative and International Education Society, qualifies
for this description - are raising deep fundamental questions about the basic
assumptions on which Bank activities are founded. Learning organizations do
things like this. Heynemann is attempting to make sense of the world in which
he operates. He is attempting to transform his experience to generate and
manipulate information. He is attempting to interpret information that can be
collectively acted upon. Other staff within the Bank appear to have the same
motivation. The Bank President's push for more emphasis on learning within the
organization can be seen as part of the same imperative. Yet an explicit task of
this study was to raise the issue of whether the Bank could be made more of a
learning organization than it already is. Learning means changes in behaviour
which are more or less permanent. At the same time attention has been drawn to
over-permanence in Bank values and culture. Is it time to reformulate the
concept of the learning organization ? The inadequacy of the prescriptions of
Senge, Dixon and others is clear. Deeper theorizing is necessary.
7.4. Completing the hermeneutic circle
The model of the learning organization presented in the literature has
weaknesses. A two-dimensional model of organizations - they are learning
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organizations or they are not according to the criteria adduced- is inadequate.
The World Bank has been checked against these and in many cases gets a
passing grade. Yet organizations are more sophisticated than this model suggests
and the research approach of this study goes beyond mere check-listing.
Organizations are multi--dimensional. They suffer from ambiguities (March and
Olsen,1979); they have an 'aleatory dimension' in Hoyle's (1988) phrase. There is
a 'looseness of connections' among them (Scott, 1981). Learning was loosely
defined earlier in this study as 'a change in behaviour which is more or less
permanent'. As Fuilan (1993) indicates, knowing what causes change is not
sufficient to bring it about successfully. One has to recognize the unique factors
in a situation and prepare for them. Rational planning may not be adequate.
Decisions have to be made about whether change is to be incremental or
sweeping, based on innovations or more modest improvements. Attempting change
armed only with an inadequate theory of the learning organization will prove less
than helpful.
7.5. Borrowing metaphors
The metaphor of the learning organization rests upon an analogy with human
learning. Therefore, it is to this field that we now turn in attempting to refine
theory. Theories of learning and their partner theories in the field of cognition
provide a rich source of metaphor. Guilford (1988) has provided one of the more
satisfactory models of human cognition. He suggests that there are three 'faces
of intellect'. These can be conceived of as processes, contents and products. In
other words, how we think, what it is we think about and the outcomes or end
results of our thinking combine or interact to produce intelligent behaviour and
hence learning. This analysis of what goes on in the mind is more helpful than
suggestions that humans sit somewhere on a two-dimensional continuum from
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intelligent to stupid. In the same way the learning organization could benefit
from a deeper analysis of what goes on within it. Borrowing from Guilford the
following processes, content and products might be identified:
- PROCESSES:	 Reflection, Self-examination, Participation, Continuous
Feedback, Constructive conflict etc.
- CONTENT:	 Networking, Information,Patterned performance
- PRODUCTS:	 Generative solutions, Making sense of the world,
Dealing with failure, Creating spare capacity etc.
Something unsatisfactory with the model begins to make itself apparent. Is this
just another list of traits, the great difference being that the interaction of
these characteristics produces the learning organization we seek ? Flow can the
'boxes' of Guilford's model be filled in? Will the product of this exercise move the
theory of the learning organization on much further? The learning organization
is a metaphor. Guilford's model is a metaphor and the best ways in which
researchers have attempted to understand human learning is through the use of
metaphor. Skinner's black box is now part of the language. Piaget's schemata and
the information processing models of Gagne are all analogues of what we believe
goes on within the mental processes we refer to as learning or intelligent
behaviour. To understand the learning organization better, we need a more
effective metaphor.
Sternberg's triarchic theory of intelligence (Sternberg, 1990) emphasises
the thinking processes that are common to all people rather than the differences
in the content of thinking which Guilford and others focus on. Sternberg
identifies componential intelligence (thinking), contextual intelligence (adaptations
to context) and experiential intelligence (solving new problems) as the key factors
in intellectual functioning (see Woolfolk, 1993: 113-115 for a fuller discussion).
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The theory obviously owes much to Guilford and there is a temptation to start
filling in boxes again. However, Sternberg's theory has much relevance to an
attempt to refine the theory of the learning organization. The three factors
identified by Sternberg interact dynamically with one another and obviously lend
themselves to a fuller conception of the learning organization. If Guilford's is a
filing cabinet model then Sternberg presents us with a 'stock exchange model'
where everything is shifting, patterns are laid down and broken up and where
activity is the key feature.
Sternberg's theory has important insights for learning organizations. His
metacomponents (planning strategies) interact with performance components and
knowledge acquisition components to produce what he calls thinking. Applied to
the learning organization this analysis would indicate that such organizations are
purposeful and reflective in planning what they are to do, executing appropriate
strategies and acquiring the knowledge relevant to the tasks to be undertaken.
Woolfolk (1993) notes that:
Examples of metacomponents are identifying the problem, allocating
attention, and monitoring how well a strategy is working. A second function
served by components - executing the strategies selected - is handled by
performance components. One performance component allows us to perceive
and store new information. The third function - gaining new knowledge -
is performed by knowledge acquisition components, such as separating
relevant from irrelevant information as you try to understand a new
concept.
(Woolfolk, 1993:114)
Woolfolk's discussion goes on to note that some components are very task-
specific; others are more general and are required for any cognitive task.
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The second part of Sternberg's triarchic theory concerns coping with new
experiences. There are echoes of Whiston in his identification of the ability to
deal effectively with novel situations - creativity, plus the development of
"automaticity", or patterned performance whereby new solutions become routine
processes (Whiston, 1994). A fundamental dimension of any learning theory
concerns how the organism adapts to or accommodates new information and
situations. This becomes a dominant issue for learning organizations which are
generative rather than merely adaptive.
Finally, Sternberg highlights the importance of choosing an environment
in which people can succeed - by adaptation to that environment or re-shaping
it if necessary; in Sternberg's terms this demands selecting, reshaping or
maximizing the context. These capacities would be valuable within a learning
organization. It has been argued that they are largely missing from the World
Bank in operation. Sternberg's conception of what happens when we try to think
and act offers a more useful way ahead than the mere listing of desirable traits
that this study has already rejected. It is a dynamic model which takes us
further in the "process of becoming". From the theory a learning organizaflon
can be reconceptualized as one which applies appropriate thinking and planning
strategies, handles new problems creatively and speedily and adapts to its
environment by selecting and reshaping its context. But we are sliding towards
a new set of criteria. Organizations are actually more than the sum of their parts
or characteristics. Gouldner describes rational system organizations as:
• . .a structure of manipulable parts each of which is separately
modifiable.., by deliberate decision.
(Gouldner, in Scott,1981:60)
But the real world is not like this. Organizations are complex and variable.
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Concepts like equifinality, multi-headedness, the amorphousness of boundaries,
coalitions of individuals and sub-groups are found in them. They are rarely
mechanistic and predictable. They are ambiguous in their intentions, their
understanding of cause and effect, their reconstruction and recall of history and,
most importantly for the learning organization, they are ambiguous in the
attention individuals and groups give to contesting demands and decisions (March
and Olsen, 1976). It could be argued that this study's analysis of the World Bank
has in effect been an investigation of its ambiguities. Thus the theory of the
learning organization emerging from the work has taken a metaphor from
psychology, found it lacking in plausibility and has extended it by the
application of Sternberg's triarchic theory. This in itself is insufficient to
improve the quality of the lens referred to as the learning organization. The lens
has to be wide-angle rather than tight-focus. Ambiguity theory widens the focus.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), building on the earlier work of Burns and Stalker
(1961), looked at successful organizations in turbulent environments. They tended
to be organic rather than mechanistic. Such organizations had more in common
with an amoeba than a machine ( Morgan, 1986). Lawrence and Lorsch gave
precision and refinement to the genera] idea that certain organizations need
to be more organic than others, suggesting that the degree of organicism
required varies from one subunit to another.
(Morgan, 1986:55)
Contingency theory teaches us that in different environmental circumstances some
types of organization are better able to survive than others. Space precludes a
detailed analysis of the work of Mintzberg on the five species of organization he
has identified - the machine bureaucracy, the divisionalized form, the professional
bureaucracy, the simple structure and the "adhocracy" (Mintzberg, 1979).
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Mintzberg's typology helps us understand why the Bank functions and fails in
the way that it does. Mintzberg's first two categories are ineffective where the
environment is complex and unstable; the developing world par excellence. The
professional bureaucracy tends to function best in such organizations as
universities and hospitals where the people with key skills are allowed to work
fairly autonomously. The Bank would appear to fit into this model; yet its staff
cannot be said to work in this way. The simple structure or the adhocracy are
inappropriate to the Bank. In short, it does not have a clear model to work to.
Contingency and ambiguity rule.
What theory of the learning organization can we work with if useful advice
is to be offered to the Bank or any other organization seeking to improve itself?
7.6. Refining the theory of the learning organization
In Sternberg's terms, intelligent behaviour involves thinking, adapting to
contexts and solving new problems in a dynamic, interactive model. Fagerlind and
Saha (1983:197) present what they call a dialectical model of the relationship
between education and development. The terms dynamic and dialectical have
application to a refined theory of the learning organization. In escaping from
trait theories we are challenged to produce theory which is more organic in
nature and which relies less on hard and fast characteristics or dimensions and
more on interactive elements. Combining insights from Fagerlind and Saha and
from Sternberg the following statement emerges:
Learning organizations think; they adapt themselves; they solve problems.
By thinking we mean they have strategies for planning, for performing and for
acquiring knowledge. By adaptation we mean they select their environments, they
reshape them where necessary and they maximize the opportunities their contexts
offer. Through these dynamic and interactive processes they are able to solve
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new problems creatively and efficiently. They become insightful and they develop
automaticity. These are more than traits, indicators or characteristics because all
these processes are in a dialectical relationship with one another. Furthermore
this dialectic is conducted in an environment which is acknowledged to be
complex, contingent, ambiguous and even turbulent. Figure 6 below illustrates the
relationship between the components of the model and the influence of the
ambiguous and contingent environment in which they function. This is an organic
model where making sense of the world influences the knowledge and information
acquisition processes which in turn are determined by the creativity and
efficiency with which knowledge is generated.













Spare capacity	 Making sense of the world
AMBIGUITY	 CONTINGENCY
The model is dynamic, focusing on activities rather than characteristics. Contrast
these dynamic inter-relationships with the analysis of the World Bank presented
through the data in Chapters 5 and 6 above. There seems to be little reflection
or 'thinking' within the Bank about its shared basic assumptions. The economistic
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view of education is a fixed ideology. Success and failure are not adequately
analysed and dealt with in terms of evaluating the executing strategies or
performance of the Bank. The whole package of problems associated with the
Bank's generation, integration and use of knowledge and information has been
highlighted. Contextual intelligence is another clear area of failure by the Bank.
All environments in Third World education appear to be seen as much the same.
This non-differentiation could be seen as 'reshaping the environment' but cannot
be interpreted as maximizing of opportunities. Perhaps the Bank's failure is seen
most clearly in its inability to solve new problems creatively. The mixture as
before, with slight changes of emphasis, is not an unfair judgement on the
policies and practices reviewed from 1974 to 1995. Undoubtedly the Bank is
efficient in its procedures. It is information rich but cannot learn from
experience. Perhaps most disappointingly, in its public pronouncements the Bank
fails signally to recognize the complex, ambiguous and contingent world in which
it operates.
Examining the World Bank through a lens called the learning organization
does not result in all bad news. The Bank is staffed by very capable people. One
informant referred to the working environment as "like the 4th of July" with
bright ideas and exciting issues bursting forth everywhere. That the hierarchical
and conformist culture of the Bank creates a major brake on progress towards
becoming more of a learning organization is clear. For the individuals within the
organization to learn, and thus for the organization to learn and change, certain
conditions have to be met.
7.7. Learning how to learn
Smith (1990) suggests that learning to learn represents an essential skill in
today's workplace. This means the fostering of learning which is more efficient,
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more effective, more active and more reflective. Fostering more active learning
refers to the practice of encouraging personnel at every level of the organization
to initiate a greater number of learning efforts on their own. This may entail
both officially sanctioned and self-initiated learning activities. More reflective
learning entails enhancing the capacity of members of the organization to make
sound and imaginative choices about the learning strategies and resources they
use and to monitor their effectiveness. To the extent to which people take on
these responsibilities they are learning to do what teachers and trainers have
traditionally done for them in the past. Enhancing learning competence in this
way means not so much teaching people what to do but creating the environment
within which they will want to learn for themselves in their own ways. Thus
learning organizations are more than organizations which have programmes or
strategies for instructing their members. The model of the learning organization
advanced above is essentially an action model. It has resonances with some of the
characteristics of learning organizations drawn from the literature, especially
those of Senge and Morgan. But it focuses on activities rather than traits. The
task of the learning organization is to create the environment in which its
members can think, adapt and problem-solve in the dynamic way the model
suggests. The present structure of the Bank and its culture clearly prevent this
from happening. If we turn to the World Bank again and apply the model to its
activities in, say, developing a project for or with a developing country we would
see Bank staff thinking, planning and acquiring knowledge and information which
would lead them to select and maximize the appropriate environment for their
intervention. They would actively try to make sense of the contextual world in
which they are operating. Insight and creativity would characterise the solutions
brought forward. Project components would be implemented efficiently. Reflective
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monitoring would typify the performance of the project tasks. Spare capacity
would enable staff to cope with contingencies and ambiguities. Evaluation of the
project components would identify areas of success and areas of failure such that
the organization and its members would learn from experience. All this can sound
as mechanistic as it would be to follow a set of traits or blindly to attempt to
impose Dixon's organizational learning cycle on a business or other enterprise.
The message of activity is insufficient in itself. If this study has shown the
writer anything it has shown that there are no formulae or guaranteed guidelines
for the development of a learning organization. There are helpful metaphors,
whether they be filing cabinets, stock exchanges, brains or psychic prisons. But
there has to be something more.
Fundamental to any organization is some understanding of 'the point of it
all'. Perhaps this is what is wrong with the World Bank. Some people within it
are very clear about what the point of it is - but they are wrong. Others are
unclear about the point of it - and they may be closer to the truth. It was
stated earlier that widely held deep, basic assumptions are not enough. Charles
Handy (1994:239) suggests:
To find (the) point, that reason for our doing and our being, it helps to
build on three senses - a sense of continuity, a sense of connection and
a sense of direction.
He goes on to say that without these three senses we can, in a world of change
and confusion, feel 'disoriented, adrift and rudderless'. Learning organizations
can adopt characteristics or traits. They may even adopt a dialectical action
model as proposed above. But without the sharing of the three senses identified
by Handy they are unlikely to discover and utilize the models 'more congruent
with human nature' which Senge (1990) identifies and which lie at the heart of
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the true learning organization. The identification of these three senses brings us
full circle. A continuing problem in this study's discussion of the learning
organization has been that of the deep basic assumptions or defining values of
the learning organization. Table 1 in Chapter Two listed the characteristics of
learning organizations largely in terms of defining values and these ideas were
certainly found in both the interview schedule and in the analysis of
documentation. But values do not exist in a vacuum. Handy's assertion gives the
values dimension a firm location. It is not sufficient for an organization to have
deep basic assumptions which are held by all members consensually. Deep basic
assumptions which encapsulate 'the point of it all' for an organization must be
framed within the terms Handy proposes. They must demonstrate a continuity, to
be seen to have evolved and to be evolving. They must demonstrate their
connection to both the real world and the world hoped for, the 'vision' mentioned
by Senge. The deep basic assumptions must demonstrate a sense of direction, a
notion of where the organization wants to go and what it wants to become. The
action model developed from Sternberg (Figure 6) illustrates a learning
organization which may think, adapt and problem-solve in a context of ambiguity
and contingency. It will truly operate as a learning organization only insofar as
it incorporates the senses of continuity, connection and direction which identify
the core values essential to its growth and development.
7.8. Postscript
The concluding sections of this study have presented a first approximation of a
refined theory of the learning organization. This refining is based on data
gathered from the World Bank through the processes described in Chapters Five
and Six. Revisiting the data, how can the model proposed be made more explicit
and user-friendly ?
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A key concern of the latter part of this work has been to escape from trait
theories. Such theories may encourage the view that if the characteristics are
observable then the desired state of affairs - the learning organization - has
been achieved. But it has been shown that the whole is more than the sum of the
parts and it is more fruitful to consider what activities learning organizations
need to engage in and, more importantly, how these activities interact with one
another and with an ambiguous and contingent environment. It was noted earlier
that learning organizations think, adapt and solve problems. They reflect,
plan,perform, monitor and acquire knowledge. They select their environments to
maximise their opportunities and they attempt to make sense of the world. They
solve problems in a creative, efficient and insightful way using the spare
capacity they have created. All these activities are in a dialectical relationship,
deeply interactive and inseparable. If the data gathered on the World Bank in
this study is revisited, how could the Bank's activities be refocused to bring
about a learning organization ?
From the interview evidence gathered it is clear that the planning,
reflecting and monitoring activities of the Bank are deeply flawed. The mobility
of staff was commented on by all interview subjects. The confused notion of
teamwork in an unsystematic culture of 'doing what you want' also came through
clearly from the insiders. On the other hand, hierarchical systems of review and
control were identified as problematic by Bank observers, within and outside the
organization. The acquisition and use of knowledge stand out as major areas of
difficulty for the Bank. The overwhelming scale of the information made available
and its restricted sources make it difficult for the organization to 'think'
effectively or creatively. The culture of the Bank will have to change from a
'Brownie points' system based on the number and dollar value of projects pushed
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up to the Board to one where planning, reflection and monitoring over medium
to long-term periods are the norm. Those who plan must be the reflectors. Those
who monitor must acquire and supply information. Methods of filtering,
condensing and presenting information in a manageable style must be developed.
Neo-positivism will be found inadequate when the context of educational project
work is examined more closely by planners, reflectors, monitors and information
generators. The adaptation of the organization to the realities of the various
environments within which it works is part of the cultural change process
needed. Too many informants and Bank documents reflected a 'Washington eye'
view of the world. The formulaic style of much Bank project work reveals this
inability to solve problems creatively. Efficiency is largely seen by the Bank in
terms of effective internal procedures for financial disbursements and protection
from embezzlement by recipient governments. One subject commented on the
difficulty most organizations have with the deep structural examination which is
necessary for fundamental changes of values and attitudes. The Bank is
particularly prone to this despite its frequent reorganizations. It would be a
counsel of despair to say that the Bank will always operate like a bank. Another
informant noted that the staff of the Bank is made up of many well-intentioned,
professionally very capable, competent and experienced educators -" gifted
people, committed people". The problem lies then not with the organization's
members but with 'the point of it all'. The shift from a loan-disbursing
organization to one more congruent with human nature is perhaps at the heart
of the new Bank President's radical reappraisal of how the Bank functions. His
task is to lead the Bank into Senge's fifth discipline. If a more dialectical model
of what is to be done and how it is to be accomplished can be adopted then the
Bank can change, learn and grow. It may be overoptimistic to suggest that the
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Bank can achieve continuity, connection and direction in Handy's terms. It will
certainly have huge problems in getting to this state of being. The key problem
areas for the Bank to overcome are its apparent inability to deal with ambiguity
and contingency, its reliance on what Weiss calls accretion, or the repetition of
'proven' strategies. Secondly, the Bank will have to deal with the problem of
information and knowledge, both in terms of the volume of material its staff is
subjected to and the quality of information culled from friendly sources. Thirdly
it will have to look closely into its role as an organization dealing with a deeply
human activity, the transmission of culture rather than the marketing of a
commodity called schooling. The Bank will have to make better sense of the world
than it manages at the moment. A huge culture change will require Bank staff to
develop the insight and creativity which seems so lacking in its current
operations. Despite lip-service to participation in so much Bank literature, it is
the voice of Washington which tends to dominate educational debate.
Whether the model of the learning organization advanced in this study is
adopted or not, the outlook for the Bank is not optimistic. It is a juggernaut,
hugely powerful and accountable to nobody except in the narrowest financial
sense. Whilst the values and assumptions concerning the point of its operations
remain positivist, capitalist and largely unreflective it cannot learn. Maybe the
new Bank president wifi make a difference.Certainly Senge would see leadership
as a key factor in achieving the learning organization. But it is feared that the
culture change required in such an organization is too great for any individual
or group to achieve.
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Annexure 2: The World Bank and its Education Projects
Well over 90% of IBRD/IDA loans and credits are made through specific projects.
Each project is developed through what the Bank calls a "project cycle", a six
stage process. First, the Bank identifies suitable projects which fit in with
national and sectoral development strategies and which are thought by the Bank
to be feasible. Projects are then incorporated into the Bank's lending programme
for a given country. Next, a preparation phase is entered into. The Bank plays
a major role in project preparation, no longer leaving it to recipient countries
to prepare their own documentation. Using both its own staff and hired
consultants, Country Surveys are prepared. Through this means, the Bank
maintains its hegemony, using its strength to prepare economic and social
intelligence in a more comprehensive way than most governments can. Such Bank-
developed information is usually highly secret, highly technical and inevitably
ideologically biased. As Payer puts it:
Even if we assume that the information contained in the Coun try
Surveys is accurate, it is clear that the issuing of these surveys, and
their use as guides to project identification is a powerful means by which
the Bank can impose the priorities desired by its capital-supplying
members.
(Payer, 1982:74)
The preparation phase is usually then orchestrated by the Bank prior to an
appraisal phase. Appraisal is carried out by Bank staff from Washington who
usually remain in-country for three to five weeks fine tuning project proposals.
On returning to Washington, the Bank team prepares its report which is used as
the basis for continued negotiations between the Bank and the recipient country.
Cost-benefit analysis plays an important role in the Bank's appraisal of the
viability of the project under discussion. Hough (1994) has prepared for Britain's
Overseas Development Administration a comprehensive critique of this technique.
In later discussion, the Bank's adherence to a much criticized social appraisal
technique is explored more fully. Suffice it to say at this point that there are
profound problems with social cost-benefit analysis as a means of project
assessment yet the Bank appears not to have learned from the literature which
is critical of this approach.
Three additional phases of a Bank project must be explored briefly. After
the appraisal noted above, a negotiation phase is entered into. It is at this stage
that the Bank's "conditionalities" for any given project are discussed. Typically,
as loan documents are completed and formal approval sought from the Bank for
release of the loan a number of conditions may be specified for the recipient
government. Such matters as matching or partially-matching funding, co-operation
with other donor agencies, release of local staff and resources will be negotiated
at this stage. Of the $8396 million devoted to educational projects supported by
the Bank in the early 1990s, $3901 million came from Bank credits or loans. The
larger proportion caine from the 'recipient' governments (Jones, 1991:xv). Perhaps
most important of all, the objectives and targets for the project will be agreed,
many of which will be pre-requisites for continued disbursement of funds. Payer
(1982:83) points out that these negotiations may be very one-sided. The Bank
argues powerfully. Recipients may want to ensure smooth negotiations, avoiding
any boat-rocking. As Rotberg (1981) puts it, the Bank has a multi-national staff
and bright young officials of recipient governments may see opportunities for
recognition by the Bank and subsequent employment in Washington. Although
Rotberg is coy about this, there is no doubting what he means.
Once negotiations are completed the implementation and supervision phases
of the project can begin. Basically, the recipient government implements the
project, often seconding its own officials to a 'Project Implementation Unit". The
Bank's role is to supervise and monitor the project from Washington. The annual
reviews of projects are designed to help the Bank review its policies and improve
its performance. Critics of the process point out that short-term visitations by
Washington-based staff may not necessarily bring about the results desired.
Review and monitoring of projects are separate activities from the more
formal and independent evaluation phase of the Bank's project lending process.
The Bank's Operations Evaluation Department undertakes the 'independent'
evaluation by first preparing an audit of the project completion report. Evidence
suggests that this form of evaluation leaves something to be desired. The reports
of the Operations Evaluation Department normally record a 90% success rate with
Bank projects. Focus is usually on whether project objectives were achieved.
There is little consideration of whether the objectives were appropriate to begin
with. Another recurring theme in analysing Bank performance is to ask the
classical management question, "They have cleared the jungle very effectively -
but was it the right jungle?"
This brief review of how Bank projects are conducted provides the
background topography for the study's analysis of the Bank in operation
(Chapter 3). In sum, it can be said that a rational and systematic approach is
taken to project lending by the Bank. It should also be noted that the key terms
in early Bank policy statements regarding educational lending were:
- lending for specific projects
- projects designed to meet the priority needs of recipients
- projects designed to be the most useful and urgent for
increasing the productive resources of members
- safeguards to avoid economically or technically unsound
projects.





Fax No. 00 1 202 676 0319
April 18th, 1996
Research Project: The Organizational Culture of the World Bank
I am engaged in a private research project on organizational culture. I should
like to use the Bank as an organization for examination, concentrating on the
division which deals with international education.
Within the next few days I should like to phone you to discuss the
questions below. They are quite general but may be expanded when I telephone you.
Your answers will not be attributed and the enquiry is for academic purposes
only. Please feel free to discuss the questions with your line manager to ensure
that no breach of Bank confidentiality is at risk.
I would be grateful if you could fax or e-mail me suggesting a time when
you would be available to talk on the telephone. The following time slots would
suit me best - Monday or Tuesday 22/23 April or the following week, 29/30 April
at any time after 8.00a.m. Washington time. I estimate that we would need about
thirty to forty minutes to explore the questions. I hope you will feel able to
help me with this research which is for my doctoral dissertation.
The Research Questions
1. If organizational culture means the deep basic assumptions and beliefs shared
by the organization's members, what would you say these are in the Bank ?
2. How would you describe the culture of the Bank ? Which of the terms below best
describe it - participatory, rigid, hierarchical, open, competitive - other terms
which occur to you ?
3. What would you say are the defining values of the Bank - the ideas generally
thought most important among your colleagues ?
4. How are successes and failures dealt with in the Bank ? What mechanisms are
there for learning from the past ?
5. Knowledge and information seem to be important issues in successful
organizations. What is your experience of the Bank in terms of:
- development and sharing of information
- openness and availability of information
- levels of interaction among Bank staff
- where good ideas emanate from in the Bank
- how feedback mechanisms operate in the Bank ?
6. How is information generated in the Bank - mainly externally, mainly
internally or a balance from both sources ?
7. How is information integrated into the organization - how do you obtain
information relevant to your work ?
8. How is knowledge interpreted and used in the organization - is this done 'from
the top' , individually or collectively ?
9. How free are you to take action on your own interpetation of information ?
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Annexure 4: A Bank Project which failed
The Project described is drawn from the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago's Third
Education Project. A similar case study might have been selected from Pakistan,
the Fourth Education Project from 1979 and its subsequent incarnations in that
country.
London (1993) in the article attached, draws attention to the following causes of
project failure:
- lack of research into why projects succeed or fail
- project implementation more complex and subtle than anticipated
- failure to learn from past experience
- lack of correspondence between plan and project outcomes
- mismatch between rationalistic planning and actual contexts
- practical, personnel and financial problems.
London identifies "insuffient regard for congruence between plan and social
reality" as the main cause of failure.
From International Journal of Educational Developaient (1993) Vol 13, No.3, pp 265-
275
e
,,i. J. Educano,,c, Oe'.rlop..ev. Vol. 13. No, 3. pp.
	
1993	 c373&4593193 6.ii .- iXi
Pnnced si Grec ancain	 993 Petmon P,.s Lcd
WHY EDUCATION PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FAIL:
A CASE STUDY
NORREL A. LONDON
Faculty of Education. University of Western Ontario. Canada
Abstract - Nlzinv of the lar ge scale educational development projects in the Third World have
been attended by success stones upon their conclusion. Some projects, less publicized, have.
however, met with failure in the sense that planned objectives were not met. The present study
identifies one of these failed projects. Trinidad and Tobagos Third Education Project. analyzes
the proolerns encouiuered. and offers a framework within which (he project might have been
successfully irnplemerued. The study reveals that it is not so much in the implementation of the
project but in the plan and the paradi gm used, where the main causes of failure resided. The
findings suggest therefore that as a wa y of ensuring success in project outcome, the plan upon
which the project is based ought to be given careful attention during the initial stages of project
conceptualization.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years the project approach has
increasingly been used as a major vehicle for
initiating education innovation in developing
societies. Very often projects have been
initiated to implement specific features of
education stipulated in existing strategic de-
velopment plans. In the case of a given Five
Year Education Plan a single project (school
construction, for example) may be mounted to
achieve a specific planning objective (curricu-
urn vocationalization, for example). Other
cnajor projects may result from the same plan.
but availability of funds is always a prime
:onsideration in the decision to extract and
nitiate projects. Where funding is not avail-
1ble plans may remain inert for a long time,
md sometimes may never be implemented.
3ecause of the fiscal problems which develop-
og countries often face, most of their major
:ducation projects extracted from long-term
ducation plans have had to await funding
:ither in part or in whole by international
ending agencies such as the World Bank.
The major education projects that have been
Indertaketi in the Third World in recent years
Lave had a mixed history, particularly as far as
telivery of planned services is concerned.
attainment of stated objectives is used
S a performance benchmark, some recent
education projects may be characterized as
'successful'; others have been proven to be
only partially successful in the sense that
implemenrational objectives were achieved in
certain areas but not in others; yet some other
projects may be described as 'failures' in which
case objectives as planned were not achieved
(Psacharopoulos, 1989).
In an analysis of the educational planning
process in parts of Latin America, McGinn et
at. (1979) refer to the 'mounting evidences' of
the failure of major education projects in less
developed countries. Even more disappointing
is the remark that reasons for these failures
have not yet been adequately researched, so
that causes may be identified and remedial
strategies proposed as a course for future
action. There is little or no analysis of what
has been previously tried and . . . failed, and
efforts to collect information about obstacles
to implementation are markedly limited'
(McGinn et at., 1979).
W'hatever the status (success, partial success
or failure) Williams' (1975) argument is that
the educational project implementation pro-
cess is both complex and subtle. Because of
the paucity of knowledge about project
implementation, 'one hardly knows where to
begin' any meaningful analysis of the impact
of the implementational exercise (Williams,





number of education projects undertaken in
developing nations, particularly following the
decolonization era beginning in the late 1950s
and gaining momentum in immediately suc-
ceeding years.
Admittedly, a certain amount of corporate
technical knowledge about these projects
would inhere from one undertaking the next,
but as the experience of the British Overseas
Development Administration reveals, failure
of education projects may still continue. This is
how Iredale puts it:
continuity does not in itself ensure that mistakes
made are not repeated. Miniacers come and go. and the
inevitable musical chairs routine that is central to all
civil service structures means chat the managers
responsible for country programmes are moved at
reguLar 3-4 yearl y
 intervals, as are their junior staff.
(1990. p. 1b3)
Thus, in spite of past experiences subsequent
project failure in the same educational en-
vironment may occur for a variety of reasons
and, depending upon the definition used.
project outcome may be interpreted differently
depending upon the objective of the evaluator.
In the present paper 'success' or 'failure' is
measured against two main indices. In the first
place it is seen as a quantifiable element,
measured in terms of the extent to which
measurable, technically stated project ob-
jectives have been met. In the second place
success or failure may be client-related. That
is, in spite of what may have been achieved, a
project has failed or succeeded if the client so
deems it. These two approaches have been
adopted in the present article.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES DATA AND
METHOD
In the desire to achieve greater efficiency in
undertaking education projects it is instructive
to look back at past performances, with a view
to improving the quality of future imple-
mentational strategies. This approach has been
recommended by Iredale who warns that:
if we forget the need to go on learning from our
experience we do so at our peril. Our evaluation reports
(of education projects in the Third World) show many
successes. But they include some self fla gellation coo.
and we are constantly conscious o the need to take
account of past experiences in theformulation of new
work.
(1990. p. t68)
In the present article a past project i
therefore examined in the hope that sonic
lessons might be learned as regards imple-
mentation of future education projects in
developing societies in particular.
The country
 in respect of which the project is
examined is the twin-island state of Trinidad
and Tobago in the south-eastern Caribbean,
and the project under scrutiny is referred
to as Trinidad and Tobago's Third Education
Project (1979-1985). This project has been
deemed by the client, the Government of the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, to have
failed for the reason that the project's primary
objective, provision of a total of about 13,500
school places, was never achieved.
The main objective of the article is two-fold:
it isolates some of the problems which
contributed to failure of the Third Education
Project on the one hand, and on the other it
suggests an approach to planning which might
be used to cushion or avert similar problems
which may contribute to project failure. The
planning framework which the article suggests.
therefore offers greater possibilities for project
success under similar implementational cir-
cumstances, and is in response to the view that
the planner who is disenchanted with the
results of his or her plans ought to 'look
elsewhere for solutions that are workable'
(McGinn et al., 1979).
Data for this resarch were gleaned from
three major sources: government files and
progress reports dealing with the Third
Education Project: World Bank documents on
the project, but in particular the Loaii
Agreement. the Saff Apprairal Report and the
Project Working Papers: and commentaries on
the theory and practice of education planning.
The paper is presented in the form of a case
study, and its findings are believed to have
significance for the planning and implementa-
tion of education projects in some other
settings besides Trinidad and Tobago, but
particularly in Third World societies.
The rest of the article is divided into several
parts. In the next section an. analytical
framework for investigating the causes of
project failure is presented. followed by an
overview of the educational development
'climate' in which the project was struck.
Significant highlights of large scale education
development projects in Trinidad and Tobago
are then given, as a way of relating the Third
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0ject to predecessor educational initiatives.
objectives of the Third Education Project,
investigation of what went wrong and the
sons for difficulties experienced are then
esugated. Lastly, an attempt is made to
e project failure to the models of planning
senced earlier in the paper. The article
cludes with an optimistic note: project
ire can be minimized through application
appropriate models during the planning
ess.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
rrea er a!. (1986) argue that there exists a
nonal relationship between project out-
and conceptualization of the planning
ess itself'. Correspondence between plan
project outcome is also highlighted by
inn et a!. (1979) who assert that 'the
l of planning employed' has a direct
ection with project performance. If this
onship holds true then examination of the
ing process upon which Trinidad and
gos Third Education Project was based
be insightful.
o intellectual traditions are offered from
educational planning may proceed.
according to Adams (1991), may be
• of the rational or interactive (transac-
type, and within these two domains
1 derivative models may be found. The
al approach 'includes all models which
he planning process as basically sequen-
)servable and capable of being evaluated.
ctive models, on the other hand, reflect
nphasis on the human dynamics of
n making' (Adams, 1991).
,brooke and Lindblom (1970) further
e that rational models assume agree-
in goals, and reflect 'a faith' in available
iues or technology to translate targets
ogrammes of action. With rational plans
ientation is therefore expected to pro-
the plan directs'. In interactive models
other hand faith in the technology used
LmJzed, and implementation assumes
and uncertainty which are dealt with in
:e as the plan unfolds. Plausibility of the
ive model is therefore demonstrated in
bility to resolve problems 'that typically
succumb to the demands of objectivity
ntiflcation' (Adams, 1991).
niy the model qua model, but the social
paradigm from which each model emerges is
also significant. In the final analysis it is
the paradigmatic 'logic' which determines
the 'rules of the game' in implementation,
and although the social paradigm may not
be readily apparent, it is this feature that com-
prises the important element which imparts
meaning and direction to the implementation
task. Popkewitz (1984) notes, for example,
that it is through the social paradigm that the
educational planner or project manager is
guided into an understanding of 'what consti-
tutes fact par excellence and how people make
sense out of the disparate events of their social
world'.
Using a continuum of educational planning
suggested by Adams (1987), we may identify
two social paradigms corresponding with the
rational and interactive intellectual traditions
of educational planning. Rational planning
models are said to be cast within an objective
social paradigm, whereas interactive models
conform to the subjective type. The rational-
istic model 'incorporates positivistic assump-
tions of a value-free social and physical
science, in which the scientist is outside the
orderly world being examined' (Adams, 1991).
In interactive models by contrast, 'the sub-
jective paradigm has, at its core, the notion
that individuals create the world in which they
live, and that any understanding of society, its
institutions and its emergent social processes,
depends on the vantage point of the partici-
pant' (Adams, 1991).
In further contrast Morgan explains that the
subjective paradigm 'is based on the assump-
tion that society has a systematic character
oriented to produce an ordered and regulated
state of affairs. The ontological assumptions
encourage a belief in the possibility of an
objective and value-free social science in which
the scientist is distanced from the scene'
(1980). The objective paradigm on the other
hand:
overlooks the critical role of human actors pursuing
personal and collective goals. It assumes shared goals
and ideologies where in fact there is conflict, and it
expects change to result automatically on presentation
of a technically excellent proposal.
(McGinn et al.. 1979, p. 220)
This is the reason that many rationalist plans
based upon an objective paradigm 'end up
gathering dust' (McGinn et a!., 1979).





educational plans are never wholly rational or
wholly interactivist (Carlson and Awkerman,
1991). In any given rationalist plan there are
often elements of the interactivist mode, and
vice versa. In many rationalist plans for
example can be found dimensions of subjec-
tivity just as features of objectivity
 may be




Trinidad and Tobago operates a system of
education that is state run and centrally
controlled. When political independence was
gained in 1962 access to secondary education
was limited, about 35% participation, while
participation at the primary level was about
80%. It is this contrast which provided the
major rationale for the course which future
developments in education should follow.
Large scale post-colonial education projects
were therefore focused on expansion at the
secondary level. Primar school expansion was
held in abeyance in the interim.
When the above Third Education Project
was conceived around 1979. there were 91
secondary schools in Trinidad and Tobago
providing instruction for about 91.000 students
altogether. The norm for secondary education
was and still is five years. Participation rate at
the secondary level had by then (1979) risen to
about 75% (from about 35% at the beginning
of the 1960s). but this increase was achieved at
great expense to the quality of educational
inputs at the primary level. One result was that
in the intervening years the primary school
plant had deteriorated tremendously. In
addition, there was severe over-crowding in
many schooLs caused by natural increase in
the population and by internal migration.
Dangerous to life and limb S was the expression
used by a World Bank team to describe most of
the primary school buildings then in existence
in Trinidad and Tobago (World Bank. 1979b).
Under these circumstances provision of
facilities for primary education came of age'.
A previous human rights recommendation to
provide a safe learning environment for
children, together with the goal of curriculum
reform as an aid to economic development was
the major factor that underpinned the new
focus on primary education. Rebuilding of
dilapidated schoolhouses, therefore, and not
the establishment of new schools comprised
the new thrust. Irreparable primary school
buildings were not merely to be replaced, but
certain modern facilities such as library, hea!thJ
dental room. Principal's office, staff room, a
multi-purpose area where school meals could
be served, and facilities for the teaching and
learning of science and the creative arts were
also planned. That is to say, modernization of
the primary sector was a major goal.
Because of the government's commitment to
the idea of development of education for
economic growth and transformation, the
above efforts at secondary education expan-
sion did not cease, however. The expansion
ethos came to embrace not only the establish-
ment of new schools, but also extension of some
secondary schools that had only recently been
built. These two lines of action. establishment
of new schools and extension of others, were
pursued around the 1980s and were included as
objectives in the Third Education Project.
This therefore is the educational development
settin g in which the Third Education Project
was conceived. Construction of primary schools
was of pivotal importance. but construction
and extension of a few secondary schools were
also to be undertaken. Technical assistance
was also to be provided to assist development
of indigenous skills, and curriculum reform was
emphasized through proposals to include two





Prior to political independence large scale
school building projects were unknown in
Trinidad and Tobago, a feature also un-
common throughout the Caribbean and the
rest of the developing world. Ascent to
national sovereignty changed that picture.
however. This is how Trinidad and Tobago's
first post-colonial education plan, otherwise
known as the Draft Education Plan explains
the need for change:
What are we educating for? We are 5upposed to
produce citizens who are intellectually, morally and
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emotionally fitted to respond adequately and produc-
tively to the varied challenges of life in a small multi-
racial developing country and to the changes which are
being brought about rapidly in the economic founda-
cons of civilization, particularly the challenges of
Science and Technology. And we are supposed to
anticipate and cater for such inevitable situations such
as the disappearance of the cotaily unskilled labourer
the rapid increase in the body of highly specialised
knowledge upon which the world society progresses (in
other words the barest educational demands of effective
citizenship will be increasing rapidly as well), and the
rapid increase in population which will mean . a
greater degree of urbanization of life in the country.
(Ministry of Education. 1968. p. 5)
This therefore is the policy decision which
arked commencement of large scale educa-
n projects in Trinidad and Tobago, and
sociated with this new beginning was
tablishmenc of the nation's Educational
anning Division within the Ministry of
ducation. Prior to the Third Education
'oject there were three large scale school
instruction endeavours. Two of these, the
rst and Second Education Projects were
nded by the World Bank; the third, officially
ferred to as the Short Term School Building
eject. was wholly financed by the govern-
ent. The Third Education Project mentioned
ve was therefore the fourth in a series of
ge scale projects, but derives its name from
e fact that it was the third local education
tiative to be funded by the , World Bank. A
th project, financed by the Inter-American
tvelopment Bank (I.A.D.B.) is now being
plemented.
e First and Second Education Projects
l'he first and second projects (1969-1978)
phasized construction of secondary schools
a way of increasing secondary enrolment,
Trinidad and Tobago's two technical
titutes were also built under these two
felopment efforts. Construction of two
chers' colleges were also peripheral but
ortant undertakings. Under these First and
ond Education Projects a total of about 18
jot secondary schools were built with an
oLrnent capacity of about 30,000. The
dels upon which planning of the First and
oridary Education Projects was based were
the technical—rational, objective type.
ject success or failure was to be seen in
rititative terms, measured by the extent to
cb technically stated and quantifiable
ctives were met. There was faith in the
technology available to translate plan into
action, and to achieve project success. Disap-
pointments and failure in project outcome
were not anticipated in accordance with the
social paradigm used in the planning process.
Conflict, contradiction and uncertainty were
not expected because of 'tight' and 'logical'
planning.
The planning model used was considered
appropriate, and the two initiatives proceeded
'as the plant directed'. Both endeavours have
been 'success stories' in the history of large
scale education projects in Trinidad and
Tobago. A World Bank audit report on these
two projects explains that:
A major part of the success was due to the realistic
nature of the objectives, the careful preparation of the
plan on which they were based, and the government's
commitment to the type of development supported by
the projects. The school places provided were fully
utilized, and the planned diversification of curricula
implemented. The few problems which arose in regard
to procurement of furniture and equipment are fairly
representative of the experience of first education
projects in other countries.
(1979a. p. 14)
The Short Term School Building Project
This project was funded wholly by the
Government of the Republic of Trinidad and
Tobago, and was made possible by the windfall•
in oil revenues received when the price of
petroleum, Trinidad and Tobago's premier
resource, quadrupled during the mid-1970s.
The major objective of the Short Term School
Building Project was expansion of secondary
places through construction of 36 schools.
Between 1977 when the project started and
1987 when it was concluded about 35,000 new
secondary school places were provided. The
planning model upon which the project was
based was of the rational, objective type, very
similar to that which was used previously in the
First and Second Education Projects.
However, the Short Term School Building
Project did not owe its success to the planning
model used. At the time of its implementation
Trinidad and Tobago society had undergone
some significant changes, due largely to the
influx of 'easy petroleum dollars' into the local
economy, and in consequence of which project
implementation was affected in several ways.
Prices of land for school sites soared; labour
costs escalated, and project management skills




retain. Implementation difficulties such as
these might have been more cost-effectively
solved perhaps by a change in project plan, but
this line of action was not followed. Money is
no problem' became the slogan of the day and
schools were constructed at severely increased
costs. There were huge cost overruns.
THE THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT
Trinidad and Tobago's Third Education
Project was a joint venture between the
Government of the Republic of Trinidad and
Tobago and the World Bank. According to
plan, the implementation time was 5 years.
Total project cost was given as U.S.S54.62
million of which tJ.S.520 million was loaned by
the Bank. The remaining U.S.334.62 million
was to- be contributed by the borrower,
Trinidad and Tobago. As stipulated in the
Loan Agreement (1722 TR) the main objec-
tives of the project were as follows:
(a) construction, furnishing and equipping of
27 primary schools to replace obsolete and
sub-standard schools (9320 places), two
junior secondaryL schools (2880 places).
two composite secondary school extensions
(384 places), six senior secondary school
extensions (932 places), one National
Curriculum and Teacher Development
Centre (N.C.T.D.C.), and one Regional
Teacher Development Centre (T.D.C.),
and
(b) provision of technical assistance by way of
10 man-years' of specialist services, 9.5
man-years of fellowships, and 10 rnan-
years of project management services
(World Bank. 1979).
For the sake of implementational conveni-
ence, however, three broad areas of project
objectives were recognized: construction, to-
gether with furnishing and equipping of
buildings; project management; and technical
assistance. Some degree of failure was evident
in the last two domains in the sense that
objectives as stated were not altogether met,
but it is in the construction sector where most
of the funds were allocated that failure was
accentuated. For the client, the Government
of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the
first objective - school construction, furnish-
ing and equipping - constituted the primary
purpose and raison d'être of the project, and
as a result non-performance or under-per-
formance in this area was interpreted as
project failure. None of the primary schools
was built: extensions to the senior secondary
schools were never initiated and. with respect
to the N.C.T.D.C. and the T.D.C., negotia-
tions were not even finalized regarding
orientation of these institutions to fi local
needs.
The project was to be executed by a special
implementational team, the Educational Fa-
cilities Management Unit 2 (E.F.M.tJ.) created
as an arm of Trinidad and Tobagos Ministry of
Education by Cabinet decree in 1979. Estab
lishment of this ad hoc implementational unit
was a strate gic planning device, in conformity
with World Bank stipulations. The main
purpose of such an organization, according to
Williams. is bring together people and
material in a cohesive organizational unit and
motivate them in such a way as to carry out the
organization's stated objectives (1975. p. 554).
SOME EXAMPLES OF WHAT WENT
WRONG AND WHY
Implementation of the Third Educational
Project met with difficulties along seven fronts:
project cost, primary education, construction
of junior secondary schools. composite and
senior school extensions, Teacher Develop-
ment Centres, project management, and
invasion by ioreign' projects. The following
areas have been isolated for particularly
comment.
Project cost
Rapid escalation of prices was the main
problem as regards project cost. When the loan
agreement was signed (13 July 1979) estimated
project cost was U.S.S54.62 million (of which
the loan component was U.S.$20 million).
When the project was re-estimated in October
1980 the cost had risen to U.S.3135 million,
and in May 1981 this figure became U.S.S152
million. As a result of further escalation and
implementational problems the estimated Cost
in March 1982 stood at U.S.S164.75 million.
A comparison of project costs estimated at
May 1979 and at February 1982 is given in
Table 1.
Explanations for this dramatic increase in
project costs have been offered. The Central
e
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Sourcr: Project files. Minisirv of Education. Trinidad and Tobago. Port of Spain. 1979-1982.
Staristical Office (1983) argues that world
economic inflation was at the time (o
implementation of the project) at an all-time
high. averaging about 14.8% in Trinidad and
Tobago. Si gnificant, however, was the reaction
of the World Bank to the inflationary prices.
Financial support for the project from the
World Bank commensurate with the above
increases was not forthcoming. and increased
costs had to be borne by Trinidad and Tobago
alone. In a communiqué to the government the
World Bank declared its intention not to
increase loan funds. , but to hold World Bank
participation in project cost constant (at the
original figure of U.S.S20 million). This was
the case in spite of an overall increase in cost to
the tune of 202% (Table 1).
Prijnarv education
On the primary education front there were
three main problems. In the first place
acquisition of sites for project schools was
difficult. In Trinidad and Tobago site acqui-
ton for construction of public facilities,
including schools, can be a tedious and
labyrinthine process. A 1982 ministerial report
On the project explained that:
• Since the Loan Agreement was signed in July 1979. only
six out of the twenty-seven primary school sites have
been fully acquired and surveyed (toporaphicaI and
cada.stral). Acquisition procedures are holding up the
design of four schools . . . for which consultants have
beep
 appointed, and cadastral surveys are still required
tor nine others.
(Ministry of Education. 1982. p. 25)
The second problem had to do with validity
Pt the respective demographic data. Enrolment
gures for project schools, for example,
changed between the time (1977) of the loan
request and initiation of project implemen-
tation (1979). In consequence, additional
demographic surveys were necessary in order
to validate enrolment capacity for each
proposed school. In another progress report it
was commented that:
In all cases it had been the practice before design
commences to conduct investigation in the locality of
the given school to determine the precise needs. The
enrolment and thus the size o( the new schools ace
tailored to suit the present and anticipated demands.
The total revised enrolment resulting from this action is
8690. thus producing a saving of 790 places from the
original estimate of 9480 places.
(Ministry of Education. 1982. p. 3)
The third problem at the primary level
concerned space standards for project insti-
tutions. Some difference existed between
standards espoused by the government and
those recommended by the World Bank.
Government proposals were less generous, and
were the result of local adjustments in
education policy subsequent to signing of the
loan agreement. The main changes in space
standards were:
(a) reductior. in individual classroom area,
(b) elimination of certain special-purpose
rooms such as those for the teaching of
science and handicraft,
(c) elimination of the multi-purpose area (to
be used for assemblies and communal
school activities),
(d) elimination of the library in schools of
certain sizes, and,
(e) elimination of certain non-teaching areas
e
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such as the Principal's office and staff 	 responsibilities satisfactory to the Bank:
room.	 and,
Construction of the primary school could not
proceed until agreement was reached between
the World Bank and the government regarding
building and space standards to be adopted.
Reasons for difficulties in all of these areas
of the primary education component are
noteworthy. In the first instance suitable
building sites became a rare commodity during
the 'building boom' then in existence. Caught
without a 'sites bank' which was recommended
by a UNESCO planning mission (UNESCO,
1964), the Ministry of Education was hard put,
not only to find potential sites for schools, but
also to conclude lengthy administrative, legal
land technical processes necessary for site
acquisition. Secondly, validation of enrolment
data became an imperative because of internal
shifts in population since initial surveys were
conducted. New housing estates sprang up and
migration of people to urban and sub-urban
areas in search of employment upset demo-
graphic patterns in many areas previously
earmarked for school construction.
Thirdly, in the case of space standards the
government believed that per student alloca-
tion of 1M 2 was rather lavish, and would
become a future economic liability to the
Ministry of Education. Caution was sounded
when downturn in the local economy leading to
severe recessionary times appeared to be
imminent. As a consequence space standards
previously agreed to with the World Bank had
to be renegotiated.
Project management
One of the major distinguishing features of
the Third Education Project was the conditions
which were imposed by the World Bank, and
which had to be met before the loan could
become effective. Loan effectiveness, that is.
eligibility of the borrower (Trinidad and
Tobago) to initiate and continue draw down of
loan funds, was hinged upon two factors that
had a significant bearing on project manage-
ment. They were also contributory to project
failure.
In the loan agreement it is stated that the
borrower shall:
(a) establish and thereafter maintain in its
Ministry of Education an Education Pro-
jects Implementation Unit (E.P.I.U.) in
form and with powers, staffing and
(b) cause E.P.I.U. to be adequately staffed at
all times and shall appoint to it on a full
time basis a Director, a Project Archite
or Engineer, a Quantity Surveyor or Co
Engineer, a Procurement Officer and an
Accountant, all of whom shall be perso;
whose qualifications and experience and
terms and conditions of service shall be
satisfactory to the bank.
(World Bank, 1979a, p. 5
There were problems. however, in recruitn
and retaining the above personnel. A minis-
terial review of the project explained that
'since its inception . . . the E.P.I.tJ. has
experienced great difficulty in recruiting and
retaining professional staff. The Accountant
resigned after four months in the post, the'
Architect after five months and the Procure.
ment Officer after three' (Ministry of Educa-
tion. 1983). Staff retention problems such as.
these were met with dismay by the Bank, but
such difficulties are not uncommon in some
Third World societies. Bacchus (1989), for
example. explains that in small nation state.
such as Trinidad and Tobago initiation of large
scale projects is often frustrated by a shortage
of trained personnel.
Recruitment and retention problems were
manifest not only in the case of the indigenous
E.P.I.U.. but also in the case of the expatriate
team (the Project Management Team). Here is
the rationale given by the Bank for recruitment
of the Project Management Team:
During the project implementation period the E.P.I.U.
(indigenous team) would be coached, trained and
supported by a project management team, the costs o
which would be financed by the project, to ensure the
ttmefy and effective impiemencanon of the project and
to help develop the necessary expertise for the E.P.LU.
to become self-sufficient and capable of managing the
Ministry of Educations educational facilities invest.
merit programmes.
(World Bank. 1979a. p. '_S).
Thirteen months of project implementation
time elapsed, however, before finalization:
of arran gements for engaging the Project
Management Team. Main reasons for the.
delay were difficulties relating to the terms and.
conditions of engagement, legality of taxes to.
be paid, and clarification and interpretation of
the laws of Trinidad and Tobago regarding the;
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ition's eligibility to employ an expatriate
am for project management services.
Although the 13 months lost were • re-
enied' by art approval for extension of
oject implementation time by the Bank, the
rnsfer of technology envisaged in the loan
reement could still not be adequately
alized due to staffing problems in the
unterpart E.P.I.L1 . In an aide-memoire from
World Bank to the Ministry of Education it
LS pointed out that vacancies for key
P.I.t..J. staff remained unfilled' and that this
oblem 'has adversely affected the transfer of
:hnoiogy envisaged as a major component of
project' (World Bank. 1984).
a/err overload
The problems experienced by the Third
lucation Project were also the result of what
ty be described as 'project overload'. Apart
m the project objectives outlined above, the
P.I.t.J. was saddled with some additional
ks too cumbersome for the Units already
Lited human and technical resources. There
however no agreement between the Bank
I the Government regarding the use of the
'.l.U. to undertake additional programmes.
e decision to assign extra implementation
s to the E.P.I.IJ. was therefore unilateral
y the Government.
Ic additional responsibilities assigned to
E.P.I.U. were construction, furnishing and
upping of:
five senior comprehensive schools, rem-
nants of a former project locally referred to
as the Short Term Building Programme;
annexes to four traditional government
secondary schools, to provide additional
student places;
three composite schools, remnants of the
nation's Second Education Project which
had recently been 'concluded' and;
three denominational primary schools under
a special arrangement between the respec-
tive Church and the State.
I addition the E.P.I.U. was charged with
work necessary for upgrading and extend-
facilities in several traditional grammar
ols to allow for curriculum diversification
r what was known as Government's
onal Model Education Programme.3
asons for assignment of additional tasks
te E.P.I.U. may be found in the political
economy of educational planning in Trinidad
and Tobago, as well as in relationships
believed to exist between schooling and the
state. At the time when additional projects
were assigned popular support for the then
government administration was low, and
implementation of extra projects in spite of the
limited implementation capacity of the Minis-
try of Education, appeared to be an urgent
imperative. Failure of the Third Education
Project, together with failure of the 'additional
projects' may have been a contributory factor
in the 1986 defeat of the People's National
Movement (P.N.M.), the political party which
at that time formed the government.
PLANNING AND PROJECT
PERFORMANCE
The Third Education Project discussed
above was planned using rationalistic logic,
guided by a supposedly objective view of the
world in which implementation was to proceed.
Project objectives as outlined were sequentially
and logically defined: the implementational
machinery (for example, E.P.I.U./E.F.M.U.)
was seen a priori as a trouble-free facility;
financial and human resources were deemed
adequate; and the project was to proceed as
the plan directs'. Once the planning process
was concluded there was little room for
manoeuvre of project inputs. Implementation
was construed as a linear process of change,
following plan formulation and preceding
project evaluation. Project success was to be
defined only in terms of fulfilment of
technically stated objectives.
Characteristics such as these conform to the
canons of rationalistic planning and may
become functional only if the social paradigm
within which they reside permits. The circum-
stances of implementation in the Third
Education Project were, however, far from
what was expected. Project implementation
was being attempted in an environment where
there was dysfunctionality between planning
ideology and implementation paradigm. The
rationalist principles upon which the project
was planned did not, and could not, fit into
those elements believed to, but in fact did not,
exist as reality in the irnplernentational
environment of the project. Implementation
on the other hand was riddled with conflict,





ments quite different from those anticipated in
the rational approach used. Square peg in a
round hole' is the local phrase which perhaps
best describes this unfortunate mismatch.
CONCLUSION
One of the main causes of failure of Trinidad
and Tobago's Third Education Project, there-
fore, is to be found in the principles of planning
and implementation that were engaged. Not
only this project, however, but some others in
the Third World which have utilized large sums
of local and foreign capital have also flound-
ered for similar conceptual reasons. The failure
has sometimes been lamented in this way:
Something seems to have gone wrong with educational
planning. Once acclaimed and propagated as one of the
key scraegies to overcome educauonal under-develop-
ment in the countries of the Third World. it has now
become a source of increasing fnistracion and the object
of raising scepticism. Both the assumptions on which it
was based and the models which guided its efforts have
come in for serious questioning, and for some, the gap
between the theory and practise of education planning
has become so vast as to raise serious questions about
the continued utility of this craft.
(Weller. 1982. p. 105)
In spite of observations such as these,
planning and implementation of large scale
education projects in the Third World very
often proceed with insufficient regard for
congruence between plan and social reality.
Since the experience with the Third Education
Project, local attempts have been made to
adjust the planning models on which large
scale education projects in Trinidad and
Tobago are being based. This adjustment, it is
believed, lies at the root of the success which
the government claims the present I.A.D.B.
project, mounted largely to pick up the pieces'
from the Third Education Project, is currently
experiencing. Many of the schools which the
previous Third Education Project failed to
deliver are now being built.
A major feature of the new project is the
extent to which its plan anticipates the kinds of
conflicts, contradictions and problems that
might be expected in the Trinidad and Tobago
society, and tries to engineer these when
encountered towards successful project out-
come. One example will suffice. Because of the
intricacies of site acquisition, the exercise was
withdrawn as normal civil service routine, and
adapted as a citizens' responsibility. That is to
say, a participatory approach rather than a pre-
determined official approach was used; but
more important the method proved to be
effective in accelerating the process of site
acquisition. Acceleration translates into mone-
tary savings, but more significant, leads to
early delivery of the planned educational
service.
Whatever the device used, and however
defined, project success is nevertheless desir-
able. The need for success is also justified by
reason of the large sums of money, local and
foreign, public and private, that often go into
project implementation. The problem for
educational planners and project managers is
to understand what Ravetz (1973) refers to as
the pitfall phenomenon' which frequently
rears its ugly head after project planning, and
to be prepared to deal with it. According to
Carison and Awkerman, failures always result
in a considerable waste of human energy and
fiscal resources, from an efficiency and
effectiveness point of view. Worse, yet, failed
efforts breed disaffection for future planning
efforts and negatively impact the morale of an
organization' (1991).
There may be some good news, however.
Provision of education services may not be
hampered by project failure, but may be
enhanced through engagement of those princi-
ples of planning that are more in conformity
with realities of the local environment.
NOTES
1. In Trinidad and Tobago there are several models of
secondary schools. There are the junior secondary, the
senior comprehensive, the senior secondary. the govern-
ment secondary. the composite. and the traditional
secondary having a grammar school orientation. In the
junior secondary students attend for three years followed
by a minimum of two years in the senior comprehensive or
senior secondary. In all other secondary schools attend-
ance is for a minimum of five consecutive years.
2. E.F.MIJ. and E.P.I.U. refer to one and the same
Unit. The original designation. E.P.I.U.. was changed by
Cabinet decree to E.F.M.U. some time between project
planning and commencement of implementation.
3. The National Model Programme gave effect to the
governmenms policy of adding some technical subjects to
the curriculum in grammar schools. Combination of
existing academic subjects with technical subjects would
impart to the new curriculum in grammar schools the
diversity of knowledge. skill.s and opportunities found in
comprehensive schools, and would result in a common
curriculum for all secondary school students throughout
the nation.
e




a4ains, D. (1987) Paradiamatic contexts of models of
educational planning and decision making. Educational
Planzwig 6. 36-47.
iams, D. (1991) Planning models and paradi gms. In
-Ed.ucaaonal Plannutg: Concepts. Strategies. Practices
(edited by Carison. R. V. and Awkerman, 0.).
cLongman.s, New York.
3acckius, M. K. (1989) Educational needs of small nation
states with special reference to education at the post.
secondary level. Canadian and International Education
18. 5-17.
.E.uison, R. V. and Awkerrnan, 0. (eds) (1991)
Ed.ucazional Planning: Concepts, Strategies, Practices.
Lanemans. New York.
czntsal Statistical Office (1983) Economic Indicators:
October-Decentber. Port of Spain. Trinidad.
torrea. H. ci al. (1986) Proposal for a comparative study
oieducadonal planning. Educational P(anntng 1. 22-23.
edale. R. (1990) international agencies: learning how to
'ideatify and meet needs. International Journal of
_Educaaonal Development 10. 163-168.
cMcGinn, N. et al. (1979) Educational planning as political
process: two case studies from Latin America.
Comparative Education Review 23. 218-239.
\41nistry of Education (1968) Draft Education Plan. Port of
Spain. Trinidad.
'nistsv of Education (1977) Loan Request for Third
Education Project. Port of Spain. Trinidad.
Ministry of Education (1981) Files. Third Education
Project. Port of Spain. Trinidad.
Ministry of Education (1982) Files. Third Education
Project. Port of Spain. Trinidad.
Ministry
 of Education (1983) Files, Third Education
Project. Port of Spain. Trinidad.
Ministry
 of Education (1991) Flies, I.A.D.B. Education
Project. Port of S pain. Trinidad.
Morgan. 0. (1980) Paradi gms, metaphors and pule-
solving in organizational theory. .4dminisrrarion Science
Quarterl y 2.5, 605-622.
Popkewitz. T. S. (1984) Paradigm and IdeologY in
Educational Research. Falmer Press. New York.
Psachar000ulos. 0. (1989) Why education reforms fail: a
comparative anal ysis. International Review of Education
35. 179-195.
Ravetz. I. R. (1973) Scientific Knowledge and Its Social
Problems. Penguin. Middlesex.
UNESCO (1964) Education Planning Mission: Trinidad
and Tooago. UNESCO. Paris.
Weiler. H. N. (1982) Educational planning and social
change: a critical review of concepts and practices. In
Comparative Education ( edited by Aitbach at at.).
Collier Macmillan. London.
Williams. W. (1975) Im plementation analysis and assess-
ment. Policy Analysis 1. 53 1-568.
World Bank (1977) Loan Request. Washington. D.C.
World Bank (1979a) Staff Appraisal Report on Third
Education Project (No. 2430b TRI. Washin gton. D.C.
World Bank (19'9b) Loan .4greament to Third Education
Project (No. 1722 TR). Washington. D.C.
World Bank (1979c) Working Papers o Third Education
Project (Loan 1722 TR). Washin gton. D.C.
World Bank (1984) Aide Memotre (0 Ministry of
Education. Washington. D.C.
